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INDEPENDENCE FOR INDIA?

Compiled by
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PREFACE

It is vital that the West understand the problem of India and its peoples; its ancient and magnificent past and culture; the potentialities inherent in it, to be realized in the future toward which it is painfully struggling. Its population represents an immense section of that of the world; its proximity and relation to the theatre of war gives it today a considerable importance to the United Nations; as a major Eastern nation it will inevitably rate high in the annals of the peace. For the East has come to the dawn of a new place in its own consciousness and in the international life.

"Independence for India" may appear to many thoughtful and impartial observers to imply today not so much "Shall India be free?" as "When and how shall complete Indian self-rule be attained?" For notwithstanding the recent criticalness of Indo-British relations and a considerable opinion as to the benefits of an India within the Empire, with the closer facility for interchange of cultures, economic and other advantages, and a broadened cooperation and comity, contentions at this time concern in considerable measure the readiness of the Indian nation for self-rule, and the immediacy and conditions for granting it. India's determination to attain its complete independence is widespread and deep, if we may judge by its political factors and publicized events. British opinion has given ever-increasing recognition to the eventual necessity of Indian autonomous rule and, officially, practical pledges of its near realization, at least under dominion status. Nevertheless factors remain complicated and involved. The long evolution of Indian nationalism has been marked repeatedly by incidents of intensity and bitter conflict; among these the recent Cripps Mission of 1942, the subsequent civil disobedience movement, mass violence, bloodshed, arrests and other disorders, have been but a culmination which has served to bring to bear upon the situation the attention and concern of the rest of the world. To other Eastern nations the struggles in

India have been reflections of like struggles of their own; and in the United States the widespread interest manifested has fluctuated between the full recognition and acceptance of the position of its British Ally and appeals for Presidential and United Nations' intervention in behalf of India.

In this number of the Reference Shelf the endeavor has been made to present material without bias, and with a full recognition of the sincerity of both nations. The case for each nation has been presented both by its own nationals and from the standpoint of more neutral opinion. An ample bibliography is given to afford the student, inquirer and general reader scope for a selective and helpful basis of additional fact and understanding. The great amount of available literature on India makes desirable the restriction of references in large part to writings of recent issue and present relevance. Both Indian and British writings have been listed more freely than would normally have been the case; the difficulties presented by occasional distant publication sources of desired items will be offset by the availability of these and other materials in many libraries.

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February 5, 1943

JULIA E. JOHNSON

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GENERAL DISCUSSION

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE¹

A peninsular subcontinent of Asia, with thrice the population and considerably more than the area of European Russia, India is the cradle of an ancient civilization. Recent excavations in the Punjab (Harappa) and Sind (Mohenjodaro) have shown that populous cities flourished there about 5,000 years ago, with amenities equal to, and, in some respects, surpassing those of Egypt and Sumeria, the great contemporary centers of civilization. The house planning, systems of drainage, industries and wheeled transport of that "Indus" civilization all betokened high attainment unknown to later ages when the sands of oblivion had shrouded those sites. . . .

India's story is of incessant invasions, the rise and fall of great kingdoms. Emphasis on her underlying unity has persisted throughout these vicissitudes, despite diversity of races, the clash of cultures and the warring ambitions of monarchs. Akin, perhaps, to the Sumerians, the Dravidians—short, stocky, sun-ebonied—are regarded as the oldest inhabitants. Highly cultured in arts and literature though they were, they could not withstand the vigor of disciplined military might as it poured through the North-West Frontier passes in the successive waves of Aryan, Scythian, Pathan and Moghul invaders. That tale was oft repeated.

Like the Saxons who came under Norman yoke, the Dravidians managed to preserve their own institutions and impose some of them on their conquerors—notably the organization of village life through the panchayat, or village council. But the invaders—again like the Normans—with their tribes, clans and families, their elevation of the priest and warrior to high rank in the community, brought notions of caste and the Hindu

¹ From pamphlet "A Picture of India," by Edwin Howard, Journalist, British Adviser on Indian Affairs. British Information Service. New York. [42.] p. 7-11.

social system of which the joint family—a survival of Greek and Roman civilization—was a salient feature. Later, the invading armies of Muslims, who came to dominate Northern India for 700 years till the eighteenth century, added a new culture to the common pool. The caste system was unshaken by them, but they came to share with pride the cultural heritage of the country of their adoption. Of the dynasties before the Muslims came, the Mauryan, in the fourth century before Christ, established an empire which rose to its greatest heights under the Emperors Chandragupta and Asoka, both assiduous patrons of art and literature. The Gupta period is remembered still as the “golden age” of India. The Moghuls, the last of the Muslim conquerors, produced the Emperor Akbar, contemporary of two other great monarchs: Elizabeth of England and Hideyoshi of Japan. Mediaeval splendor, relentless rule, are symbolized in the magnificent buildings which today stand in memory of these Moghuls at Delhi, Lahore, Agra, Allahabad and the tenantless Fatehpur Sikri. The pageant of Rajput valor, to which enduring monuments stand in princely Rajputana, must not be forgotten. A Sikh Empire rose for a time in the north under Maharajah Ranjit Singh in the early nineteenth century. His sway from Lahore over a martial people recalled the glories of the Maharashtra in the South, a century earlier when Sivaji led his Mahratta troops to victory in vindication of the common man's right to patriotic aspirations. In the present war, as in the Great War of 1914-18, descendants of Muslims, Rajputs, Sikhs, Mahrattas, as well as Dogras, Garhwalis, Jats, Pathans, Madrassis, in fine comradeship with their fellows of the British Empire, have well upheld and revived the traditions of their own chivalry.

In those distant days of turbulence, the ideal of a unified India was not convertible into practice. Invasion, with its attendant upheavals, so constantly created distraction. Successive invaders found their predecessors easy prey, weakened by climatic and other enervating influences. Cultural difficulties in themselves were formidable enough. The absence of security put the final and fatal bar to unity.

Now, India, under one monarch, is divided into two well-defined political entities—the 562 Indian states under Indian

rulers, in contractual relations with the British Crown, and the eleven provinces of British India now enjoying responsible self-government ("provincial autonomy"). The proposal to put the coping stone on Indian unity has been accepted by Parliament in the form of a federation of India under a government responsible to a federal legislature composed of representatives of the states and of British India. Plans to that effect were in train, but not completed, on the outbreak of war. The form of federation proposed has not had general support in India. . . .

The British *regime* in India has gone furthest in approach to the ideal of a unified India. This may be because the British have never attempted to unify India by political conquest. They came as traders originally. They remained to organize, not merely a government in India, but, with the help of Indians themselves, a nationalism, instinct with pride, justified by age-old traditions and achievement. They established a rule of law. They gave India a penal code which is recognized as a model of its kind. They refrained from undue interference in the religions and customs of the people. Where reform of such customs was required, care was taken not to proceed too far ahead of public opinion on which reliance was placed for the necessary inspiration. Above all, the British ensured that the different communities, in civil matters, could retain their personal laws, if such existed. So, today, all Hindu India—nearly three-quarters of the population—is governed by caste laws with which the government has never interfered. . . .

Queen Elizabeth's grant in 1600 of a charter to the body of merchants who eventually became the East India Company brought the British to India. From the possession of agencies these merchants advanced to territorial ownership. In 1668 they received from Charles II the gift of Bombay Island, which had come to him from Portugal as part of the dowry of his bride, Catherine of Braganza. After a struggle with the French—an offshoot of the war raging in Europe—the East India Company expanded its influence. Clive's victory at Plassey in 1757 made it master of Bengal. This expansion which had arisen out of rivalry with the French, both nations being involved in the internal feuds between Indian princes, threw on the Com-

pany responsibilities of administration. Parliament grew anxious over evidence of temptations to which profit-seeking merchants had succumbed.

With Warren Hastings as the first Governor of Bengal, an experiment was made in establishing British government in India in 1773. Eleven years later, anxiety still persisting, a Board of Control (ancestor of the India Office) was formed in London to ensure contact between Parliament and the Company in the direction of Indian affairs. In 1833 the Company's trading activities were ended and it received a renewal of its charter as the authority responsible to Parliament for the good government of India. Lord William Bentinck—the abolisher of *sati* (widow self-immolation)—became the first Governor-General of India under this scheme in 1834. It was provided that the door should be opened to the employment of Indians in the administration. In moving the bill embodying the scheme, Lord Macaulay dimly foresaw that experience of administration might lead to a demand from the people of India for European institutions. He added: "Whether such a day will ever come, I know not, but never will I attempt to avert or to retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history."

For nearly a quarter of a century this system held. In 1848 the Punjab was merged into British India after stubbornly fought campaigns. In 1856 Oudh was annexed to become eventually part of the United Provinces. Then came a storm. Its mutterings were first heard at Dum Dum near Calcutta, but on May 10th, 1857, mutiny really broke out at Meerut. The tale of bloodshed is well known with all its loyalties, deeds of desperate valor and its cruelties. The Ganges Valley was chiefly affected. Delhi, Lucknow, Allahabad and Cawnpore played their sad part in the story. It was not a national movement, but primarily a revolt of the Bengal Army.

The shock of the Mutiny to British public opinion led to the transfer of the Company's powers to the British Crown. Viscount Canning, who became the first Viceroy and Governor-General of India, read at Allahabad on November 1st, 1858, Queen Victoria's proclamation announcing her assumption of

the Government of India. In this proclamation Her Majesty declared her will that "our subjects of whatever race or creed be freely and impartially admitted to office in our service." In 1877 the Queen assumed the title of "Empress of India." The proclamation of 1858 marked the completion of the territorial consolidation of British India. The Sikhs who had been gallant foes in war became staunch comrades in peace. They played a conspicuous part in Nicholson's forces which relieved Delhi in the Mutiny.

THE PEOPLE OF INDIA AND THEIR RESOURCES ²

India has both strategic and economic values to the United Nations in their global war. On the defensive side, India provides the last remaining supply route to China and indirectly supports the Persian Gulf route through Iran on which Russia relies for a good part of her supplies from the United Nations. As a result of the shipping shortage, India must supply food and various kinds and amounts of munitions and weapons as well as repair and assemble material for the United Nations forces in the Middle East and Africa. India presents the last geographic barrier, behind the uncertain countries to her west, separating the Nazi hordes from their Japanese partners.

On the offensive side, India can constitute a base for land operations. She has manpower, mostly untrained at present but potentially large in numbers, she is near the enemy fronts and she produces raw materials and food. She also has a manufacturing capacity which is being expanded for turning out many of the smaller weapons of war.

Whether India can fulfil the increasingly important mission which is being placed upon her in this world crisis will depend on her people and their ability and desire as well as upon the encouragement they receive to employ the resources which India possesses. . . .

India is full of striking contrasts, both socially and geographically. It is the land of fabulously wealthy maharajahs

² L. C. Mann, Division of Industrial Economics, National Industrial Conference Board. *Conference Board Economic Record*. 4:289-96. September, 1942.

and of wretchedly poor Hindu untouchables, of the rainy monsoon summers and of the dry windswept winters. It has the towering Himalayas in the north, river depressions south of the mountains and the plateau region of peninsular India in the south. About 225 languages, not considering dialects, are spoken in this subcontinent.

As one commentator has put it, the current political problem of India is how the separate peoples of India can be both independent and united. The separate peoples of Europe have never been able to solve a similar problem although they are more experienced politically than the Indians.

In recognition of Indian help during the First World War and of a growing internal demand for self-government, the British Secretary of State for India announced in August, 1917, that the Crown had adopted a policy "of increasing associations of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." Two years later a Government of India Act was passed by the British Parliament. This act provided for a measure of self-government in the provinces, established a strong central government under the British Crown and stated that the constitutional issue should be reviewed after ten years. A new Government of India Act was passed in 1935. . . .

Federation has hitherto appeared impossible because neither the Indian National Congress nor the Moslem League nor the princes will surrender any of their prerogatives or demands. Instead the two Leagues accuse Britain of fomenting their religious and political differences in order to prevent federation, which would carry with it dominion status. The Indian National Congress felt that the Viceroy and the Indian states, upholding the power of Britain as opposed to native India, were given too much power.

At the outbreak of World War II, dominion status, promised in 1917, had as a consequence not yet been achieved. When England declared war against Germany in 1939, the Dominions voluntarily followed suit, but India was given no choice in the

matter, the British government immediately proclaiming her a belligerent. Finding India automatically at war, and being able to obtain from Britain only a promise of dominion status at an indefinite date after the war, the eight Congress provincial ministers resigned, leaving the Crown-appointed governors in these eight provinces to carry on as best they could without ministries. The Congress Party leaders offered to cooperate in the war providing a national government was formed and a definite date was set for granting India independence. . . .

Although India's area is only slightly more than half that of the United States, its population, approximately 389 million in 1941, is almost three times as large.

During the preceding decade the population of India increased about 15 per cent. The rate of increase, ranging from 10 per cent to 100 per cent, was particularly marked in towns of not less than 100,000 inhabitants.

Of the total area, British India contains 886,000 square miles and the Indian States 690,000 square miles. The population of British India is some 296 million and that of the states is about 93 million.

The huge population of India would appear to supply an inexhaustible source of potential manpower for both industry and the army. Her manpower, however, cannot be measured by numbers of men but by their capacity as individuals.

In 1941, only 47.3 million, or 12 per cent of the people, were classed as being literate, that is, able to read and write. This figure shows a good percentage increase over the 8 per cent of 1931 and 7 per cent of 1921; but, in contrast, during the forty years that the Philippines were under American control, literacy increased from 2 per cent of the population to 55 per cent.

A distinct drawback to the development of Indian mechanical training has been the caste system of the Hindu religion. Although the Moslems do not directly adhere to the caste system, their social organization reflects the customs of the predominant Hindu community. About 68 per cent of the people were registered as Hindu in the last religious census taken in 1931, 22 per cent were Moslems, while the

remaining 10 per cent consisted of Buddhists, Christians, Sikhs, Jains and others. It is not likely that there has been any significant change in this classification since that date.

Hitherto the caste system has greatly impeded the development of the engineering professions, because only the lower castes and untouchables, who number about 40 million persons, are permitted to work with their hands, while only the higher castes receive the technical training at the universities. These theoretically trained engineers have no practical experience and expect helpers to do all the mechanical work for them. Recently, however, some of them have begun to see the absurdity of this situation and many high-caste Indians are being attracted into the mechanical trades by the present extraordinary opportunities for economic advancement.

As for technical training, the average Indians, however bright they may be, have had so little education and background experience in the use of even simple tools such as pocket knives, it is reported, that it will take one or two more generations to make good technicians of them; at present they also lack confidence and initiative, although many of them are skilled in certain hereditary crafts.

It is a well known fact that the vast majority of the Indian people live on agriculture and employ the crudest methods of cultivation. The latest occupational census taken in 1931 showed nearly 68 per cent of the working population of 154 million engaged in the exploitation of animals and vegetation, and only 10 per cent, or 15.4 million, employed in industry. Other important sources of income were domestic service, which accounted for 10.9 million, and trade, which employed 7.9 million. The professional and liberal arts group accounted for only 2.3 million.

An estimate made for 1938 shows little change in this occupational distribution—with about 18 per cent of the people engaged in trade, transport or industry, and 66 per cent in agriculture.

The Hindus, representing more than two-thirds of the total population, are pacifists by nature and religion, while the physical stamina of the southern Indians is low, and the

imperial policy of the British government in keeping the people unarmed has done nothing to develop any latent military ability which might have existed. There is also a sad lack of good material for officers. The educated Hindus lack the necessary belligerence, while the martial men, the Sikhs, the Gurkas and the Punjab Moslems, usually lack the necessary education. In 1937, the armed forces in India consisted of 57,000 officers and men of the British Regular Army, 159,000 of the Indian Army, 19,000 of the Indian frontier forces, 37,000 of the Auxiliary Force (British), and 19,000 of the Indian Territorial Force. The Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun had a capacity for training 200 Indians for commissions as officers at the outbreak of war.

The British have come to regret the policy of having kept the Indian natives untrained and defenseless. The *Calcutta Statesman* declared in 1940, "The number of Indians trained to be airmen or gunners or fitted in any way for mechanical war, or to be officers, is pitiable. We have wasted the years. Let us admit our mistakes and repent rapidly." Even then, in September, 1940, a ban was imposed on the formation of volunteer defense units, which only intensified the restrictions on the right of the Indian people to bear arms.

No conscription has been necessary to build up the army. About one and a half million volunteers have been accepted and many more have had to be turned down because of lack of equipment and instructors. It should be pointed out, however, that the enthusiasm of the Indians in enlisting in the army may not be so much from patriotic fervor as because of the comparatively high rates of pay in relation to the wage of the ordinary Indian worker, who receives less than \$4 a month, out of which he must purchase his food and clothing. . . .

In terms of the total population this army is woefully small when compared with the mobilization which has occurred in the other warring nations.

Arrangements have been made to provide what appears to be, in view of past inadequacies, unprecedented numbers of trained personnel and officers to lead this new army of

India. The British government, after the fall of France, threw all units of the army open to Indians. Two new officers' training schools have been established with an annual capacity exceeding 2,600 officers and a new engineer officers' training school has been equipped to develop experts in the intricate technical problems of modern warfare. . . .

India's economic development is inextricably intertwined with her political history, and the latter helps to explain (1) how industrial progress has been necessitated by the World Wars and (2) how British policy has often hindered Indian development when it became competitive with her own industries and trade.

India was discovered by the Europeans in 1498 when the Portuguese explorer, Vasco de Gama, sailed around the Cape of Good Hope and landed at Calicut, on the southwestern coast of India. In 1505, the Moguls invaded India, and unified the country into a Mogul Empire.

England established her commercial supremacy by means of the British East India Company, which had been chartered by Queen Elizabeth at the end of 1600. After the fall of the Moguls in 1707, this company fought with France for the Indian trade, thus carrying an extension of the European wars to India as well as to North America. The issue at stake was not whether India should be independent of Europe, but whether she should come under the control of the British or the French. The British East India Company's great hero was Baron Robert Clive. When he died in 1774, he had virtually kicked the French out of India, reduced Portuguese holdings to the little fragment called Goa on the west coast, and solidified British domination of India and British friendship with most of the native princes.

The British government began taking over control from the East India Company under Pitts' India Act of 1784, a process which was not completed until 1858. Finally, on January 1, 1877, Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India.

To accomplish this conquest, the British made treaties with many native rulers, who were kept in power in return for their

support of the British Crown. Thus has lasted to this day feudal territories set down in the midst of provinces in which democracy is partly operative.

Before the British conquest, India's economy had been based on agricultural production combined with a highly developed system of handicraft industry, and the country had been practically self-sufficient. After the establishment of British rule, however, Indian economy was rapidly altered to meet the demands for raw materials of the new British manufacturing enterprises which arose with the industrial revolution, and to provide a market for British products. British manufactures were granted virtually free entry into the Indian market, while high tariffs were imposed on Indian handicraft products entering England. As the result of this colonial policy, Indian handicraft industries declined in importance or were commercially eliminated. The basis of the traditional village economy in which farming was supplemented by domestic industry was thus destroyed, and millions of handicraft workers were forced to turn back to the land, causing the terrific overpressure on agriculture which has remained one of the chief problems of modern India.

Faint stirrings of the nationalist movements were felt toward the end of the nineteenth century, but Indian nationalism did not begin to assume importance until World War I. With the cessation of European imports, India was forced to lean upon her own resources and, consequently, made immense industrial progress. To preserve those gains, a series of protective tariffs was enacted, enabling India to develop her cotton textile, iron and steel, sugar, and match industries. A conflict between British and Indian interests developed, because Britain presented a tariff excluding competition only from non-Empire countries, while the Indians had wanted a tariff which would provide protection against the more strongly entrenched British manufacturing interests. The new policy of imperial preference was as unpopular as the old colonial policy had been, and was probably as obstructive to Indian industrial development. It eventually led to the boycott of English cotton goods and the revival of hand weaving.

For example, the development of Indian shipping facilities was prevented because no protection was permitted by the Constitution of 1935, which prohibited any discriminatory legislation against British subjects or interests. Indian shipping companies could not successfully compete with already entrenched British companies, with their powerful political influence. The Indian federal legislature, if it had had the power, might at least have restricted coastal traffic to Indian vessels, just as most countries forbid external competition for their intercoastal shipping.

Although agriculture supports more than 80 per cent of the Indian population, only a little more than a third of the land is cultivated. Crop yields are generally low partly because of insufficient or erratic rainfall and partly because of poor methods of cultivation. Indian farms are small in size, nearly half of them consisting of less than three acres. The farmers live in about 600,000 small villages, from which they work their small and scattered plots. Bound by tradition, many of these peasant farmers are ignorant of progressive methods of agriculture. With almost no capital they must work with inadequate tools and endure a low standard of living.

Much of the farming is for self-sustenance. The leading food crops, rice, wheat and sugar cane, are grown for home consumption and vegetable oils are produced for use in cooking and illumination. Although India ranks among the world's leading producers of these commodities, she has in recent years imported about 1.5 million tons of rice from Burma and has also imported some refined sugar, principally from Java.

Cotton, jute and tea, the principal cash crops of India, are largely produced for export. India's cotton crop, second only to that of the United States, is generally divided between the domestic textile manufacturers and the export trade. It is India's leading cash crop and most valuable export. In the production of jute India holds a virtual monopoly, because of the peculiar climate and soil in the Ganges Delta and the cheap labor which can be used. About half of the jute crop is exported in the raw form while the other half is manufactured into gunny cloth and bags and then exported.

As a result of the Hindu opposition to the killing of animals, India has great numbers of domestic animals, mainly cattle and goats, which are used chiefly as work animals in the tillage of the soil. After death, however, the animals are skinned and this activity has made India one of the world's leading producers of hides and skins, which also rank among her leading exports. Supplying boots and other leather products to the armed forces of the United Nations has now become one of India's leading contributions to the war effort. . . .

India is the second largest producer of manganese in the world, being outranked only by the U.S.S.R. She has also produced fairly large amounts of chrome, iron ore and mica for export. All these commodities are important raw materials for United Nations war production. Her coal output is used to supply her iron and steel industry, which has taken on new significance in the current war. Her copper production, however, supplies only a fraction of her normal domestic needs and she must import all the tin, lead, zinc, and nickel she uses.

India has been ranked as the eighth leading industrial nation of the world. The textile industry is her chief manufacturing industry. The cotton textile industry, which is located chiefly around Bombay and the cotton regions of the Deccan, normally consumes half the cotton grown in India. Some of these textiles have been exported while other types have been imported. Jute processing, the second most important branch of the textile industry, is centered in Calcutta near the jute-growing regions.

A large part of Indian-grown wool is exported unmanufactured but some of it is in normal times made into rugs and carpets in the homes of the far northwest where the domestic form of manufacturing predominates. The textile industries are now providing cloth and turning out uniforms and blankets for the armed forces.

The iron and steel industry, which is concentrated in the Calcutta region, in the pre-war period was able to satisfy only about 60 per cent of domestic needs. A considerable expansion and conversion to production of munitions and weapons has occurred in this industry since the fall of France.

Most of the important electrical developments have taken place during the last fifteen years, and are still few judged by American standards. Of the potential 39 million h.p. in India, only 500,000 h.p. are being utilized. India has great potentialities for the development of electric power, both steam and hydro, but one great drawback to the latter is the seasonal rainfall, necessitating the building of expensive storage facilities.

Inland transportation in India is largely by railroad and the country is well served in this respect since there is an average of one mile of railway for every thirty-eight square miles of land. The Ganges Valley and the western portions of the Deccan are the areas of greatest track density of rail net which focus principally on the leading ports, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and Karachi.

The railroads were originally built by a combination of public and private capital, with the government reserving and exercising the right to buy the lines at the expiration of their contracts, a process which is still going on. At present over 90 per cent of the mileage is owned by the state, some being directly operated by the government while others are managed by companies under contract. Fewer than 5,000 miles are privately owned.

In 1939-40 there were 41,156 miles of railways, of which 29,731 were in British India and 7,131 in the states. The gauges were standard on 21,154 miles; metre on 15,899 miles; and two narrow gauges were in use on 4,103 miles, mainly in branch lines and in hilly regions. The total mileage has now decreased to 41,062 miles, because some tracks were torn up or moved on account of the war.

Although highway competition has to some extent cut into the revenues of the railroads, it has not been nearly so severe as in the United States. Four great trunk lines form the framework with which most of the important roads are linked, except during the monsoons when some of them are impassable. In 1940 there were 64,070 miles of surfaced roads and 221,243 miles of unimproved roads. Many of the "motor" roads in the Himalayas are only wide enough to admit the one-way passage of a "baby Austin" car.

Although India is well linked by air to the rest of the world, the development of local air transportation has been neglected. In 1937, the mileage of regular air routes in India was 8,325, compared with 26,679 in Great Britain, 63,656 in the United States, 38,750 in France, and 31,880 in Germany.

INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND THE WAR ³

The political crisis in India which flared up in March 1942 was merely precipitated by the Japanese advance. It had long been gathering. Open deadlock between the government and its subjects had existed for nearly two years, bitter conflict for as many decades. The struggle in the political arena reflected the clash of deeper forces beneath.

In the last half century a new India had been emerging from the stagnation of an old civilization in decay. For thousands of years India had been subjected to successive waves of conquerors. Now it was awakening to want an independent role in the world as a nation among other nations. Despite the burden of a grievous heritage from the past, barriers of caste, language and religion, widely diverse social and cultural levels, economic backwardness and administrative bifurcation, the advance of national consciousness was unmistakable. If we compare the so-called Indian Mutiny of 1857 with the movement of the modern period, the former rising is seen to be essentially a revolt of the feudal forces to stave off the tide of British conquest which had then been sweeping away the petty princedoms and combating backward social traditions (such as *suttee*); whereas the modern movement is anti-feudal, pro-democratic and nationalist.

This nationalist movement though still in its early stages has already achieved organizational form and programatic definition. What distinguishes the Indian National Congress from any would-be rival organization is not merely its far greater following but its different basis. Congress includes in its membership and following Hindus and Moslems and Sikhs, Brahmins and

³ By Michael Greenberg, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University; member of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. *Pacific Affairs*. 15:164-87. June, 1942.

Untouchables, landlords and peasants, businessmen and workers, intellectuals and illiterates, subjects of "British India" and of the "Native States." Its heterogeneous composition produces frequent internal disagreement and contradiction especially on social policy, but its platform of national independence and democratic self-government in a unified India binds it together. Those observers who have an eye only for the vastness and complexity, the diversity and backwardness of India call to mind the western commentators on China half a generation ago who could see nothing but chaos and warlords. Such pundits were blind to the historical role of the young Chinese Nationalist party, the Kuomintang, and were thus unable to understand how China could be built into a united and powerful nation. The exact situation of the All-India National Congress and the early Kuomintang is not identical; but their historical significance is similar. Sun Yat-senism successfully challenged the Manchu Empire, the warlords, the "unequal treaties." The rise of the Indian National Congress challenges the continuation not only of British rule in India, but of the princes, of caste, of every kind of anti-nationalist particularism, of old India. The handwriting on the wall has not escaped the more alert British observers. In a report published in 1941 after two years spent in India a British political observer wrote as follows:

In 1753 after a visit to Paris, Lord Chesterfield wrote: "All the symptoms which I have ever met with in history, previous to great changes and revolutions in government, exist and daily increase in France"; and a rather similar observation forms itself in the mind of a visitor to contemporary India.

It is beyond the scope of this article to trace the development of the Indian nationalist movement over half a century of complex growth. But it is important for our purpose, which is to throw light on the current situation, to note the successive trends which have gone to give the movement its present character. Otherwise one cannot grasp the significance of the comment by the London *Economist* (December 26, 1941) that it was "a misfortune that Indian nationalism now is not what it was in 1885 or 1909."

The transformation of the National Congress from a creature of officialdom (it was founded in 1885 by an English ex-official with the encouragement of the Viceroy) with extremely limited aims and membership into the main focus of Indian nationalism was not accomplished gradually but in a series of waves of unrest, each of greater intensity than the previous one. In its earliest phase, for some twenty years after its foundation, Congress made no claim for Indian self-government in any form. It sought only to reform the existing government apparatus so as to permit a greater degree of Indian representation in the administrative personnel. This desire expressed faithfully the ideology of its membership, a few thousand western-educated Indians—lawyers, doctors, engineers and the like—who so far from challenging British rule looked to it as an ally in the battle for education and modernization against obscurantism and backwardness in India. Nevertheless the British official attitude toward Congress soon turned from patronage to hostility. In 1900, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, wrote to the Secretary of State "My own belief is that Congress is tottering to its fall, and one of my great ambitions while in India is to assist it to a peaceful demise." (Ronaldshay, *Life of Lord Curzon*, Vol. II, p. 151)

As it became evident that there was no avenue of national advance along the lines then being followed by Congress, a new school of nationalists arose which criticized the "Moderates" and their leader Gokhale, and demanded a more positive platform including a break with the British. This new school, under the leadership of B. G. Tilak, called itself "orthodox nationalist," but became generally known as "the Extremists" in opposition to the old "Moderates." The Extremists called for a break not only with the British rulers but with all things western. Regarding the upper-class Moderates as "denationalized" imitators of British social customs and thought, they denounced "westernization" and sought to revive a somewhat idealized ancient Hindu culture. (This combination of metaphysics and militancy left enduring marks on Congress where it reappeared in a later and more sophisticated form in the shape of Gandhism.) While the Extremists attracted many new groups especially among the students and impoverished intel-

lectuals, they alienated others who though eager for stronger action disliked obscurantism.

Tactically, the Extremists relied on the method of individual terrorism and assassination. But when after 1905 the first great wave of nationalist agitation swept forward, it chose a very modern weapon—economic boycott. A national boycott of foreign goods was proclaimed on August 7, 1905 in answer to Curzon's plan of partitioning the province of Bengal where nationalism was most developed. Another stimulus to the rapid advance of the nationalist movement was the victory of Japan over Tsarist Russia, the first defeat in modern time of a European power by an Asiatic. In 1906 the Calcutta Congress (Congress meets each year at a different place) adopted a new platform. For the first time *Swaraj*, defined as self-government within the British Empire, was proclaimed as the nationalist goal. The following year saw the Moderates split away from the Extremists. (They reunited with the Extremists in 1916, but left Congress again in 1918 to form the Indian Liberal Federation.) Meanwhile the government took steps to check the growing unrest.

The second wave of national agitation in India followed in the wake of the First World War, which shook the foundations of imperial relations, bringing down several empires—the Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian and German. At each of its four annual sessions from 1914-18, the Indian National Congress, under Moderate influence, proclaimed its loyal support of Britain and the war effort. But as the war progressed there were increasing signs of growing unrest, such as the Ghadr movement in the Punjab and mutinies in the Indian Army. How seriously this movement was regarded is indicated by the appointment in 1917 of the Rowlatt Committee to inquire into "the criminal conspiracies connected with the revolutionary movements in India."

In 1919 the Indian situation came to a head. By January, 125,000 textile workers in Bombay were out on strike. Tilak, deputed by Congress to represent it at the Peace Conference at Versailles, was refused a passport by the British government. In March the government hastened to enact the Rowlatt Acts,

whose extraordinary repressive powers roused widespread opposition. Gandhi, now coming to the fore as the most influential leader in Congress, began to develop a technique of mass civil disobedience. A *hartal* (suspension of all business activity) was called for April 6. Throughout March and April, strikes, demonstrations and in some cases rioting spread all over the country. The official government report ("India in 1919") points out that "One noticeable feature of the general excitement was the unprecedented fraternization between the Hindus and Moslems. *Their union, between the leaders, had now for long been a fixed plan of the nationalist platform.*" [My italics—M. G.] In 1920 the unrest intensified. At the Calcutta Congress in September a plan was adopted of "non-violent non-cooperation," envisaging the triple boycott of legislatures, law-courts and schools, and leading to the final stage of non-payment of taxes. "The movement assumed the undeniable character of an organized revolt against the British raj" (Chirol, *India*, 1926, p. 207). Finally at the Nagpur Congress of December 1920, a new and still vague program was adopted, "the attainment of *Swaraj* by peaceful and legitimate means." Organizationally, Congress began to develop the machinery of a mass party, with local units reaching down to the villages and a Working Executive Committee of fifteen. Congress had now attained the character of a popular party engaged in organizing millions in a struggle against the (British) government and for the realization of self-government along democratic lines. This position Congress has maintained and extended throughout the subsequent ebb and flow of its fortunes.

For the next significant development in the program of the Indian nationalist movement we must leap over half a decade during which Congress recovered from the collapse of Gandhi's civil disobedience campaign in 1922. Toward the end of 1927 the British government announced that it was sending out the Simon Commission to reconsider India's future constitution. The Madras Congress at the end of that year indicated the emergence of new leftward tendencies in the nationalist movement, especially among its younger adherents. Two of these young leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas

Chandra Bose, were appointed General Secretaries of Congress at Madras, where it was also decided to boycott the Simon Commission.

In 1928 a new wave of nationalist agitation developed. The Simon Commission was greeted on its arrival in India with hostile demonstrations. The growing labor movement carried out a series of huge strikes. The newly developed youth and student organizations made considerable headway. On October 31, 1929, the Viceroy made the first official reference to "dominion status" as the "natural issue of India's constitutional progress" but refused to promise any immediate scheme for realizing dominion status. Accordingly, at the Lahore Congress held in December 1929, new steps were taken. Henceforth *Purna Swaraj* or complete independence was declared to be the goal of India. On January 1, 1930 the flag of Independent India (green, white and red) was unfurled. On January 26 the first annual Independence Day was celebrated all over India in vast public meetings. The Congress Committee was authorized to launch a civil disobedience program, including non-payment of taxes. The following April, Gandhi's well-publicized Salt March on Dandi let loose a mass movement which went far beyond the limits conceived by the Mahatma.

It is not necessary for our purpose to narrate the turbulent events of 1930-34, in which Congress in spite of its attempted suppression evoked such resources of popular enthusiasm and support as to presage future success. The Irwin-Gandhi pact itself whereby the Viceroy had been compelled to sign a public agreement with the leader of the National Congress which it had previously declared illegal and sought to crush, was undoubtedly an admission of the strength of Congress. The subsequent repression of 1932-3 exceeded that of 1930-1. According to Congress figures in April 1933, there were 120,000 political prisoners. (In 1931, Congress figures gave 90,000 arrests, official records 60,000.) In 1934, the civil disobedience campaign was called off. Registered membership of Congress fell to below half a million. Yet within two years the nationalist movement was advancing again. By 1937 the membership of Congress was three million; by the Tripuri Congress in 1939

it reached five million. The Indian National Congress had proved too vigorous and grown too powerful to be suppressed.

Thus at the opening of World War II, the All-India National Congress stood as easily the most powerful organization in the country, with a clearcut program of complete national independence and a strategy of "non-violent non-cooperation" with the government. It had also developed certain political principles opposing sectionalism, communal representation and all forms of particularism which promoted division among Indians and were therefore anti-nationalist. But these will be best considered in relation to the battles over the Constitution of 1935 and subsequent British proposals which were the immediate forerunners of the draft plan presented by Cripps.

Contrary to widespread belief, especially in America, the British response to the rising tide of Indian nationalism was not confined to repression. It included also aware adaptation of policy and careful experiment. Just as the 1857 Mutiny was followed by a turning away from the early nineteenth century policy with its vigorous innovating spirit culminating in Dalhousie's Viceroyalty, and by a radical change of attitude to the princes and other conservative pillars of Indian society; so the rise of the Congress after 1905 was attentively watched by British statesmen and the nationalist demands met by a declaration of changed constitutional policy. First adumbrated in the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 (The India Councils Act), it was definitively formulated in August 1917 at a dark hour in World War I in what came to be known as the Montagu Declaration. Its operative section ran as follows:

The policy of His Majesty's Government is that of increasing the association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. . . . Progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government and the Government of India must be judges of the time and measure of each advance.

The implementation of the new policy was cautious and gradual, spreading over the entire inter-war period, and was accompanied by controversy in England and conflict in India.

Two legislative measures were enacted in 1919 and in 1935, in the effort to devise new constitutional arrangements embodying the "self-governing institutions" of which the Montagu Declaration had spoken.

The first, the Government of India Act of 1919, introduced into British India a system known as dyarchy. Ten years after its enactment, the defects of dyarchy were mercilessly exposed by the Simon Report itself and need not here detain us.

The second constitutional scheme, embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935, was brought into operation in 1937 and is theoretically still in force, though actually suspended since the outbreak of the war in September 1939. It was unanimously rejected by Indian opinion, not only by the National Congress but by the Liberal Federation, which saw in it not a scheme for self-government but for maintaining British rule in the new political conditions no longer by reliance on the "official bloc" but by the use of the princes and communal organizations. It is important to examine the nature of Indian opposition to the 1935 Constitution because it throws light on the refusal to accept the current Cripps plan.

The provisions of the 1935 Constitution consisted of two parts, the Federal and Provincial. The proposed "Federation" was a new departure in that it provided for an All-India central government uniting both "British India" and the "Indian States." The Federal Chamber was to consist of two Houses, in which the princes were to nominate two-fifths and one-third of the members. Elaborate weighting governed the choice of elected members. Seats were allocated to prescribed groups, Moslems, Sikhs, "scheduled castes," women, Anglo-Indians, Labor, etc. In the Upper House, only 75 out of 260 seats were open to general election; in the Lower House only 86 seats out of 375. In the Upper House the electorate was restricted to about 0.05 of the population of British India; in the lower it was about one-ninth. The powers of these legislatures were extremely limited. Defense and foreign policy were reserved for the Viceroy; financial policy and control of bureaucracy and police were also excluded from the competence of the Assemblies. No legislation could be passed on certain prescribed topics.

The Viceroy had wide discretionary powers including the right to veto any legislation, dismiss ministers, pass legislation rejected by the legislatures, dissolve the legislatures and suspend the Constitution.

The provincial section of the Constitution, applicable only to the eleven provinces of British India, was somewhat less narrow. There were no appointees of the princes. The Legislatures were wholly elected, though the franchise for the Upper House was very restricted. There were no reserved topics except that the secret police were under the control of the Governor, who also had full emergency powers, if he thought the "tranquillity of the province is endangered." The provinces thus offered some limited possibilities for popular governments. The seats in the Assemblies were allocated to communal groups as at the center, but 657 "general seats" were left open out of the 1585 in the eleven provinces. It was therefore possible for the National Congress, while opposing the Constitution, to participate in the first provincial elections in 1937, in which it proceeded to win majorities in seven (later eight) out of the eleven provinces.

But from the point of view of nationalist aspirations, the crux of the Constitution was the federation not the provinces. The provincial cabinets could handle only local issues, and Congress regarded the formation of its ministries in the eight provinces only as means of improving the strategic position of the national movement in the real battle for its declared aim of independence. While political unification of India was held indispensable to Indian political, social and economic advance as a modern nation, the conception of federation in the Act was regarded as a scheme for perpetuating division since the federal law did not apply to the eighty million subjects of the princes. The weight of representation allotted to the princes was out of proportion to the size of their states, or the ratio of their populations, which total less than a quarter of that of All-India. The princes' nominees were not elected and were responsible only to the autocratic prince. Lastly, sovereignty did not lie with the federation but outside it, with the British Crown-in-Parliament at London, to which the British govern-

ment was responsible; the Viceroy and Secretary of State for India being in turn appointees responsible only to the British government in London.

Democrats in England joined Indians in condemning the "federation" as a denial of democracy and a travesty of "responsible" government. Thus the noted British constitutional historian, Professor A. Berriedale Keith, wrote in his *Constitutional History of India, 1600-1935*:

For the federal scheme it is difficult to feel any satisfaction . . . it is too obvious that on the British side the scheme is favored in order to provide an element of pure conservatism in order to combat any dangerous elements of democracy contributed by British India. . . . It is difficult to deny the contention in India that federation was largely evoked by the desire to evade the issue of extending responsible government to the central government of British India. Moreover, the withholding of defence and external affairs from federal control, inevitable as the course is, renders the alleged concession of responsibility all but meaningless.

From the standpoint of Indian nationalism the Constitution of 1935 had another sinister aspect. The whole theory of communal representation according to religious and social groups was regarded as designed to disrupt *national* consciousness and thus constituted a menace to India's growth as a nation.

In its election Manifesto of August 1936 Congress declared communalism unacceptable, "as being inconsistent with independence and the principles of democracy. It encourages fissiparous and disruptive tendencies. It hinders the normal growth and consideration of economic and social questions. It is a barrier to national progress, and strikes at the root of Indian unity."

The development in recent years of separatist communal organizations, in particular the Hindu Mahasabha and the Moslem League, strengthened Congress suspicions of the direction of British administrative and constitutional policy. The obvious bearing of this trend on the Cripps negotiations will be discussed below.

Parallel with the crystallization of Congress policy toward communalism came the definition of its attitude toward the

563 princedoms, the "Indian States." In the past, Congress though claiming to be an all-India national body, had voluntarily refrained from organizing nationalist agitation among the 80 million subjects of the princes. But the central role assigned to the princes in the Federal Constitution of 1935 compelled Congress to take up a fight for democratic government and against the perpetuation of these autocratic enclaves. When in 1938-9 a number of princes ruthlessly crushed the first beginnings of a popular, nationalist movement inside their domains, Congress rallied to the support of these movements. At its Haripuri meeting in 1938 the following principle was laid down:

The Congress stands for the same political, social and economic freedom in the States as in the rest of India and considers the States as an integral part of India which cannot be separated. The Purna Swaraj or complete independence which is the objective of Congress is for the whole of India, inclusive of the States, for the integrity and unity of India must be maintained in freedom as it has been maintained in subjection.

The only kind of federation that can be acceptable to Congress is one in which the States participate as free units enjoying the same measure of democracy and freedom as in the rest of India.

Thus, on the eve of the war, the All-India National Congress as a result of its experience with the constitutional scheme of 1935, had added two corollaries to its ten-year-old program of complete national independence—opposition to communal representation and to preservation of princely power.

The outbreak of European war in 1939 and the course of the war in the two years following brought profound changes not only in the position of Britain as a world power but in the relation of political forces within the Empire and inside England itself. At the same time, British utilization of Indian troops in the Near East and the important place assigned to India as headquarters of the Eastern (Empire) Supply Group lent a new international significance to the attitude of the Indian nationalist movement, even before the entry of Japan into the war gave it military urgency.

On September 3, 1939, within a few hours of the British Declaration of War on Germany, the Viceroy declared India a belligerent and issued an ordinance containing the most stringent powers for the suppression of internal disorder. On September 11, he announced that the completion of the federal constitution under the 1935 Act would be suspended for the duration.

On September 14, the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress issued its reply. While condemning Nazi aggression, it criticized the British government for declaring India a belligerent and promulgating ordinances affecting the Indian people without Indian consent. But it then added:

If Great Britain fights for the maintenance and extension of democracy, then she must necessarily end imperialism in her own possessions and establish full democracy in India, and the Indian people must have the right of self-determination to frame their own constitution through a Constituent Assembly without external interference, and must guide their own policy. A free and democratic India will gladly associate herself with other free nations for mutual defence against aggression and for economic cooperation.

This preliminary clash between the British government and Congress was followed on October 2 by a one-day political strike of 90,000 workers in Bombay. On October 17, the Viceroy replied to the demand for self-government with a statement published in London as a White Paper (Cmd. 6121). His only contribution was a proposal to establish "a consultative group" to include Indian representatives. He also reaffirmed the pledge of future dominion status first made ten years earlier by Lord Halifax (Irwin) as Viceroy.

The effect of this statement was to widen the breach with the Indian nationalist movement. Gandhi declared that the White Paper showed clearly "that there will be no democracy for India if Britain can prevent it." On October 27, Congress termed the Viceroy's offer "unsatisfactory" and ordered the Congress ministries in the provinces to resign. At its plenary session held at Ramargh the following March it resolved that:

Nothing short of complete independence can be accepted by the people of India. Indian freedom cannot exist within the orbit of im-

perialism, and dominion status or any other status within the imperial structure is wholly inapplicable to India, is not in keeping with the dignity of a great nation and would bind India in many ways to British politics and economic structure. The people of India alone can properly shape their own constitution and determine their relations to the other countries of the world, through a constituent assembly elected on the basis of adult suffrage.

It then went on to say that the preliminary step of withdrawing its ministries from the provinces "must naturally be followed by civil disobedience . . . to enforce Congress determination to free India from foreign domination."

This threat to launch a civil disobedience campaign was checked by two events, the downfall of the Chamberlain government and the opening of the Nazi blitzkrieg. On May 20, Nehru said: "Launching a civil disobedience campaign at a time when Britain is engaged in a life and death struggle would be an act derogatory to India's honor." Similarly, Gandhi stated: "We do not seek our independence out of Britain's ruin. That is not the way of non-violence."

On July 27, the All-India Congress Committee in a conference at Poona which was not attended by Gandhi went so far as to declare that Gandhi's principle of non-violence did not apply to international disputes. This was virtually an offer of cooperation with Britain in the war provided Congress' demands for independence and self-government were conceded.

But the Viceroy's reply of August 8 added little to the statement of October 1939, except that it offered to include a number of representative Indians on his Executive Council as well as in his consultative Council. Wherefore, on September 15, 1940, Congress withdrew its offer of conditional cooperation and invited Gandhi to resume its leadership. The latter began to prepare a campaign of limited civil disobedience. The government's reply was to arrest several thousand Congress leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru, but not Gandhi who was demonstrating his ability to keep the movement within very limited bounds. The Viceroy's subsequent reconstitution of his Executive Council to include more Indian members failed to change the nationalist policy of non-cooperation with the gov-

ernment. From October 1940 onwards the political deadlock in India was complete.

The spread of war to the U.S.S.R. and Southeast Asia produced a new situation and compelled a new approach.

It was in this context that the British government decided to open negotiations with Indian political leaders through the agency of Sir Stafford Cripps.

From the above account can be seen the extent of the chasm which the Cripps negotiations were to bridge. On the one hand, the Indian nationalist movement had evolved a mass organization, the National Congress, with a program of complete independence, democratic self-government and a united India, which had proved itself powerful enough to paralyze the country by the technique of civil disobedience, which had swept the polls at the first elections despite adverse electoral conditions, and which regarded British constitutional policy as determined to utilize the two counterweights of communalism and the princes to frustrate nationalist aims. On the other hand, the pattern of British policy had been modified to embrace the principle of dominion status but still maintained the thesis that it could not hand over the government of India to Indians unless the latter first solved their communal differences, that Britain was bound by its treaties with the princes to safeguard their position as well as by its pledges to protect minority groups against majority rule. Here were two sets of principles diametrically opposed to one another. The question was whether the pressure of war would produce a plan which would resolve the divergence or exacerbate it.

THE INDIAN TRAGEDY ⁴

A tragic situation in India involving bitterness, repression and violence as well as grave added dangers for future hopes of peace and democracy is rendered doubly tragic by reason of the fact that men of good will both in Britain and India are

⁴ By Bertram Pickard, former Secretary of the Friends Center in Geneva (1926-1940). Memorandum prepared for the Peace Section of the American Friends Service Committee. 13p. mime. August, 1942.

in substantial agreement concerning ends, but unable to agree about the best means of reaching those ends.

I think it may be affirmed, despite some harsh things said on both sides of the controversy in recent months, that the goal of a free India taking her rightful place in a community of free nations just as soon as is conceivably possible is desired ardently by the Congress leaders and those who share their views on the one hand, and by Sir Stafford Cripps together with progressively minded elements in British public life, on the other.

But, opinion is divided (and divisions are apparent both in India and Britain) among those equally concerned for Indian independence as to how, in the present tangled situation, progress toward the goal may best be realized.

It is not my purpose, in this memorandum, to express personal opinions, or judgments, either as to what might have been done to avoid the present impasse, or what might now be done to break the deadlock. My sole purpose is to set forth briefly some of the salient events and arguments as objectively as possible in the hope of furnishing data, helpful in the formation of judgments, whether moral or political.

For years the Congress Party had expressed strong opposition to India being involved in war measures except with the consent of the Indian people.

When, therefore, the Viceroy (who had the constitutional right to do so since Foreign Affairs and Defence lay outside popular control) declared India to be at war the Working Committee of the Congress Party issued (September 15, 1939) an important manifesto. Congress members had earlier (August, 1939) been withdrawn from the Central Assembly as a protest against Indian troops being sent out of the country without the consent of the Legislature.

The Congress Manifesto included the following points:

1. Protest that India should be deemed a belligerent without her consent.
2. Denunciation of Nazism and Fascism.

3. Claim that Britain's avowed war aims should imply the end of imperialism in her own possessions, and that the Indian people should be granted self-determination through the instrumentality of a constituent assembly.

4. Demand that Britain should make a clear statement of "how these aims are going to apply to India and to be given effect to in the present."

Both in the autumn of 1939 and early 1940 the Viceroy (Lord Linlithgow) interviewed representative Indian leaders, including Mr. Gandhi with whom he had a friendly conversation. He emphasized that "full dominion status in accordance with the Statute of Westminster" was the goal and that it was the intention at the close of the war to make the necessary modifications of the 1935 Act in consultation with representatives "of the several communities, parties and interests in India."

In March 1940 both the Congress Party and the Moslem League defined their positions. The former insisted that nothing short of complete independence was acceptable and that "no permanent solution is possible except through a Constituent Assembly, where the rights of all recognized minorities will be fully protected by agreement, as far as possible."

The latter reiterated its previous stand against a federal solution and announced the adoption of the Pakistan scheme as a basic principle (i.e. the areas in which Moslems are numerically in a majority to be grouped to constitute separate states in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign).

The Chamber of Princes (also March, 1940) welcomed the promise of dominion status, but stated that there must be "essential guarantees and safeguards for the preservation and sovereignty and autonomy of the states, and the protection of their rights arising from treaties, etc."

In July 1940 being "more than ever convinced that the acknowledgement by Great Britain of the complete independence of India is the only solution," the British government was urged:

1. To make an "unequivocal declaration" in that sense.

2. To constitute at the center "a provisional national government . . . such as to command the confidence of all elected members in the central legislature, and secure the closest cooperation of responsible governments in the provinces."

If such steps were taken, then the Congress Committee pledged full support of "efforts for the effective organization in the defence of the country."

This offer was made with a time limit after which it would lapse.

In what became known later as the "August proposals," the Viceroy (August, 1940) stated he was authorized to invite representative Indians to his Executive Council and to establish a War Advisory Council. He reaffirmed the British government's determination to fulfill its obligations to minorities, but declared that they would welcome, as soon as possible, after the end of the war, the setting up of a representative body to devise the framework of a new constitution.

The Congress Party rejected the proposals as basis for discussion, declaring them to be "totally at variance . . . with the objective of Congress."

Mr. Jinnah saw the Viceroy but while approving the reference to minorities stated that the Moslem League could not accept the particular proposal concerning the expansion of the Executive Council.

In September 1940 the All-India Congress Committee stated its regret that its July offer had not been accepted and invited Mr. Gandhi "to guide the Congress in the action that should be taken."

A campaign of limited (or "symbolic" as it has sometimes been called) civil disobedience was subsequently started, Mr. Gandhi explaining to the Viceroy personally the nature of the campaign which was designed, so it would seem, to press India's claim to immediate freedom and her opposition to participation in the war, though without carrying such opposition to the point of endangering the whole war effort in India.

Before long, as a result of defying an ordinance forbidding public opposition to the war, some 12,000 men and women were

imprisoned, or detained. These included 6 ex-Premiers, 29 ex-Cabinet Ministers, 290 members of Provincial Legislatures; also Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, Dr. Azad, and most of the Congress Party leaders (but not Mr. Gandhi).

The situation deteriorated rapidly, and the Viceroy stated he would not proceed with the expansion of his Council though the offer remained open.

Hope that a new attempt at settlement might be made resulted from a move by the so-called "Moderates" (i.e. political leaders outside the Congress Party and the Moslem League). In March 1941 a conference, under the chairmanship of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, made the following proposals: 1. Reconstruction of the Viceroy's Council in such a way as to place it virtually on a dominion government basis; 2. The British government to declare that within a specified time after the war, India "will attain the same measure of freedom as will be enjoyed by Britain and the Dominions."

The British government did not feel these suggestions had the necessary backing to furnish the basis for new negotiations; but, in July 1941, the Viceroy enlarged his Council by the inclusion of five non-official Indians of repute and experience, which gave the non-official Indians a majority in the Council for the first time. A war Advisory Council was also created, including representatives from the Indian States. Both the Congress and Moslem League held aloof.

Tension was increased when, following his return from his historic meeting with President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill stated, in the House of Commons (September, 1941) that the Atlantic Charter did "not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India and Burma or other parts of the British Empire."

At the beginning of December 1941, however, the government of India released most of the Congress Party leaders including Mr. Nehru; and seizing this new evidence of relaxation in tension, Sir Tej Sapru and other liberals appealed directly to Mr. Churchill to take "some bold stroke of far-sighted states-

manship" since it was essential to transform "the entire spirit and outlook of administration in India."

Before the end of the year Mr. Gandhi asked to be relieved from the responsibility laid upon him by the September 1940 Resolution. This was agreed to by the Congress Working Committee. Civil disobedience based on non-violence ceased to be the official policy of the Congress Party. It was generally assumed in India that the door to negotiation was open again.

The Moslem League, evidently foreseeing a new attempt at settlement, warned Britain that any departure from the spirit of the "August Proposals" (which stressed the safeguarding of minorities) would "constitute a gross breach of faith with Moslem India." The League strongly reiterated its opposition to the conception of a central government for India "with the Mussulmans as an all-India minority." Such a solution would be resisted "with all the force at their command." But they were prepared to cooperate in defending India "on the basis that a real share of the responsibility is given in the government at the center and in the provinces within the framework of the present constitution."

In February 1942 a profound impression was made in India, Great Britain and elsewhere by the visit to India of General and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, and by the former's "appeal" to Britain and India.

Evidently some important new development was brewing; as in fact a reply (delayed through absence in the United States) from Mr. Churchill to Sir Tej Sapru that same month indicated.

With an eye doubtless on forthcoming negotiations various bodies in India announced their respective attitudes. The All-India Azad Board denied that the Moslem League had the right to speak for all Moslems and demanded immediate recognition of India's freedom and transfer of real power. The All-India *Momin* Conference (Moslem agricultural workers and weavers) similarly challenged Mr. Jinnah's leadership and urged immediate freedom for India. While Moslem groups repudiated the Moslem League the President of the Hindu Mahasabha (Mr. Savarkar) cabled Mr. Churchill urging "co-partnership equal with Britain in an Indo-British Commonwealth" and repudiating the

Congress claims to represent the Hindu interest stating that "Hindu representation must be strictly in proportion to their population strength in relation to Moslems."

It was in this situation that Sir Stafford Cripps undertook to go to India, where he had had direct and friendly contact with the Congress Party and other leaders earlier in the war, as the bearer of a Cabinet scheme and as Mr. Churchill put it in his statement in the House of Commons of March 11, 1942, "to satisfy himself upon the spot, by personal consultations, that the conclusions upon which we are agreed, and which we believe represent a just and final solution, will achieve their purpose." Sir Stafford arrived in India on March 22, 1942, and spent the first week in talks with Indian leaders, following initial consultation with the Viceroy and General Wavell, Commander in Chief for India.

On March 30, 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps made public the British Draft Proposals as follows:

His Majesty's Government, having considered the anxieties expressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of the promises made in regard to the future of India, have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realisation of self-government in India.

The object is the creation of a new Indian union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.

His Majesty's Government therefore make the following declaration:

(a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India.

(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian States in the Constitution-making body.

(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed, subject only to:

(1) The right of any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new Constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides.

With such non-acceding provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution giving them the same full status as the Indian union and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.

(2) The signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the Constitution-making body. This treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands. It will make provision in accordance with the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government for the protection of racial and religious minorities, but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian union to decide in the future its relationship to the other member States of the British Commonwealth.

Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrangements so far as this may be required in the new situation.

(d) The Constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:

Immediately upon the result being known of the provincial elections, which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of the Constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college.

Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of the representatives of British India as a whole and with the same powers as the British Indian members.

(e) During the critical period which now faces India and until the new Constitution can be framed, His Majesty's Government inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain control and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war effort, but the task of organising to the full the military, moral, and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the cooperation of the peoples of India.

His Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth, and of the United Nations. Thus will they be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India.

It is not possible to summarize briefly the various replies to the British proposals. But, before stating in more detail the attitude of the Congress Party with whose representatives alone Sir Stafford Cripps conducted lengthy negotiations, the attitude of other groups may be mentioned in a few words.

The India States Delegation (April 10, 1942) through a resolution of the Chamber of Princes stated its willingness (assuming certain safeguards) to proceed with discussions and negotiations on the basis of the Draft.

Similarly the Moderate leaders (in a memorandum by Sir Tej Sapru and Mr. M. R. Jayakar, April 5, 1942) were ready to accept the Draft as basis for discussion, though expressing grave doubts about the possibility of more than one federal union being formed; and urging the greatest importance to the immediate transfer of real power to the central government, and to the inclusion of an Indian Defence member in the Executive Council, while admitting the impracticability of "the transfer of absolute control over defence at the present juncture."

The Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikh All-Parties Committee and the representatives of the Depressed Classes rejected the proposals outright. The first mentioned because some essential features were wholly or partially unacceptable; the second because, it was held, the cause of the Sikh community had been lamentably betrayed by the provision to permit the separation of the Punjab (with its Moslem majority) from All-India union; the third because the scheme was calculated to do the greatest harm to the Depressed Classes and to place them under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule.

Finally, the Moslem League, despite the inclusion of the Pakistan concept in the scheme, was unwilling that Moslems should be compelled to enter a constitution-making body whose main object was the creation of a single Indian union. Moreover, the League objected to various questions of procedure both regarding elections and the determination of the right of secession. Finally, the suggestions for interim arrangements were found to be too little defined to warrant a definite judgment. (One has the impression that Mr. Jinnah was glad to let the Congress Party shoulder the main responsibility for turning these down.)

Reading between the lines of the correspondence between Sir Stafford and Dr. Azad (the Working Committee's chairman) one has the impression that strong and sincere efforts were made on both sides to reach agreement but that the gulf which still separated the respective positions was never as nearly bridged as some of the news and radio commentaries led us to believe at the time.

In the Resolution of the Working Committee, sent to Sir Stafford Cripps on April 2, 1942, but only made public on April 11, 1942, when negotiations had been finally broken off, criticism is made both of the long-term and short-term arrangements proposed.

In connection with the former it is argued that the treatment of 90,000,000 people in the Indian States as commodities at the disposal of their rulers was a negation both of democracy and self-determination. Furthermore, that the acceptance in advance of the novel principle of non-accession for a province was a severe blow to the conception of Indian unity and injurious to the future organization of the world after the war.

But, however important these matters may have seemed to the Working Committee, the chief debate during those crucial days centered particularly around the question of the short-term (or wartime) arrangements proposed (i.e. Clause "e" of the Draft).

The Congress leaders insisted upon two points: 1. that the effective control over the defence of India should be vested in the Indian national government; 2. that such a national government should in fact be a cabinet government with full power, the Viceroy remaining as a constitutional head merely.

The margin of difference in the two attitudes to defence appears to have been diminished considerably, but deadlock supervened over the question of the precise degree of responsibility to be borne respectively by an Indian Defence Minister and the Commander-in-Chief who, as both parties agreed, must remain in supreme control of the armed forces with full latitude in military operations.

As to the more basic question of the transfer of authority the Working Committee demanded a degree of independence for the national government which it claimed could be achieved

without immediate fundamental constitutional changes, but which the British government claimed could not. The Committee argued that unless a demonstrably national government were formed the Indian people could have no sense of defending their newly-won freedom. Sir Stafford argued that what the Committee proposed did involve constitutional changes and that, even were that possible (which he claimed everyone else denied), the result would be "government for an indefinite period by a set of persons nominated by Indian parties responsible to no legislature or electorate, incapable of being changed, and a majority of whom would be in a position to dominate large minorities." "It would be a breach of all the pledges (to minorities) that we have given," he said.

Before leaving India, Sir Stafford Cripps, in a press statement (*New York Times*, April 12) declared, "The Draft is, therefore, withdrawn and we revert to the position as it was before I came out here, though not quite perhaps to that position."

Alas, despite the evident sincerity with which he and the Congress leaders wrestled to reach agreement, a certain acerbity of tone had crept into the final exchanges which found echo in the reported statements and counter-statements made both in India and Great Britain subsequently.

Moreover, no complex and emotionally charged situation stands still—it either gets better or worse. The situation in India went from bad to worse, though the reporting in the press has been so meager that it is difficult to piece together the tragic chapter which has ended with open conflict in India.

On August 4, three days before the All-India Congress Committee met to consider the momentous Resolution of the Working Committee proposing nation-wide non-violent civil disobedience failing any modification of the British government's attitude, the British authorities in India raided the Congress Party's headquarters at Allahabad, charged Mr. Gandhi and the majority of Congress leaders with being "appeasers" toward Japan and published the text of an alleged draft (so-called "Quit India") resolution submitted to the Working Committee on April 27th.

This draft contained the sentence, "If India were freed her first stop would probably be to negotiate with Japan." The British authorities (see *New York Times* of August 5) stated that even the minority including Mr. Nehru, had only pressed for the deletion of this sentence on the grounds that "the resolution should be so phrased that the Congress' position before world opinion would not be compromised."

Interviewed the same day (August 4) Mr. Nehru maintained that the sentence about Japan was "quite incorrect" being "torn from its context." He explained that "Gandhi always sends notice to his adversary before coming into conflict. He would thus have called upon Japan not only to keep away from India but to withdraw from China."

Mr. Gandhi, also interviewed the same day, charged the government with making "illegitimate" use of the Party's papers but said there was nothing in them that any Congress Party member need be ashamed of.

He confirmed his intention in certain circumstances to negotiate with Japan, in the sense that, "If India became an independent nation tomorrow, I would certainly plead with the provisional government to send me, old as I am, to Japan and I would plead with her, as the first instance, to free China, her great neighbor, from the menace Japan has become; and to tell her that if she does not do this elementary justice, she shall have to count upon the stubborn resistance of millions who would at long last find themselves in possession of the thing which the nation prizes before everything else."

Mr. Nehru claimed that the various documents seized by the government were brief disjointed notes and that important qualifications had been omitted. It is hard to judge the matter precisely from the texts and reports in the *New York Times*, but it is plain that while the first part of the alleged Gandhi draft is cast in the form of a resolution the latter part is in the nature of "disjointed notes," as Mr. Nehru claims, covering a variety of questions that would necessarily arise in the discussions of the Working Committee last April.

The best and fairest thing we can do in trying to arrive at a proper judgment of the present deplorable events is first, to

study the actual terms of the Congress Resolution as approved by the Working Committee as a whole; and second, to describe separately the personal attitude of Mr. Gandhi as revealed in his speech before the Congress Committee on August 7th.

What purported to be the full text of the resolution as finally approved by the Working Committee appeared in the *New York Times* of July 18th, 1942. The comment from London was to the effect that the resolution was not interpreted as an ultimatum but as offering another chance for negotiation, which, however, it was unlikely that the British government would take.

The resolution (which it should be remembered was prepared shortly after the abortive Cripps Mission) may be summarized briefly as follows:

British rule in India must end immediately, not merely because foreign domination at its best is evil in itself . . . but because India in bondage can play no effective part in defending herself.

The freedom of India is thus necessary not only in the interests of India, but also for the safety of the world, for ending Nazism and Fascism, militarism and other forms of imperialism and aggression of one nation over another.

Congress has "studiously pursued a policy of non-embarrassment" and hoped that the employment of *satyagraha* against the British government only symbolically would be interpreted as a friendly gesture.

The Cripps proposals showed "no change in the British government's attitude to India," and the frustration resulting from the failure of the Mission led to "rapid and widespread increase of ill-will against Britain and a growing satisfaction at the success of Japanese arms." "The Working Committee views this development with grave apprehension as this, unless checked, will inevitably lead to passive acceptance of aggression."

"The Congress is anxious to avoid the experience of Malaya, Singapore, and Burma and desires to build up resistance to any aggression or invasion of India by the Japanese or any foreign power."

(In connection with the above two paragraphs the letter of Bertrand Russell, appearing in the *New York Times* of August

5, together with the reply two days later signed by Mary W. Hillyer, Anup Singh and Roger Baldwin, might be studied as showing how persons with strong sympathy for the Indian people and for the cause of the United Nations may yet have opposite views as to the best strategy of the Congress Party in the present circumstances.)

Congress has tried to "bring about a solution of the communal tangle."

"The present political parties, formed chiefly with a view to attracting and influencing British power, will . . . probably cease to function" if and when independence be granted.

"On the withdrawal of British rule from India responsible men and women of the country will come together to form a provisional government," and "will evolve a scheme whereby a constituent assembly can be convened in order to prepare a constitution . . . acceptable to all sections of the people."

Congress has "no desire whatever to embarrass Britain or the allied powers in their prosecution of the war"; and assuming independence, is ready for allied troops to stay in India for this purpose.

Nor does "withdrawal of British power from India . . . mean the physical withdrawal of Britons from India and certainly not those who would make India their home and live there as citizens and as equals with the others."

The Congress admits risks will attach to immediate independence, but believes they will be less than by a continuation of the present situation.

If the demand for immediate independence be rejected Congress "will then be reluctantly compelled to utilize all non-violent strength it has gathered since 1920."

"Such a wide-spread struggle would be inevitably under the leadership of Mohandas K. Gandhi."

Before noting the salient features of Mr. Gandhi's speech made on the eve of his arrest, brief reference should be made to the attitude of the Indian and British governments.

Immediately on the ratification of the All-India Congress resolution, the Indian government (i.e. the Governor-General-in-

Council) issued a statement on August 8th (see *New York Times* August 9, 1942).

The government admits that "the Congress Party has for long occupied a position of great prominence and great importance in Indian political life." But it states that "it is the duty of the government of India to take a balanced view of the interests of all sections of Indian thought and Indian opinion."

The government states its belief that acceptance of the resolution would imperil the country from without as well as from within through civil war, the collapse of law and order, communal feuds and the dislocation of economic life.

"Nor can the government of India accept the suggestion that a stable provisional government could be formed in a moment of time, within a day or two of the withdrawal of British power."

Hence they "urge the people of India to unite with them in resistance to the present challenge of the Party." The government will carry out such resistance "with clear determination but with an anxiety that the action shall be preventive of interruption of the war effort and of other dangers to which they have referred, rather than punitive."

(It has subsequently been claimed that the policy of arresting Mr. Gandhi and his colleagues immediately following the Congress Committee's decision but before the campaign of civil disobedience was actually launched, was to cut off the leaders from the rank and file, and to prevent the systematic organization of the movement.)

In the course of a broadcast on August 9th (see *New York Times*, August 10), Mr. Amery, Secretary of State for India, emphasized the strength and number of the elements in Indian life (members of the Viceroy's Council, members of Provincial Legislatures and ministries, Moslems, Depressed Classes, Indian Christians, volunteers in the Indian Army) who do not recognize the leadership of the Congress Party. He argued, furthermore, that if the Congress leaders believed there was the "slightest chance of an agreed provisional government coming into being on the disappearance of British rule . . . surely their obvious course would be to bring the members of such a government

together now and let India know in advance to whom her fortunes are to be entrusted."

Sir Stafford Cripps, in a statement on August 5th, refers to the same crucial question of the immediate transfer of effective power as follows:

I remember Mr. Gandhi saying at some time in recent years that, once given the certainty of Indian freedom in the future, he cared little how long the period of transition lasted.

Certainly that has now been given, and the period of transition has been reduced to "while hostilities last." Is it not then unreasonable to demand suddenly that there should be no period of transition at all, and make that demand at a moment of peculiar difficulty for the United Nations? No practical suggestion—by which I mean reasonable and capable of being carried out at a time of war danger—has been put forward since I left India."

This memorandum must remain descriptive rather than interpretative to the end. But, even in presenting such facts as we can glean concerning the fateful action of the Congress Party under Mr. Gandhi's leadership, it is essential to keep constantly in mind the unique nature of Mr. Gandhi's personality as well as the particular character of his political authority which arises from his ability to incarnate and therefore to represent, the inarticulate aspirations of the praying and toiling masses of the Indian people.

More than any man in history, perhaps, Mr. Gandhi is at one and the same time saint and politician—Mahatma and "*bania*" (i.e. shrewd business man) to use his own word in the speech before the All-Indian Congress Committee on August 7th. (See *New York Times* of August 8th for excerpts from the speech.) "My business," he said, "is to obtain *swaraj*" (home rule).

But that is not all. Mr. Gandhi wants two things—freedom for India, and the success of the cause of the United Nations. He is very specific about this. He is reported as saying,

But supposing they (the British) leave us, what happens to us? In that case Japan will come here. The coming in of Japan will mean the end of China and perhaps Russia, too. In these matters Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is my guru (teacher). I do not want to be the instrument of Russia's defeat, nor China's. If that happened I would hate myself.

That last sentence illustrates the extreme complexity of Mr. Gandhi's position. He is faced with a double dilemma. His first dilemma is how to promote *swaraj* without fatally jeopardizing the defence of India (and China). Judging by his speech, and by the fact that Mr. Nehru goes with him, it would seem that Mr. Gandhi is convinced that without active cooperation of the Indian masses (which alone would come from the energizing sense of new-found freedom, he argues) the defence of India is problematical.

I am a greater friend of the British than ever I was [he says]. I know they are on the brink of the ditch, and are about to fall into it. Therefore, even if they want to cut my hands off, my friendship demands that I should try to pull them out of that ditch. This is my claim, at which many people may laugh, but all the same I say this is true.

But though some may laugh and others wish to have him shot, the Viceroy knows better, as the resolution of the Indian government shows. Prevention of trouble, rather than punishment is the motive of Mr. Gandhi's arrest, and though there is talk of "appeasement" there is nothing in the government's statement which casts doubt on Mr. Gandhi's sincerity or intentions, though he is charged with lack of a full sense of responsibility and of the realities of the situation.

But, it is precisely these so-called "realities" which contain complex spiritual and psychological elements, not always taken into account by governments, especially those dealing with people of an alien race.

"It may be," says Mr. Gandhi, "that the British will understand that it would be wrong for them to put in jail the very people who want to fight for them. It may be that a change may come in Jinnah's mind too." Mr. Gandhi's actions are always an admixture of faith and calculation.

He has been detained on account of alleged irresponsibility, but, paradoxically enough, his greatest danger (to his person) is not from the authorities (who are probably praying that he will not die) but from his own sense of responsibility for what happens in a civil disobedience campaign. Many times he has called off a campaign on account of his followers resorting to

violence. Other times he has fasted to the point of death as vicarious penance for the betrayal of *satyagraha* through violence. More than once he has decided to fast to death unless some specific concession be made—which it was. It is more than possible he may contemplate such a step now though he is reported as being non-committal on the subject. But in his speech he said, "You should not resort to violence: that would put non-violence to shame. When such things happen, you may take it that you will not find me alive, wherever I may be." Opinions differ as to the validity of such an extreme form of moral pressure, but no one questions its potency in connection with a leader of Gandhi's dynamic and almost mythical influence.

That brings us to the second dilemma facing Gandhi. It is the dilemma of a profound believer in the efficacy of *satyagraha* (non-violent resistance, or soul force) who finds himself at the head of a vast political movement, the bulk of whose members do not fully accept his philosophy and, even when they do, have not his powers of self-discipline. But, more than that, as has already been made clear, the Congress Party, including Gandhi, in the event of Indian independence, promise that India will become an active ally with the United Nations, not least the British people, in resisting the aggressions of the Axis Powers.

Whether it really is possible to reconcile these things, or hold them in some sort of shifting but cooperative relationship, is a matter of opinion. Some will say no; but others will reply that this is precisely what Gandhi the pacifist has been doing all the time, in intimate friendship with Nehru the non-pacifist, whose political judgment he prizes, just as Nehru looks up to Gandhi as the man who "represents the mind and heart of our people as no one else can."

In his speech of August 7th Gandhi says, "I want you to adopt non-violence as a matter of policy, with me it is a creed, but so far as you are concerned I want you to accept it as policy. As disciplined soldiers you must accept it in toto and stick to it when you join the struggle." (Gandhi knows, of course, that thousands hold *satyagraha* like him, as a creed, but the question still arises as to how far so difficult a way of resistance can be accepted as policy, at least in a manner to be effective. Gandhi

knows the difficulties full well, and must be taking these grave risks with his eyes open.)

As to the other aspect of the dilemma, when retiring from the leadership of the Congress Party in January 1942, Gandhi explained that, "My resistance to war does not carry me to the point of thwarting those who wish to take part in it. I reason with them, I put before them the better way and leave them to make their choice."

But it is clear that Gandhi goes further than this, namely, he makes moral judgments concerning the greater and lesser evils inherent in varying kinds of use of weapons he himself will not employ; and in his capacity as political leader, makes it abundantly clear where his moral judgment and his political preferences lie.

As illustrating this, in the text of the alleged Gandhi first draft of the "Quit India" resolution appear the following words:

At present our non-cooperation with the British government is limited. Were we to offer them complete non-cooperation when they are actually fighting it would be tantamount to bringing our country deliberately into Japanese hands. Therefore, not to put any obstacle in the way of the British forces will often be the only way of demonstrating our non-cooperation with the Japanese.

On the face of things such an attitude (which has the ring of authenticity in the light of all we know) seems hard to reconcile with the present action of Congress.

Perhaps history will prove that it is irreconcilable; in the sense that the present conflict in India will pave the way for Japanese invasion. But even then, the "proofs" of history will be inconclusive, because we can never know what would have happened if the Congress Party had pursued a different policy.

I conclude where I began—the tragedy of the Indian conflict lies especially in the fact that men like Gandhi, and Cripps, and Nehru passionately seek the same ends of freedom, justice and peace, but differences over methods and the sheer magnitude of events, and the intractability of minds thwart their best efforts to realize their dreams.

ESSENTIALS OF AN INDIAN SETTLEMENT ⁵

The tragic sequence of events in India has served to quicken American concern, with the result that appeals for active American intervention are echoed from several quarters. That something should be done seems to be the strong, if inchoate, urge of some elements in the United States and of critics of governmental policy in Britain as well. Obviously the policy of putting down law-breaking and sabotage caused or occasioned by the Congress Party's "non-violent" civil disobedience movement and the government of India's "repression" can but lead to one of two results: the complete breakdown of the administration and the war effort, in which case mediatory attempts on the part of observers abroad would not be required; or, more likely, the petering out of the movement and an embittered stalemate. So something should indeed be done. But what is that "something" to be?

Hard political problems are not solved by gestures or slogans or even a generous outpouring of sentiment. Whoever attempts to settle the Indian problem—Britain, mediating elements in India, the United States or the United Nations as a whole—must grapple with its fundamental difficulties. Let us try to face these squarely to understand the conditions precedent to a settlement in India. The task is less difficult today because the Cripps Mission and the present civil disobedience campaign have highlighted the fundamental issues of controversy. Attitudes and motives have come out into the open. Let us examine these first without passion or prejudice.

What is the present British attitude? Mr. Winston Churchill has put it very recently in succinct terms. "The broad principles" of the Cripps proposals are firmly declared to be the settled policy. "Their full scope and integrity" cannot be added to and will not be reduced. Gandhi and other principal leaders "will be kept out of harm's way until the troubles subside." All necessary support will be given to the government of India "in their firm but tempered measures."

⁵ By T. A. Raman, London Editor of the United Press of India. *Far Eastern Survey*, 11:205-11. October 5, 1942.

To these Mr. Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for India, adds the postscript that he entirely agrees that the problem cannot be solved by standing pat and enforcing law and order. "But amidst war and when there is not a beginning of signs of powerful organizations coming together there may be no alternative for a time to enforcing law and order and good government." "Mistakes are always allowable," he concludes, "but there could be no greater mistake than to negotiate when there is not the slightest chance of success or to negotiate with those who are not in a position to deliver."

These straightforward points of policy were made in the last parliamentary debate and they are the points that matter. Unfortunately, much of their effect on the public here and in India was lost because of the exaggerations and unstatesmanlike pugnaciousness which marred Mr. Winston Churchill's speech.

What does this policy boil down to? We may paraphrase the "broad principles" of the Cripps offer as full self-determination immediately after the war, plus transference de facto of a large measure of power over the administration at once.

It would not be accurate to deny the completeness of self-government offered immediately after termination of hostilities. Criticisms have been made on this score but it is useful to remember that, though the declaration outlined a method of constitution-making at the end of the war, it also provided that Britain would abide by an alternative procedure agreed upon by the principal Indian parties. The only stipulations were that the new Union of India should negotiate a treaty with Britain covering all matters arising out of this complete transfer of power and that no province should be coerced to join the federation against its will. There was nothing to prevent the Indian leaders agreeing not to use this option. And, even if some of the provinces chose to keep out, they too would become self-governing and, as far as Britain is concerned, the transfer of power would be complete.

As to the Indian States, it is not within Britain's powers to sign away their autonomy (see *Far Eastern Survey*, Sept. 21, 1942); but neither would it be practicable for a Britain which has surrendered control over the rest of India to continue to be

bound by obligations to secure that autonomy indefinitely. Every practical politician in India knows that, even if the Indian States chose to keep out of the federation at the beginning, political and economic pressure within and without would compel them to come to terms with the two-thirds of India which surrounds them.

If the first broad principle of the Cripps declaration was a definite commitment of postwar self-determination, the second one was that there should be no radical change during the war. Indian party leaders were asked to choose their representatives to join the Viceroy's Executive Council. All the portfolios of the central government except the operational and strategic part of defense were to be handed over to them. Inevitably they would wield immense *de facto* power as executive councillors, and the Viceroy would be a very foolhardy man indeed if he were to oppose their will on any issue, for these councillors would be delegates of the same parties which also held the eleven provincial governments of the country. Further, they would have their nominee in the British War Cabinet and in the Pacific War Council. Anyone, whether in Britain or abroad, who was anxious to have the goodwill of postwar India would naturally have to avoid conflict with these likely leaders of the postwar Indian federation. India's present strategic position, too, gives direct military significance to the country's morale and the enthusiasm of her government.

An Executive Council composed of leaders of the principal Indian parties would therefore exercise very large *de facto* control over policy and administration. No Viceroy could lightly overrule them, nor could any Commander-in-Chief work successfully without the willing cooperation of the men holding such portfolios as Supply, Transport, Civil Defense, the Home Department and a part of the defense portfolio. Nevertheless, legally, the Viceroy could overrule the advice of his councillors, though he might never in practice do so. He could, if he felt constrained to do so, exercise his ultimate veto. Further, external relations and the relations with the Indian princes would continue to be exclusively in his hands under the authority of the British Parliament. Even here the Executive Council could

make its opinion felt (as even the present council does), but the Viceroy would have the last word if he chose.

What is the present stand of the Congress Party? Here, too, a very succinct summing up is possible today. In one phrase, what the Congress Party now demands is *independence at once*. British rule should end immediately, because India's freedom is "essential to end nazism, militarism and other forms of imperialism." If India were declared independent at once and the British withdrew, then Congress would make India a willing partner "in the enterprise of securing freedom for nations and peoples of the world." A provisional government would be formed upon the withdrawal of British rule and would later evolve a constituent assembly. Indian and British representatives would then confer for adjustment of future relations and for cooperation of the two countries as allies in the common effort to meet aggression. The armed forces of the United Nations would be permitted to stay in India for that country's defense and to help China.

This resolution of the Working Committee was further modified on August 7, a few hours before the government swooped down to arrest the leaders. The amendment stated that "free India will wholeheartedly and unreservedly declare itself on the side of the United Nations agreeing to meet the Japanese or any other aggressor with armed resistance." But simultaneously the terms of the previous resolution about fighting "nazism, militarism and imperialism" were broadened by the assertion "that the freedom of India must be a symbol and prelude to the freedom of all other Asiatic nations under foreign domination. Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, *Iran and Irak* [italics of the author] must also attain their complete freedom."

The essence of the present Congress policy may therefore be put as unconditional grant of independence here and now. After such a declaration by Britain surrendering her control of the country, the Congress Party together with other elements would set up a provisional government and then would work out a method for final constitution-making. The proffer of armed support for the United Nations in resistance to aggression on

India would, of course, have to be ratified by the proposed provisional government. The above statement of foreign policy is also insisted upon. As to the Hindu-Moslem problem, the Party takes the stand that no settlement is possible as long as the British are present, but that a settlement would be reached the moment British rule is withdrawn. Nothing is said about the princes in the resolution, although Mr. Gandhi appealed to them in their own interest to support the movement.

A few months ago Mohammed Ali Jinnah, president of the Moslem League, summed up his party's attitude in the following terms to the present writer: "An interim solution or a radical settlement here and now, I am ready for either. But I will not allow our postwar position to be prejudiced under the guise of a wartime settlement." The Moslem League insists on the division of India into Hindu and Mohammedan states as its creed and purpose. Its leaders assert—at least in public—that no other settlement of the problem is possible. Nevertheless they are prepared to cooperate in a wartime government, provided that by so doing their right is not prejudiced to demand Pakistan at the time of postwar constitution-making. They demurred to the Cripps proposal on the ground that this right to secede was not clearly enough recognized. But it is well known that, if the Congress Party had accepted the Cripps offer, the Moslem League would also have come in.

Since the Cripps Mission, the Moslem League leaders have made diverse statements which reveal the same attitude. They turn to the British and say that, if Pakistan is definitely guaranteed, then they would be prepared without more ado to cooperate actively in a wartime government. They turn to the Congress Party and say that, if it would only accept Pakistan, they could then cooperate in a joint effort to drive the British out and achieve here and now the complete independence of India. They denounce civil disobedience as "an attempt to blackmail the British into surrendering the Moslems to Hindu domination," but they indignantly proclaim that they too want the freedom of India, and the sooner, the better.

The Hindu Mahasabha, the orthodox Hindu and anti-Mohammedan party, takes precisely the opposite view. Their

policy is described as "responsive cooperation" with the war effort, and their leader, the vigorous ex-revolutionary, Vinyak Savarkar, has been touring the country for months urging Hindus to flock to the recruitment centers and the war-production factories. Whatever may be the merits of the war, he declares, Hindus should build up their industrial and military strength and therefore should exploit all the opportunities of the war. The Mahasabha thought Cripps went too far in permitting the possibility of Pakistan. But for all that, it, too, would probably have accepted the Cripps proposals, though under protest, if the other parties had done so. Today, too, the Mahasabha would probably agree to any other settlement, provided only that Pakistan is not forthwith conceded or made more likely.

The other minorities are legion. The Untouchables are important but, since their leader has already accepted active participation in the government, we may pass them by. But a word must be said about the position of the Sikhs. This small community of six millions is important out of all proportion to its numbers because of the percentage of first-class manpower it contributes to the armed forces. The Sikhs are politically divided, but on one issue they are practically unanimous: they will not accept Pakistan. Their attitude matters because they are the people who would be most affected if Punjab, where they live, should become a Mohammedan state. It is not too much to say that 90 per cent of the Sikhs would be prepared to fight any such "vivisection" of India with fanatical fervor.

What of the Indian princes? They insist on their sovereignty, on the treaties by which Britain guarantees that their territorial integrity will be protected. They would probably decide to join the federation after the war, but they would not agree to democratization of their constitutions at the dictate of British Indian leaders. They are cooperating wholeheartedly in the war effort with men and money and material, and their contributions in all these categories are important. Many of them have started gingerly on the process of constitutional reform. The Viceroy has recently been telling them that, great as their war contributions are, they must also move with the

times and broad-base their governments on the goodwill of their subjects.

This survey of the problem prompts the fundamental questions raised by the controversy. Whoever attempts to intervene in this dispute must answer the three basic riddles of present-day Indian politics. The first of these we may put this way: A Hindu-Moslem settlement before or after independence?

The British answer is: "Before, *of course*," and the Moslem League's reply is the same. But the Congress Party asserts precisely the reverse and now has gone all out to force Britain to yield independence regardless of the lack of understanding between itself and the second-largest political party in the country. Congress leaders had many opportunities, after the Cripps failure and before they launched their civil disobedience movement, to come to some understanding with the League on further policy. Gandhi himself had stated that "a mass movement during the war without communal (Hindu-Moslem) unity would lead to civil war . . . would be an invitation to suicide"; and, again, that independence can never be achieved without Hindu-Moslem accord.

Nevertheless, the only effort they made was to crush Rajagopalacharia's campaign for a Congress-League understanding and to tell the Moslems that their claims would be generously attended to after the British were driven out. Naturally, the Moslem League's reaction was that the main motive of the Congress in precipitating such calamitous risks was to "black-mail the British into surrendering Moslems to Hindu majority rule."

Suppose we overrule the British and the League and accept the Congress thesis that Hindu-Moslem unity could be worked out only after the country attained independence, what risks would we be taking? The Moslem League today does speak for the majority of the 90 million Mohammedans in the country. In Congress Mohammedans are definitely in the minority—some 100,000 in a total membership of between one and one and a half millions. Between the Leaguers and the pro-Congress Mohammedans there is a large independent bloc which does not care for the overstatements of either party. Should, however, the

League make a really strong case that Moslem interests have been sacrificed and stage a dramatic movement, this bloc of free-thinking Mohammedans would not hesitate a moment before joining the League.

Nor should it be forgotten that, although the Mohammedans are only a fourth of India, they are half the army. Further, the Mohammedans are the majority in Bengal and Assam, now facing the Japanese, and in Punjab and Sind, looking westward toward another foe. The Indian Mohammedan soldier cares as little about politics as his Hindu comrade, but the effect of a cry that Islam had been abandoned and the country surrendered behind his back to the Hindu majority would indeed be incalculable. Mohammed Ali Jinnah is not a very shy man. Understatement is not one of his many gifts. But there is substance in his threat that the League can cause more trouble than any Congress campaign.

But let us suppose that these are exaggerated fears or that, since there is trouble already, nothing worse could happen if the risk were altered. Even so, the prime concern of the Mohammedans as well as the orthodox Hindus would be to see that they obtained the best possible terms for their communities. There can be no doubt that for weeks, if not months, they would be preoccupied with the agitation of rival claims. Such conflicts or threats of conflict open dangerous possibilities internally and externally.

It should be remembered that what is meant by a Hindu-Moslem settlement in this context is not necessarily a full and final resolution of all the constitutional details. That, obviously, should wait till the time of constitution-making. But what is essential is some basic understanding between the two principal political parties in the country on broad principles.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah rants away about Pakistan as if it were a holy injunction. The majority of his followers, however, do not want actual secession from the rest of India so much as the right to threaten secession. Students of American history can readily appreciate that urge. Many sober Mohammedans, including Mian Iftikharuddin, leader of the Congress Party in Punjab, told me that they do not want Pakistan and that they

would work against it, but they did not see why the Mohammedans should be denied the right to demand it. Here is an issue, they say, of principle, and with that issue rise many deep-seated historical fears.

In substance, then, what the Mohammedans want is some bargaining point when the British withdraw and they have to deal with the Hindu majority. If this bargaining point of the right to threaten secession by agreement were denied them, they might feel obliged to resort to more direct threats. Suggestions have been made from time to time that the Moslems should agree to defer the Pakistan demand for a period of, say, five years. They have been rejected for the understandable reason that, if you want a bargaining point, you should have it at the time of bargaining, i.e., when the constitution is drawn up, not five years later.

Riddle number two which the would-be mediator will have to answer is: Independence now or after the war?

The British answer is: "After, immediately after, but we are prepared to transfer a great deal of power now." The Moslem League's reply, as we have seen, is: "We don't care whichever way you have it, so long as our right to Pakistan is recognized."

The arguments against immediate and full independence are easy enough to perceive. Could it be seriously suggested that India should resolve all her internal differences and proceed to constitution-making for a fifth of humanity, with an invader already at her gates? Even supposing that this first step were achieved without confusion and conflict, would it not mean months of agitation over conflicting claims, during which time the attention of the country would be diverted from the urgent needs of defense? Can India afford the dislocation of even a general election at this moment?

To these, the sublime radicalism of Jawaharlal Nehru retorts: "There are risks, of course, but the risks must be taken, especially in wartime." And Gandhi parries the pertinent question to whom the British are to hand over the country, with the reply: "Leave India to God or, in modern parlance, anarchy." It is a fact that neither Gandhi nor any other Congress leader

has elaborated a single practical suggestion as to how a provisional government is to be formed after the British withdraw according to their demand.

"They may all fight like cats and dogs," ruminates the Mahatma, "but I should hope that twenty years of preaching non-violence has not been in vain and that wise men from different sections will come together to form a provisional government." So nebulous indeed are these statements that many advocates of the Congress point of view have been obliged to take the line that the Party does not literally mean what it says. They insist that, though the Congress demands independence at once, it is not quite "independence" nor 100 per cent at once.

That way lies dangerous folly. There is no warrant in any authoritative Party statement, since the "Quit India" movement was developed, for the suggestion that the Congress will accept anything less than full independence here and now, signed, sealed and delivered.

Congress leaders have said that the "withdrawal" they demand does not mean the physical withdrawal of British civilians now in India. They have also said that the troops of the United Nations may continue to stay in the country. In their last resolution, they even proffered a declaration in favor of the United Nations and of armed support in the defense of India against aggression. They also made a sporting offer to the British that they might hand over the country to the Moslem League, if they liked—an offer, by the way, which the Moslem League denounced as an attempt to hoodwink the British. But, withal, Congress insists on independence now and the setting up somehow of a provisional government.

From the beginning of the war up to March 1942, the basis of the Congress demand was the recognition of India's right to independence, plus the transference of as much power as possible during the war but within the present constitutional framework. That basis has now been altered finally and radically. Gandhi has burned the bridges one by one—bridges which lead back to the earlier attitude. It was the conviction that the break was final and marked a radical change of outlook that forced Rajagopalacharia, chief architect of the former policy, to resign.

Today, as through the last fifteen years, the overwhelming influence in the Congress Party is that of Mahatma Gandhi. He believes in non-violence, the essence of which faith is that it is possible to persuade Hitler or Tojo by the force of self-immolation. He asserts that he will assuredly use all his influence in free India to convert the people to pure non-violent resistance. Gandhi therefore wants an independent India to choose the way of non-violent resistance at home and abroad. Rajendra Prasad and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel want to play neutral.

Others in the Working Committee, while not going so far, would agree to allying with the United Nations for the purpose of defending India and, perhaps, helping China—not for all-out war against the Axis. Nehru and probably two other members want independence, to fight all the better for the United Nations. The common factor of all these elements, however, is independence at once, and that is the basis on which the Congress plunged into civil disobedience.

No serious student of Indian politics can wish this fact away. That is why suggestions of a United Nations' guarantee are futile—because they beg the question. "No guarantees are contemplated by the Congress," Gandhi said. "Independence is the need of the hour, not guarantees."

To the many arguments against independence at once and at the demand of the present leadership of the Congress Party, must be added one which is frequently lost sight of. The American public knows little and seems to care less about the support which India, despite the Congress leaders, has given and continues to give to the war effort. The one and a half million volunteers in the army are dismissed as mercenaries, British tools. At the end of the war, these men, most of whom are now literate and would have accumulated some savings from their paltry earnings, would be entitled to vote, even according to the present 10 per cent franchise. The number includes hundreds of brilliant young officers.

Consider also the two-hundred-thousand-odd civil defense volunteers, who, despite the frowns of Congress leaders, volunteered for service; the hundreds of thousands of textile and other laborers who have refused to join in the strikes following

the arrest of Congress leaders; the dissidents from that Party who dared to oppose its machine and the prestige of Mahatma Gandhi. Do we realize how these thousands, who serve because they think the first task is to win the war against the Axis, would fare if a provisional government were formed by the present leadership of the Congress Party without the benefit of a general election?

The most forcible statement of this position is that of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, elected Prime Minister of the Punjab on September 12. "Bloodshed and broken heads need not inevitably follow if the British just declare India independent and leave Indians to settle things as best they can," he said. "Mr. Jinnah might tell Congress to go ahead and form a government without him. But the United Nations cannot be sure that such a government will be with them in the war. I have my doubts about a section of the Congress. As premier of the Punjab, I will not accept any national government about whose war policy there is any doubt. *I do not want the soldiers who are fighting today to be treated as traitors tomorrow.*"

From the viewpoint of the other United Nations, the most important question of all is: Will India identify herself wholeheartedly with the United Nations in total war against the Axis?

To many in the United States the answer would seem axiomatic. Neither Britain nor any member of the United Nations, it would be exclaimed, would deal with India on any other basis for the period of the war. But, obvious as the answer appears, its full implications are not realized by many American friends. Indeed, their strongest argument is that granting independence at once would add immeasurably to Allied strength; that otherwise calamity awaits the United Nations in India.

We should carefully test the sweeping assumption that the moment India is declared independent all the members of the Congress Party will wholeheartedly support total war against the Axis. We must avoid the mistake of generalizing from the example of Pandit Nehru, the Party leader who, after Gandhi, is best known in America. When the present writer pressed Rajendra Prasad for a categorical condemnation of the Axis, he replied, "You really should ask Pandit Nehru, our foreign expert, for such statements."

If we study the public statements of Mahatma Gandhi from the beginning of 1939 down to the day of his arrest, we are forced to the conviction that we have to count him out, in any case, from our generalization. For Gandhi has throughout upheld and propagated the view that this war ought not to be fought to the finish and that the only salvation of the anti-Axis powers lies in surrendering arms and meeting Germany and Japan with pure passive resistance.

Gandhi's advice to the Chinese missionaries; his praise of Pétain; his appeal to Britain to surrender likewise; his refusal to denounce Pearl Harbor; his condemnation of American entry into the war; his repeated demands that the Indian Army be disbanded; his attempt to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to "the more excellent way of non-violent resistance"; his talk of trying to persuade Japan to free China—the record is too heavy to be explained away as "a smear campaign." There could not be a more complete declaration of neutrality than his draft resolution of the first of May.

To doubt Gandhi's sincere pacifism is to deny his faith of over half a century; to imagine that if India were declared independent he would not use his immense influence against active participation in the war is to fly in the face of his repeated declarations that he will do so. The furthest he could be persuaded to go was the statement that he thought it would be wrong to lead a civil disobedience movement against a free Indian government.

With Gandhi, we shall have to count out certain pseudo-pacifists in the Congress leadership who use non-violence as a white cloak to conceal defeatist calculations. We shall also have to exclude the, happily, very small group with pro-Subhas Chandra Bose leanings, including his brother Sarat Bose, who was arrested nine months ago for suspected contact with the Japanese.

There are others like Nehru who are ardently anti-Axis and whose integrity it would be blasphemy to doubt. But those who know the nice balance of power within the inner councils of the Congress Party know also that it would be extremely

difficult to get the whole of the Party to do more than agree to armed support in the defense of India.

A second implication of our question should also be borne in mind. M. N. Roy, leader of the small Radical Democratic Party, said that the difference between the maximum that Cripps offered and what the Congress Party demanded was the right to make a separate peace. We need not accept this assertion and certainly not the insinuation, but it should be admitted that the essential difference between independence now and independence after the war is control during wartime of external policy.

A favorite and powerful argument of Congress Party leaders is that only a free people can put up wholehearted resistance, and therefore complete independence should be granted as a war measure. But the Philippines had no more than a large measure of *de facto* self-government in all matters *except defense and foreign policy*, plus a guarantee of independence in 1946. The influence of the leaders must indeed be small if, after the guarantee of self-determination at the end of the war and their assumption at once of offices of great though not legally complete power, they could not arouse their followers to wholehearted fighting.

In this question of whether the Congress Party as a whole will enthusiastically prosecute the war, whatever further tragedies may befall the United Nations, is the crux of British hesitations. Added to the other difficulties, these doubts prove decisive. It was probably for this reason that the Cripps proposal insisted on the reservation of ultimate control over the wartime government of the country.

The Cripps offer of 15 out of 16 seats in the Viceroy's Executive Council, coupled with the provincial autonomy India already has and a seat in the British War Cabinet, did in fact amount to this. If the Indian party leaders were to identify themselves with the United Nations in total war against the Axis, whatever may be the fortunes of the struggle, then no real difference could develop between them and Britain on issues of foreign policy or defense.

In effect, therefore, they would run their country and, with the sympathy that does exist in the United States and China and Russia for full Indian freedom, they would be able to exercise through their spokesman an immense influence on the United Nations as a whole. Their power, in other words, would be directly dependent on two and only two factors: their internal unity and the strength of their loyalty to the common cause. They need not insist on full control of defense and foreign policy, if indeed they were to identify themselves wholly with the United Nations.

Complete identification with the United Nations in total war, regardless of the sacrifice; an avoidance of attempts at final and radical resolution of internal differences and the problems of constitution-making for the period of the war—it is difficult to see on what other bases a wartime settlement can be reached in India. Wendell Willkie the other day exhorted people to "stand up and be counted in the common struggle." When pacifism and defeatism are abandoned, and a section of the Congress Party, at least, steps out of Gandhian tutelage to so stand up and be counted, negotiations can and should be undertaken.

The first requisite to make possible the opening of negotiations is that the present civil disobedience movement be suspended and, as a consequence, the leaders of the Congress Party released.

The Secretary of State and government spokesmen in India adduce weighty evidence that the orgy of sabotage was let loose at the direct instructions of or in consonance with the wish of the Congress Committees. Sabotage in wartime can be met only by the most direct assertion of authority. If the Congress Party leaders really desire independence at once in order to give even greater support to the United Nations, it seems a trifle odd that they should set about the process by pulling up railroads and cutting telegraph wires. The orgy of riots, too, has surely demonstrated that, despite Gandhi's twenty years of preaching non-violence, mobs are what they always are. There is enough evidence to show that another "Himalayan

blunder" has been committed, and it is time for Mahatma Gandhi to exercise his generous gift of self-criticism.

From all who love India and fight for the cause of world freedom, an appeal should go to the Mahatma to suspend the civil disobedience movement and declare that preparations for another movement will not be made for a period of, say, six months. The government of India should affirm publicly that on these terms it is willing to release all the leaders of the Party and all the followers, too, except those convicted of murder, arson and calculated sabotage.

When this preliminary clearing of the atmosphere has been effected, the government of India might well declare its support of a conference of all leaders of public opinion irrespective of their party allegiance—whether already within the government or not—to devise the best possible wartime arrangement. These leaders can and probably will come to a settlement if they are agreed on the three principles which constitute the *sine qua non* of a war agreement in India.

First, they should pledge complete political and military identification with the United Nations.

Second, they should envisage as their most urgent objective the defense of India—defined as relentless total warfare against the Axis until ultimate victory is achieved.

Third, they should steer clear of the fundamental internal cleavages and therefore agree not to prejudge these issues directly or indirectly during the war. The broad basis of the wartime government should be the present constitutional framework, though the maximum possible transfer of power could be insisted upon. Adequate guarantees as to postwar self-determination may also be asked and given.

What prospect is there of the leaders of the Congress Party supporting some such effort? The answer is that a section of the Party may accept such a dispensation and another section will definitely reject it. The British government would do well not to wait for the whole of the Congress Party to accept settlement on these terms. The attempt should be made to enlist behind a settlement all those regardless of party who want to fight for India against the Axis. There is justice in another

trenchant comment of M. N. Roy, that Sir Stafford Cripps wanted the whole hog—the whole of the Congress Party—or nothing, and that he got nothing.

And what of those Indian leaders who are undecided about supporting the war? How are they to be won over? Here is where every member of the United Nations can make a distinct contribution toward a political settlement in India, by helping to cure the canker of defeatism—by doing his bit to demonstrate to Indians that they are on the winning side, that the United Nations leadership has taken thought for their defense. A rousing victory in any theater of war, or even fifty additional anti-aircraft guns from America firing in a test rehearsal at Calcutta, would do more to awaken Indian enthusiasm than any amount of generous sentiments or postwar guarantees.

For the immediate issue is winning the war, and when the British government and Indian nationalists are agreed on that point, the major stumbling block to effective cooperation will have been removed.

INDIA UNDER THE UNION JACK ⁶

Now that India, the most precious jewel in the imperial crown, is being menaced by an aggression unprecedented in history, it is the time to strike a balance and see how India has fared under British rule. It is only suitable that the record of the imperial power be examined at one of the most critical moments of its history.

Britain took over India at that country's darkest hour. The Mughal Empire had lost the last remnants of power, and the Shadow Emperor in Delhi had not even power to command allegiance a mile or two out of his capital. The country was in a state of chaos. Famine stalked the land. The country was overrun with marauding bands of discharged soldiers, religious fanatics murdering for the glory of their goddess (the notorious thuggee) and plain ordinary bandits. There was no central government to impose order in the vast subcontinent. The only

⁶ By the Nawabzada of Sardhana, India. *National Review*. 118:353-8. April, 1942.

oases of peace were in some districts where a strong man ruled. Arts and crafts had declined, trade languished because of the insecurity, industry declined because it could hardly find a market beyond the locality in which it was situated.

This picture is confirmed, not from a British source but from the Indians themselves. *Ananda Math*, or the *Abbey of Bliss*, the novel of Bunkim Chandra Chatterjee, is a favorite reading of Indian nationalists; it actually inspired the terrorist movement in Bengal. But Chatterjee himself admits that the coming of the British saved Bengal from complete anarchy. His picture of Bengal just before the British took over is painted in so dark a color as would appear incredible if it were not by an Indian nationalist. It should be read if we are to learn what England has done for India.

The Japanese (and others) accuse Britain of having robbed the Indians of their independence. What these people overlook is the fact that only a part of India is under direct British administration. Two-fifths of the country is still controlled by Indian rulers. There are 562 Indian states covering between them 514,886 square miles with a population of 60,000,000. Of these, Hyderabad and Kashmir are larger than many a European country. And it surely speaks volumes for the British rule that it is exactly among the princes, the last independent rulers of India, that it finds some of its most loyal supporters. Britain allows the rulers an absolutely free hand. She does not intervene unless they abuse their powers and oppress their subjects. In such case the overriding duty of the paramount power is to protect the welfare of the Indian peoples. But such cases are very few and far between. For over 500 states there have been only about a dozen interventions since the Mutiny, and the loyalty of the Indian princes to the British raj has stood the severest of tests. In two world wars they have placed their armies and resources at the service of the King-Emperor, and no blandishments and bribes could make them flinch from the path of loyalty.

One of the most notorious failings of all the previous regimes has been the failure to protect India from invasion from the northwest. Ever since the days of the Aryan invasions and

of the march of Alexander the Great, successful conquerors of India had come from the northwest. Britain has kept India free from attack for the last 200 years. Since Nadir Shah looted Delhi and carried away the Peacock Throne, no power has invaded India from the land. It was Britain that kept India from being overwhelmed by the steam roller of Russia with all the untold sufferings that Tsarist rule would have brought.

The Indian Army has been fashioned as an efficient fighting instrument. Its functions are several. It defends India's frontiers. It helps to maintain law and order. And, finally, India contributes to the defence of the Empire. What the Indian Army does not do is what the Indian armies of the pre-British era did, and that was to kill and rob peaceful inhabitants and to stage revolts against any ruler who tried to govern. Considering the immense size of India and her population of nearly 400,000,000, the size of the army is surely one of the most potent tributes to British rule. The peacetime army consists of some 60,000 British troops and 150,000 Indians. The proportion of military to civilian population was, in 1931, 1 in 1,280. This should be compared with the proportion in Nazi Germany before war was declared. There, out of a population of some 80,000,000, the German Army numbered about 4,000,000, a proportion of 1 to 20. The two figures point a moral.

Another of India's troubles before the coming of the British rule was misgovernment. The great administrative machinery created by the Mughal Emperors had completely broken down. Instead of the honest conscientious and well-paid Mughal civil servant, a new kind of official descended upon India like a cloud of locusts. Their activities are best described by a Turkish proverb: "The riches of the state are as deep as the sea; and he who does not help himself is a fool." The proverb held good but for one thing: it was not only the wealth of the state that the officials helped themselves to, it was the wealth of the general public as well. British rule brought an administrative machinery worthy of comparison with the great administrative service of the Roman Empire. The Indian Civil Service introduced new standards into Indian government services. The I.C.S. official was not only scrupulously honest, impartial and

unbribeable, but efficient as well, in a way that native officialdom of the old standard never was. It was the British, too, who brought to India the technical improvements that alone have made modern administration possible—the telegraph, the railway, the aeroplane, the telephone, the wireless. Again the I.C.S. numbers but a handful, seemingly lost in the vast human sea of India. But they are not lost. They stand out in the mass by their sterling qualities. As to what the Indian people thought of them, it is best to go to the people themselves and find out. When, as it often happens in Madras, a rural administrative officer is addressed as “incarnation of justice” or “cherisher of the poor,” it surely really means what it says.

Malcontents say that the I.C.S. means alien rule and so justifies the saying of an Indian nationalist that he would prefer to see India ruled like hell by Indians to being ruled like heaven by the British; let us see what is the actual state of the case. Already in 1904, out of 26,908 men drawing salaries from £60 to £800 (an extremely high standard for Indian conditions), 16,283 were Indians, 5,420 were Eurasians and only 5,205 were Europeans. The comment which Lord Curzon made at this stage is worth quoting:

It reveals a European system of government entrusted largely to non-European hands, and beyond all, it testifies to a steady growth of loyalty and integrity on the one part, and of willing recognition of these virtues on the other, which is rich with hope for the future.

Since the days of Lord Curzon Indianization has advanced a great deal. The only non-Indian civil servants are those whose presence is absolutely indispensable. They are few in numbers—the late Mr. L. S. S. O'Malley quotes a case where a population of over 1,000,000 was efficiently administered by two British officials. They are chosen with scrupulous care after vigorous tests and examinations on them.

In cultural matters, British rule brought to India another great change. Before the advent of the British, Indian contacts with Europe had been comparatively slight. Only a few individuals were affected by Western civilization. Now all this has changed. The educational policy inaugurated by Macaulay has been severely and rightly criticized, but no one can ignore

the benefits it has brought to India. Through the introduction of English the Indian received for the first time a language which could be understood from Baluchistan to Bengal, and from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin. The number of people able to speak and understand English is said to be 2,000,000. A mere drop in the ocean of 400,000,000, but these 2,000,000 form the intellectual elite of India.

English education conferred on India another boon. By bringing India in contact with Western civilization and making its wealth accessible to the Indians it solved the grave problem of arresting the rapid decay of literature and the arts. Today the vernacular literatures are flourishing. They have produced men of world distinction like Tagore and Iqbal. The same applies to the arts. In the field of ancient monuments, the work of men like Lord Curzon is responsible for the preservation of historical treasures such as the Taj Mahal which otherwise would have been lost. That this work of preservation is now continued by Indians themselves is a tribute to Britain's inspiring example. In science the position is similar. A brilliant succession of British scientists, since the days when Sir William Jones proved the links between Sanskrit and Western languages, have put Indian science on the high eminence it now occupies in the scientific world. One example will be sufficient to show what the British contribution was. Before his rediscovery by British historians and archaeologists the Indians were ignorant of the very name and existence of Asoka, one of the greatest rulers their country has produced!

But the acid test of British rule is not in its fostering of cultural activities, however valuable they might be. India, better perhaps than any other country, illustrates the truth of the Italian saying, "Words do not fill the belly." And if the belly is not filled, no amount of flourishing culture can redeem the government from accusations of failure. How does the British rule stand in this respect? The best index are the population figures. As we have already noticed, the latest census (1941) gives a figure of nearly 390,000,000. In 1800 it was estimated at about 100,000,000, a fourfold increase in 140 years. The British abolished the causes of the high death rate and pro-

vided new opportunities for the living. The death rate was partly reduced by the abolition of the perpetual wars and riots which had afflicted the unhappy country. When critics point out the communal riots it should be remembered that the victims of all the riots in the last 50 years do not amount to as many victims as one large-scale massacre of the "good old days." By defending India from invasion and by settling the disputes of her warring races and creeds, Britain brought India peace and security in which alone her population could expand. The chronic famines of the bad years were abolished by improvement in agriculture and in communications, for, in the past, people in one village might starve while grain was rotting in the next. Modern hygiene and sanitation have also helped to lower the death rate.

But to prevent death is not enough. Food and work must be provided for the living. It was British rule which changed India from a number of primitive states to her present position as one of the leading industrial countries of the world.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA, 1917-42⁷

1917, Aug. 20—Statement in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montagu: "The policy of His Majesty's government with which the government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. . . . I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. . . ."

1918, April 22—Report on Indian Constitutional Reform issued by the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montagu, and the Viceroy of India proposing "as far as possible complete popular control in local bodies, and the largest possible inde-

⁷ Reproduced by courtesy of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. *Bulletin of International News*. 19:329-35, 351-53. April 18, 1942.

pendence for them of outside control. The provinces are the domain in which the earlier steps towards the progressive realization of responsible government should be taken. Some measure of responsibility should be given at once, and our aim is to give complete responsibility as soon as conditions permit. This involves at once giving them the largest measure of independence . . . of the government of India compatible with the due discharge by the latter of its own responsibilities. . . . The government of India to remain responsible to Parliament, and, saving such responsibility, its authority in essential matters must remain indisputable, pending experience of the effect of the changes now to be introduced in the provinces . . . the Indian Legislative Council to be enlarged, made more representative, and its opportunities of influencing government increased . . . as the changes take effect, the control of Parliament and the Secretary of State over the control of provincial government must be relaxed."

1919, Nov. 17—Report of Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament (Selborne Report) amplified and simplified the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.

1919, Dec. 23—Government of India Act received Royal Assent. Its main provisions were: (1) A central legislature, consisting of the Governor-General and two Chambers, the Council of State and the Assembly, with a majority of elected members in each. The Governor-General may override the Chambers if they refuse to pass legislation, and may also secure that a bill shall pass by "certifying" it as essential. (2) Eight provincial legislative Councils (later nine), 70 per cent of whose members (60 in Burma) are "popularly elected" and the rest "nominated." (3) Defence, foreign affairs, communications, currency, Customs, industrial legislation are among the subjects reserved for the Centre. (4) Local self-government, roads, water supplies, and public works (with a few exceptions), medical and health services, education, land revenue, law and order, and justice are the provincial sphere. (5) The provincial subjects were divided into Reserved and Transferred subjects—the former including law and order, finance, land revenue; the latter mainly the "nation-building"

services—education, etc. Reserved subjects still under "official" control by "Members of Council" appointed from the Civil Service; while the transferred subjects are looked after by Ministers. (6) Separate electorates for the Mohammedans, the Sikhs in the Punjab, and some others, to secure that they shall be adequately represented. (7) A Royal Commission to be set up at the end of 10 years, to inquire "into the working of the system of government, the growth of education, and the development of representative institutions in British India" and to report "as to whether and to what extent it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible government, or to extend, modify, or restrict the degree of responsible government then existing therein. . . ." (8) A Chamber of Princes was set up to deliberate upon matters of common interest to the Indian States.

1920, Nov.—First elections for Provincial Councils, Legislative Assembly, and Council of State held. Boycotted by Swaraj Party.

1921, Jan.-Feb.—Opening of Indian Legislative Assembly, Chamber of Princes, and Provincial Legislative Councils in Madras, Bengal, and Bombay.

1923, Sept.—Swaraj Party, under the leadership of Pandit Motilal Nehru and Mr. C. R. Das, took part in elections to the second Legislatures, securing 45 seats.

1924, Dec. 3—Sir Alexander Muddiman's Commission of Enquiry presented majority and minority reports on the working of the Act: the majority finding that dyarchy had not had a fair trial, and only some form of dualism could afford the necessary training towards the responsible government and at the same time safeguard the conditions upon which government depends. The minority report held that dyarchy had broken down and that steps should be taken at once to establish a new constitution.

1926, March—The Congress Party "walked out" of the Legislative Assembly.

1926, April—Lord Irwin became Viceroy at the conclusion of Lord Reading's term of office.

1927, Nov. 25—Statutory Commission set up under the chairmanship of Sir John Simon.

1928—The Legislative Assembly refused to cooperate with the Statutory Commission, but the Council of State nominated three members.

1928, Sept.—Indian Central Committee of members of Council of State and Legislative Assembly appointed by Viceroy to work with the Statutory Commission.

1928, Dec.—At the Congress meeting in Calcutta Mr. Gandhi returned to the leadership of the Party.

1929, Feb.—Report of States Enquiry Committee (Butler Committee) on relations between (i) the Paramount Power and the states; (ii) the financial and economic relations between British India and the states. These proposals in effect (i) put the princes under the direct protection of the Viceroy; and, to give them the power of states if ever they came into conflict with the government of British India; (ii) suggested that they should not be transferred without their own agreement to any new relation with British India.

1929, March—The Indian All-Parties Congress adopted the Report of a Committee set up to determine the principles of a constitution for India to the effect that: "India shall have the same constitutional status . . . as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and the Irish Free State, with a Parliament having powers to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of India, and an executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Commonwealth of India."

1929, Sept. 10—Report of Indian Central Committee, presented to Viceroy, declared that dyarchy had exhausted its power for good, and demanded fundamental changes in the present system of government, since no safe half-way house could exist in the provinces between dyarchy and full responsibility.

1929, Oct. 31—Declaration by the government of India that dominion status was the natural issue of Indian constitutional progress.

1930, March—Civil Disobedience campaign launched by Congress.

1930, May—Report of the Statutory Commission (Simon Report) recommended a new Federal Constitution which should "contain within itself provisions for its own development, and safeguards for the maintenance and efficiency of government while India was on the road to self-government."

In the provinces dyarchy should be abolished and replaced by a unitary Cabinet responsible to the Legislature: the governor to have full powers of intervention in the event of a breakdown: the franchise to be widened, Communal electorates to be retained with special provision for various minorities.

In the Centre there should be a Federal Assembly, with the representation of provinces and other areas of British India in proportion to population.

The defence of India must be an imperial and not an Indian responsibility.

For the Indian States there should be a Council of Greater India in which representatives of the states would sit with those of British India and have consultative and deliberative functions in regard to a scheduled list of matters of common concern.

1930, Nov. 12—Opening of India Round Table Conference in London: Delegates attending represented every group in British India except Congress, and also the Indian States.

1931, Jan. 19—Declaration of Policy by H.M.G. accepted the principle of responsible federal government subject to certain reservations and safeguards through a transitory period: the central government to be a federation of all India, embracing the Indian States and British India in bi-cameral legislature, to have authority over the states, limited by agreements made by them on entering the federation. The principle of the responsibility of the Executive to the Legislature was recognized, but defence and external affairs must be reserved to the Governor-General, and he must have special powers to secure in exceptional circumstances the preservation of tranquillity and the maintenance of rights provided by statute for public services and minorities: Provincial ministries to be composed of

members of the Legislature, responsible to it, the authority of federal government limited to federal subjects.

Agreement must be reached by the communities themselves on the points raised by the Minorities Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference.

1931, March—Communal riots at Cawnpore.

Irwin-Gandhi Pact signed after direct negotiation. Civil Disobedience Movement abandoned in return for release of political prisoners (not convicted of crimes of violence) and repeal of temporary ordinances.

1931, April—Lord Willingdon succeeded Lord Irwin as Viceroy.

1931, April—Second Round Table Conference met in London. Mr. Gandhi attended as sole representative of Congress, although three other prominent members of the Party were present as individual delegates.

1931, Dec.—A Statement of Policy by His Majesty's government at the close of the Second Session of the Conference reaffirmed the Declaration of Jan. 19 and summarized the measure of agreement reached at the Conference and the action to be adopted by H.M.G. as follows: Since agreement had not been reached with regard to the composition and powers of the Federal Legislature and safeguarding of minorities under the central government, it was impossible to settle the nature of the Federal Executive in its relations with the Legislature, or for the states to settle their place in the federation and relations within it.

H.M.G. proposed to take steps to arrive at some provisional scheme for the solution of the communal deadlock.

1932, May—Report of Franchise Committee (the Lothian Committee) set up in pursuance of policy laid down in H.M.G.'s Declaration of December, 1931) found it impossible to frame specific scheme for the composition of the legislatures or for the apportionment of seats in them, since the communal question was still unsettled. Its recommendations with regard to the franchise system and the representation of the Depressed Classes were taken into consideration 1932, Aug. 16, by H.M.G. in a Communal Award which had been foreshadowed

in the Statement of Policy of Dec., 1931. The Award was confined to arrangements to be made for the representation of British Indian communities in the 9 provincial legislatures. The allocation of seats was on the following classification: General, Moslem, Depressed Classes. Election was to be by voters voting in separate communal electorates covering between them the whole area of a province: provision was made for special seats for women, labor, commerce and industry, landholders, and the universities.

1932, Sept.—Poona Pact between Mr. Gandhi and Dr. Ambedkar modified the Communal Award in regard to the Depressed Classes accepted by H.M.G.

1933, March—Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform issued by H.M.G. described the Federal Constitution as follows:

(1) Federal executive: to consist of the Governor-General and a Council of Ministers responsible to the Legislature: with defence, foreign affairs, and ecclesiastical affairs reserved to the exclusive control of the Governor-General, with special authority conferred on him to act in disregard of the Legislature in the event of a "grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of India," to safeguard financial stability, or protect the rights of an Indian State and of certain minorities;

(2) The Federal Legislature to be bi-cameral, consisting of a House of Assembly elected every five years, and representing both British India and the Indian States; and a Council of State, elected as to one-third annually, representing the same units. Provision was made in both cases for special representation of ten different communities and interests.

(3) The eleven provinces of British India to be administered by a Governor and a Council of Ministers responsible to the Legislature: Dyarchy to be abolished but special authority entrusted to the Governor to safeguard "peace and tranquillity" and financial stability. The provincial legislatures to be enlarged, with special representation of communal interests: the franchise to be extended but to remain a property qualification, supplemented by an educational standard;

(4) The Indian States to enter the federation under Instruments of Accession signed by each individual prince with

the Crown, under which the federation would acquire a large authority over internal state affairs, but substantially reserving rights to the states; these conditions might vary from state to state;

(5) The division between federal and provincial was defined in the body of the White Paper and stated in detail in the Schedule, certain subjects of All-India importance being scheduled as both federal and provincial, with discretion to the Governor-General to empower either Legislature to enact legislation for such purposes.

1933, March.—A joint select Committee of Parliament aided by 28 Indian assessors examined the White Paper.

1935, Jan.—Their recommendations, as amended by H.M.G., presented to Parliament in the Government of India Bill. The chief changes were that the method of election of both Houses of the Federal Legislature was altered, and important additional powers conferred on the Governor-General, including a new "special responsibility" to prevent "discriminatory or penal treatment" of British imports into India.

In the provincial executive the powers of the Governor in relation to law and order were enlarged; his prior consent was necessary for the introduction of bills concerning the police, and he was empowered to take over any department of the provincial government in order to combat terrorist activities.

A federal court was to be established to deal with constitutional questions arising from the federation; and all judicial appointments were to be outside the control of the federation or the provincial legislatures.

1935, Aug.—The Government of India Act passed into law; it repealed the Act of 1919, but retained its preamble stating the aim of the "gradual establishment of self-governing institutions" as the definition of British policy in India, in spite of the Nationalists' demands for the inclusion of Lord Irwin's pledge given in 1929 of dominion status.

It provided that each Indian prince should only accede to the federation by his own Instruments of Accession and not by the Act, which had no validity within the states, the Instrument stipulating the extent to which federal authority would

run within the state. The paramountcy of the Crown stood intact, the Crown being represented by the Viceroy and not the Governor-General.

The powers of the Viceroy in the event of a breakdown of the constitution were to be controlled by Parliament, the period of such emergency being limited to three years.

Federation was made conditional upon the readjustment of relations between India and the states and upon the harmonious working of provincial autonomy in British India. Only when one-half of the princes had agreed to join the federation could it be set up. (The requisite number of states had not acceded when war broke out.)

As regards Burma the Joint Select Committee recommended and the Act provided the separation of Burma from India and the establishment of a new government of Burma on similar lines.

1939, Sept.—At the outbreak of war, India, unlike the Dominions, automatically became at war also, and Ordinances were passed giving wide powers to the Executive over the provincial governments. These steps were taken without discussion in either the central or the provincial legislatures as the Viceroy had sole power over defence and foreign affairs. The Congress Party were opposed to taking part in any war, save by the consent of the Indian people, and in August their members withdrew from the Assembly as a protest against the sending of Indian troops out of the country without the consent of the Legislature.

On Sept. 15 the Congress Working Committee issued a Manifesto protesting against India being declared a belligerent without her consent, and demanding the right of the Indian people to frame their own constitution through a Constituent Assembly. On Sept. 18 the Moslem League passed a resolution welcoming the suspension of the federal part of the 1935 Act (the Viceroy had announced this suspension on September 11 owing to the war), since the experience of provincial constituents had resulted in the domination of Hindus over Moslems.

On Oct. 17 the Viceroy issued a White Paper giving the promise of ultimate dominion status for India and conveying

the British government's undertaking to consult with representatives at the end of the war with a view to modifying the 1935 Act. For the interim period the government intended to set up a consultative group for "the association of public interest with the conduct of the war." As a protest against the shortcomings of this statement the Congress Ministries resigned, while the Moslem League stressed the need for revision, not alteration, of the 1935 Act.

1940, Jan. 10—The Viceroy issued a statement emphasizing that the British objective for India was "full dominion status in accordance with the Statute of Westminster," but in March resolutions were passed by the Congress Party demanding nothing short of complete independence, and by the Moslem League adopting the Pakistan scheme.

On March 12 the Chamber of Princes passed a resolution welcoming the promise of dominion status, but demanding the protection of their rights arising from any treaties and safeguards for the autonomy of their states.

On July 7 the Congress Working Committee again demanded complete independence and the establishment of a provisional national government at the Centre. The Viceroy's August Proposals of Aug. 8 invited representative Indians to serve on his Executive Council, and proposed the establishment of a War Advisory Council, but both the Congress Party and the Moslem League refused cooperation, and a campaign of limited civil disobedience began.

1941, March 14—A Conference of Moderate leaders under Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru submitted proposals for the immediate reconstruction of the Viceroy's Council, to consist entirely of non-official Indians, and the transfer of the portfolios of Defence and Finance to Indians, and for a declaration by the British government at the end of the war of dominion status.

1941, July.—Five non-official, non-party Indians were appointed to the Viceroy's Council and three new portfolios of Civil Defence, Information, and Indians Overseas were created; a War Advisory Council, including representatives from the Indian States, but none from the Congress or Moslem Parties, was also set up.

1941, Dec. 5—A direct appeal was cabled to Mr. Churchill (in Washington) from the Moderates urging him to act on their proposals of March, in view of "the gravity of the international situation."

1942, March 8—Mr. Churchill received cables from the President of the Moslem League urging him not to be "stampeded" into a constitutional scheme which might prejudice the Moslem demands for Pakistan, and from the President of the Hindu Mahasabha, demanding "the proclamation of the independence of India with co-partnership equal with Britain in an Indo-British Commonwealth." Further appeals were received from the All-India Azad Board and the Momin Conference (both Moslem) demanding the immediate recognition of India's independence.

1942, March 11—Mr. Churchill announced in Parliament that Sir Stafford Cripps would be sent immediately to India with the new British proposals.

April 3—Col. Johnson arrived in New Delhi.

April 4—General Wavell had a discussion with Maulana Azad and Pandit Nehru, and Sir Stafford Cripps saw Col. Johnson.

April 5—Sir Stafford Cripps saw the Finance Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, the Home Member, the Member for Indians Oversea, and Air Vice-Marshal Collyer. Col. Johnson saw Pandit Nehru.

April 6—Sir Zafrullah Khan was appointed Agent-General for India in China.

April 7—Sir Stafford Cripps handed the British government's reply to the Congress Party's counter-proposals to Dr. Azad, and later received Mr. Jinnah. Mr. Jinnah had a discussion with General Wavell.

Pandit Nehru, in a speech ridiculing Japanese claims to be the "liberators" of India, said the Congress had made clear its sympathy with the democracies, and its opposition to all the Axis powers, Japan included. Referring to the bombing of Indian coastal towns he urged the Indian people not to panic, but to organize themselves in the determination to resist the aggressor.

Dr. Moonje, Vice-President of the Hindu Mahasabha, announced that he had placed before General Wavell a proposal to raise a million guerrillas to fight behind the organized Indian Army, with at least 100,000 men in each province, and he appealed to the youth of the country to volunteer for this service.

April 8—Mr. Jinnah stated that the British government had consented to the appointment of an Indian Defence Member to the Executive Council.

April 9—New defence measures were taken, including the recruiting of a Pioneer Corps at Patna for clearing debris and doing reconstruction work anywhere in India, registration of all cycles in Calcutta, and the issue of metal identification discs to all A.R.P. personnel in Bengal factories.

April 10—The Congress Working Committee unanimously rejected the British proposals. Pandit Nehru, speaking in a campaign to arouse the people to their danger, said that whatever the result of the negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps the duty of every Indian to serve and defend India to the uttermost remained. They could not run away from this and seek safety, and there was going to be no evacuation for them from their own country or from one place to another. It was the duty of every Indian abroad, who could do so, to return to the mother country.

April 11—Sir Stafford Cripps informed the press in Delhi that the British government's offer to India had been withdrawn, as the replies he had received from all parties had resulted in his regretfully advising the government "that there is not such measure of acceptance of their proposals as to justify their making a declaration in the form of the draft." He added, "We revert to the position as it was before I came out here, though not quite perhaps to that position."

April 12—Pandit Nehru told the press in Delhi that, in spite of all that had happened, they were "not going to embarrass Britain's war effort in India or the effort of our American friends who may come here. We are not going to surrender to the invader, just as we have not given in to the British in the last 22 years. . . . It would be a tragedy for the world if Germany and Japan won this war and dominated the world."

He claimed he had gone to the utmost limit to come to terms with the British government, and went on, "Today India is the crux of the war. The only other really important theatre is the Russian. . . . Every country in the world realizes this, except of course, the big people in Delhi and Whitehall—they are slow in understanding and comprehension—therefore you have these frantic wireless appeals from Germany and Japan."

They could not afford to be bitter about the breakdown, in view of the gravity of the situation; the fundamental factor was the peril to India and what they were going to do about it. They wanted production to go on full speed ahead, and people must hold to their jobs and not run away from them. They could not participate in Britain's war effort, however. Their problem was how to organize their own war effort on their own basis of a free and independent India. He went on: "I cannot tolerate the idea that I should sit idle while the battle for India is being fought between foreign armies, while the Japanese are invading the country. I am not going to give in to Britain if she wants to exploit or rule India. Much less do I want the Indian peoples to give in or be passive towards the Japanese. I want them to resist them to the uttermost—assist them in the Congress way." Their policy in regard to the Japanese invasion was that they were out to embarrass them to the utmost. As far as he was concerned the British invasion was a played-out affair, and the new invasion might not be a played-out affair. Naturally, he had to judge every question from an Indian point of view. A fundamental factor was the distrust or dislike of the British government. That might occasionally lead individuals to an expression of pro-Japanese views. That was a slaves' sentiment. "It distresses me," he concluded, "that any Indian should talk of the Japanese liberating India. Japan comes here either for imperialist reasons straight out, or to fight with the British government—not to liberate."

April 13—Sir Stafford Cripps left Karachi for England.

It was learned that about 130,000 persons out of a population of 600,000 had been evacuated from Madras since the first air alert was sounded there on April 7.

EXCERPTS

India has a direct bearing on the achieving of peace and stability in the world. Important as India is from the point of view of its size and population, she has an infinitely greater significance that transcends the physical and numerical aspects of the country to which I have referred, and that is the place of India in the cultural history of mankind. I wonder again, to how many of you has it occurred to realize consciously the part India has played in the creation of the world's civilization. It was Professor Max Müller of Oxford who said that India was the cradle of human civilization. There is abundant historical testimony to substantiate that statement. To follow that idea through, would involve a rather exhaustive excursion into the complex domain of the cultural origins, and the comparative contributions, of the half-a-dozen races and nations that may be described as the pioneers of human civilization. It will suffice now for me to give you one or two citations on the point that may, I trust, be found stimulating. You are all no doubt familiar with the name of Lord Curzon, the distinguished statesman, who was Foreign Minister of England a few years ago, and who previously had been British Viceroy in India, and earlier in his career had won fame as a classical scholar at Balliol. Here is a statement made by Lord Curzon:

Powerful empires existed and flourished here (in India) while Englishmen were still wandering painted in the woods, and while the British Colonies were a wilderness and a jungle. India has left a deeper mark upon the history, the philosophy, and the religion of mankind than any other terrestrial unit in the universe.

We may supplement this statement by what the Abbé Dubois, famous French authority, has put on record. He says:

India is the world's cradle; thence it is that that common mother, in sending forth her children even to the utmost West, has bequeathed to us the legacy of her language, her laws, her morals, her literature, and her religion. Manu inspired Egyptian, Hebrew, Greek and Roman legislation, and his spirit permeates the whole economy of our European laws.

These, of course, are statements of historical fact, in respect to which there is general agreement among authentic scholars. The primacy of India is unique. Before Greece and Rome were heard of in history, India had given to the world the Vedas and the Upanishads, still ranked among the noblest and most profound spiritual and philosophical formulations of mankind.—*Syud Hossain, former Editor of the New Orient; Lecturer in History, University of Southern California. Institute of World Affairs. Proceedings, 1934. p. 71-2.*

For more than a thousand years, from the first century A.D. down to the eleventh century, Chinese pilgrims continued to travel by land and by sea to India to seek its scriptures in their original texts and to study under the living masters of the faith. Some of these pilgrims spent decades in India and brought back thousands of manuscripts which they devoted their lives to translating and interpreting to their fellow countrymen. Buddhist teachers and missionaries who came to China throughout the ages were always honored and eagerly listened to. Many of the Buddhist and Indian ideas and concepts, such as *karma* and transmigration of the soul, have become so intimate a part of Chinese thought and belief that the average man never realizes they are of foreign origin. So thorough and so complete was this cultural conquest of China by India that it took China ten centuries to gradually come out of it and to achieve some measure of cultural independence and intellectual renaissance.

China has never been able fully to repay this cultural indebtedness. China could only indirectly repay this debt by helping to spread this Indian culture to her Asiatic neighbors and by preserving in translation India's vast store of religious, philosophical, and historical literature, the originals of which have mostly been lost in India herself.

India, our great teacher, was then not in a mood to receive much from China. The cultural relationship was almost entirely one-sided, with China learning and taking almost everything from India without even paying tuition fee for it. Even paper-making and printing, two of China's greatest contribu-

tions to civilization, failed to interest the people of India. Only silk and tea seem to have made their way to the Indian homes. What India has taken from China is exceedingly meager in comparison with what China has received from her.

My people, therefore, enthusiastically welcome India as an old teacher, an old friend and a new comrade in arms. May this new comradeship lead us into another long period of cultural relationship in which we may march hand in hand in receiving from and contributing to the new civilization which shall be neither eastern nor western but truly universal. India and China should work together, fight together and rebuild our cultural life together; for, in the words of Tennyson,

We are ancients of the earth,
And in the morning of the times.

—From address of Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador to the United States, at the celebration of the East and West Association, March 14, 1942, New York. *Asia. My.* '42. p. 323-4.

It is for India that the last and decisive battle of the Old World will be fought. That German-Japanese collaboration in this fantastic scheme was formulated, and prepared in detail, a long time ago is certain and can even now be documented, at least in part. As early as 1935, the Italian magazine *Gerarchia*, founded by Benito Mussolini, under the title "L'alleanza nippo-germanica per il predominio sul mondo," actually published what amounts to a blueprint of this collaboration; and in 1937, Admiral Gadow, a close friend of Grand Admiral Erich von Raeder, in the official *Deutsche Militaerische Rundschau* said this:

As soon as the opportunity arises, Japan will have to attack Hong Kong and destroy the British Navy in Chinese waters. She will have to attack and blockade Singapore. She will have to send her U-boats to Aden, will have to help close the Suez Canal and foster rebellion in India and Egypt. She will have to take over Thailand and destroy the ports of Darwin and Derby in northern Australia. She must take Borneo and destroy the British fortifications at Colombo.

The claim that India is the next prime objective on Hitler's program is made in all seriousness, based upon the diabolically

shrewd though daring plans of the Nazi geo-political and military staffs; upon the intimate knowledge of their visionary temerity; their gift, nothing short of genius, for detailed preparation and their utter ruthlessness in the execution of daring schemes.—*Albert A. Brandt, Teacher and Radio Commentator, Exile from Nazi Germany. Commonweal. Mr. 6, '42. p. 481.*

The Occident must revise its conception of the "White Man's Burden." Now is the right time to recognize the truth uttered by Paul Valéry after World War I: "Now we know that our civilization is also mortal." Yes, modern Western civilization is mortal, like that of Rome, Athens, Babylon, and Egypt. In so far as this civilization is built on the machines which have enslaved both owners and workers, it is on its way out. In so far as it represents a state of society in which a Victor Hugo or an Einstein are considered less civilized than the money changers of the City or of Wall Street, it is obviously absurd. Equally absurd is the possession of tanks, battleships, and planes as a measure of civilization, for by these standards the Nazis and the Japanese are more civilized than the peoples of the Democracies. The "White Man's Burden" cannot possibly mean the introduction of this kind of civilization to the backward peoples.

For the white man has a more noble burden toward other peoples. It is to extend the benefits of his science, in a disinterested way, to the Orient in exchange for the art of living which has been evolved in the ancient lands of China and India. In this way, a fusion of the Occidental and Oriental civilizations can be effected, and a more rational universal civilization can be born. Then and then only, can humanity enjoy life in peace amidst material abundance.—*Wousaofong, Former Member of the Political Section of the League of Nations Secretariat. Free World. Ap. '42. p. 263.*

It is extremely important, I think, that we should see the British connection with India in correct perspective. Three hundred years of association and a hundred odd years of political domination constitute a rather small episode in the annals

of a country and race whose civilization, according to Sir John Marshall, the official archaeologist of the British government, dates back to 7000 B.C. and has continuously functioned as a living organism through the ages. The British Empire in India is a result of that great movement of European expansion which followed upon the discovery of the sea route, and which, after the Industrial Revolution, consolidated into colonialism and imperialism. Not only Great Britain, but France and even Belgium and Holland have colonial empires of no inconsiderable size. . . . The age of colonial empires, however, is nearly done. Their primary motive was greed, and their method coercion and exploitation. The instincts and convictions of decent human beings throughout the civilized world today—and not least in England herself—are definitely against the perpetuation of that system. It is irreconcilable with the new conceptions of international morality and the imperative needs of the new world order. There can be no real progress toward the attainment of world peace until principles of equity and fair dealing are not merely professed but practiced among the nations. *Syud Hossain, Former Editor of The New Orient; Lecturer in History, University of Southern California. Institute of World Affairs. Proceedings, 1934. p. 72-3.*

The colonial emphasis which is so important in distinguishing this war from the last one is brought into especially sharp focus in India. It is fair to say that India is not only a part of the colonial order; India *is* the colonial order. No matter what the status of the Philippines, of the Netherlands Indies, even of the huge African colonies, as long as India remains a colonial possession there will be a colonial order, and the character and balance of the economy and society of the world as a whole will be given a recognizable bias by the fact that there is a colonial order. If, on the other hand, India were to cease to be a colonial possession, then the colonial order as a whole would drop to secondary importance. Even if other territories and their peoples, here and there, were to remain in their colonial status or in some intermediate status for a

long time, they would be only survivals without enough weight to alter the quality of human society as a whole.

We have reached a point at which we must choose between liberation of the colonies, harnessed with liberty for ourselves, so that the society of the world may move forward as a whole, or stratification of colonial subjection, yoked with stratification of our own society. It is a significant point, and one which does credit to the genuineness of Western democracy, that we have none of us, in our colonial possessions, proclaimed permanency of subjugation as a principle. We have always admitted, at least as an ideal, the hope of ultimate emancipation.—Owen Lattimore, *Director of Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University; Political Adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek since 1941. Foreign Policy Reports. S. 1, '42. p. 152, 161.*

According to a recent full-page advertisement in *The New York Times*, signed by many distinguished citizens of the United States, this is the time for mediation in India; and thoughtful Americans everywhere are reluctantly coming to the conclusion that it might be desirable for President Roosevelt to intimate to his good friend, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, that renewed efforts to placate public opinion in India would aid the cause of the United Nations.

One writes reluctantly because the British are our good allies and as such may well be sensitive on what is to them a British problem. Certainly we in this country would be apt to take umbrage if the *London Spectator* or *The Manchester Guardian* contained article after article asserting that the failure of Americans to grant equality of treatment to the colored people in the United States endangered the morale of the United Nations.

Such an analogy, however, is far from exact. The Japanese are at the gates of India, now; without holding India it is impossible to succor China, either now or in the future; and American troops are in India, now, not to defend the British raj but to fight for the United Nations. If British troops were stationed in Texas or Louisiana to thwart an invasion of the

United States, under such circumstances the British government might justly concern itself with the status of the American Negro. *Walter Phelps Hall, Professor of History, Princeton University, and Author of Empire to Commonwealth. Current History. N. '42. p. 205.*

One of the most distressing things of present-day Indian politics is its political beggary. Nothing is more shameful for Indians than frantic appeals to the President of the United States, General Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders of the United Nations to come to India's rescue by forcing the British people to give India liberty. These appeals are bound to be fruitless.

To me it seems as impolitic as it is unbecoming for Indians to get other nations to find a solution for their problems. It is impolitic because the Allied Nations urging settlement of the Indian problem are looking at it from their own viewpoint and not from the viewpoint of Indians. They want a settlement, not because they are interested in doing justice to the various elements in its national life. They want a settlement because they want to use India as a base of operations, and they want the base to be peaceful. Their primary interest is to win the war in which they are engaged. The settlement of India's question is only incidental. Under such circumstances they might suggest a settlement in haste which the Indians may have to regret at leisure.

I prefer Indians making their own settlement. It is their responsibility now, and as it is Indians who will live under the conditions of that settlement, and not the Chinese and the Americans, it is better that Indians should themselves undertake the task.—*Dr. Ambedkar, Leader of the Untouchables and Labor Member of the Government of India. Mimeographed release from office of the Agent General for India. Wash. D.C. N. 21, '42.*

The question of India's relations to the Western world generally raises wide issues which can be no more than touched on here. Many people, including some Indians, have hoped for an India associated freely with the British Commonwealth

and through this political association creating a bridge between East and West. Today in America there is an increasing awareness of the importance of achieving some degree of understanding between the common folk as well as between the rulers of Eastern and Western countries. In this connection there has been one aspect of India's external relationships which has been a potent but too often overlooked factor in the development of Indian nationalism. This is the desire, universally held by all Indians, that there should be an end to discrimination by other countries against Indians on account of their race. Discrimination in such matters as immigration, civil rights, economic and social status and so forth have brought India into dispute, sometimes passionate dispute, both with the British government concerning the status of Indians in colonial areas (for instance Kenya) and with the independent Dominions (notably the Union of South Africa). More recently observers have come to wonder whether the logic of political and geographical strategy, added to long-standing cultural associations, does not make inevitable India's ultimate inclusion in some regional grouping of contiguous Asiatic countries, extending from the Middle East to the Orient, rather than in the geographically scattered and culturally alien British Commonwealth. —*Raleigh Parkin, Canadian Member of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs; Author, with W. E. Duffett and A. R. Hicks, of India Today. American Scholar. O. '42. p. 402.*

The situation in India is entirely the result of grave mistakes made both by India and by Britain. Britain has generally mishandled the Indian part of the great Commonwealth, while India committed the almost irreparable mistake of rejecting *Swaraj* when it was hers for the having about seventeen years ago. Internal dissensions caused the opportunity to be lost, and such opportunities are not lightly to be rejected. . . .

India has a long way to go before she can expiate the wrong of rejecting home rule when it was available to her, and even if the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps had been successful on the surface it would have taken a very considerable time to substitute cooperation for disunion. *India has still to make herself*

whole. Therefore must all true lovers of India address themselves with the greatest ardor to the healing of all internal dissensions. India will not be safe until the various political parties have learned to trust each other instead of disuniting India by their mutual suspicions, distrusters and even hatreds.

India's internal war cannot and will not be won until every party makes sacrifices for the common good, until strength subordinates itself to weakness, and until there is no more talk of dividing India into a number of independent states, thus dismembering her body corporate and rendering impotent her soul. India's war within herself would not have been won even had a compromise been reached as regards the War Cabinet's proposals.

But with the World War taking a distinct turn for the worse, it becomes imperative that India shall think less about herself as to the forms and ceremonies of her internal government and far more about her very self-preservation itself.—*George S. Arundale, International Head, Theosophical Society, Adyar, Madras, India. Conscience. Ap. 17, '42. p. 121.*

President Roosevelt is manifestly correct in stating that the so-called Atlantic Charter, issued as a declaration by Prime Minister Churchill and himself on Aug. 14, 1941, "applies to all humanity." The name given to this document was unfortunate. One need only re-read it to see that it is also, as far as it goes, a "Pacific Charter" and a "World Charter." The governments of Russia and China have accepted it as such. If, as Mr. Willkie told us the other evening, the "200,000,000 people of Russia and the 450,000,000 people of China" are "not satisfied" with it, the reason cannot be that it is not comprehensive enough. The reason must be that it is not specific enough. The Charter is peppered with such phrases as "all peoples," "all nations," "all states" and "all men." These words are no more limited to the Atlantic than was the salt water on which floated the ill-fated Prince of Wales. Indeed, the Prince, serving as a historic meeting place somewhere off the North American coast, was later lost while serving United Nations objectives off the Malay coast.

There is nothing Russia, China or India can legitimately want that cannot be read into these eight principles. It was difficult to be more specific. The United States was not yet in the war. We were in no position to ask of Britain a clear statement on the freedom of India. We were even less in a position to ask Russia whether she would be willing, after the war, to revise the "territorial changes" in Finland, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Bessarabia by which she strengthened her defenses against Hitler. And certainly President Roosevelt could not say with authority that the American Congress would make changes in our own tariff laws that might be required if all nations were to have "access, on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials of the world."

The principles are all there. In principle we have a World Charter. What is required, without needless delay, is a full and frank discussion of what the principles will mean in practice. In such a discussion representatives of all the United Nations ought to participate, and among them the peoples of India, of the Netherlands East Indies, of Burma and Malaya, of the Philippines, of North Africa and the Near East ought to be heard. If Mr. Willkie was wrong in assuming that we needed a new Charter, he was right in maintaining that our mutual intentions, our united plans for a postwar world, ought to be made more explicit.—*Editorial. New York Times. N. 1, '42. p. 10 E.*

The defence budget of India has increased from \$148,760,-320.50 in 1939-40 to \$399,699,447 in 1942-43. Though this is a considerable increase, it should be borne in mind that the total defence expenditure which will be brought to account in India's books will be far greater than these figures indicate.

According to a scheme of financial settlement between India and His Majesty's government, India bears only those items of expenditure which strictly relate to its defence proper; the remainder is borne by the British government and the British taxpayer.

For instance, during the last year the total defence expenditure brought to account in India's books amounted to

\$901,577,700. Of this India's share was \$300,525,900. For the current year the total defence expenditure is expected to amount to \$1,601,803,047. India's share will be \$399,699,447; the British taxpayer will pay the remainder. . . .

As a result of the huge war purchases made in India by the United Kingdom, other Commonwealth countries and Allied Nations, India's export surplus in merchandise has increased considerably, thus enabling the Reserve Bank of India to hold a large amount of sterling resources. These have been partially utilised in two successive stages for the compulsory repatriation of India's sterling debt—all the terminable loans in 1941, and the non-terminable loans in 1942-43. . . .

India's foreign debt will be almost completely wiped out at the end of the current financial year. Hereafter the outflow of money from India to England for payment of interest on the former's sterling debt or for repayment of principal will cease; and to this extent any likely adverse pressure on the rupee-sterling exchange in the postwar period will have been eliminated.—*Information Officer with the Agent General for India. Wash. D.C. Mimeographed release. S. 22, '42. p. 1-2.*

In his study of "Indian Provincial Finance, 1919-1939," Dr. B. R. Misra, Professor of Economics in the Benares Hindu University . . . points out that one outstanding cause of India's poverty is the rapid growth of the population. For this, British rule must be held responsible, since it prevented war, banished famine and reduced pestilence—the three factors which prior to British rule restrained the growth of India's population (estimated to have varied in the eighteenth century between 40,000,000 and 100,000,000).

Between 1921 and 1931, the population (inclusive of Burma) increased from 319 millions to 353 millions. India added to herself the equivalent of more than a quarter of the whole population of the United States. The figures of the 1941 census showed a further advance to 389 millions (exclusive of Burma).

It is obvious that the increase of population at such a rate as this must mean that, in spite of the extension of irrigation and the labors of the Agricultural Departments, it is difficult

for production to keep pace with population, given the non-economic outlook of the masses. . . .

No detailed description can be given here of British successes in lightening [the] burden of poverty. British achievements in public works and social services are familiar to all students of Indian affairs and their importance can hardly be overestimated. But it must be remembered that these efforts have encountered the indifference of a civilization whose mental outlook is totally different.

An important point in studying the question of poverty in India in relation to British rule is that, under that rule, India has always been lightly taxed.

Paradoxical as it may appear, a more rapid improvement in the standard of living can only be achieved by heavier taxation, in order to spend the revenue on economic and social services, more especially on education and public health. But due partly to the influence of the British tradition of conservative finance, and even more to their position as outsiders, those in charge of the destinies of India were, not unnaturally, unwilling to expose themselves to the opprobrium of the charge of "exploiting India" by the imposition of heavier taxation or to the charge of interfering with the religious and social structure of the country.

Consequently the objective of government for many years has been rather to work through enlightened Indian opinion in ameliorating the social conditions which are at the root of Indian poverty.

As the Report of the Joint Select Committee, published in 1934, put it:

In the sphere of social administration, a point has been reached where further progress depends upon the assumption by Indians of real responsibility for Indian social conditions. . . . British rule has . . . followed a policy of non-interference in all matters which touch the religions of India. This attitude has not indeed prevented the government of India from introducing reforms in many matters, to use Lord Lansdowne's words "where demands preferred in the name of religion would lead to practices inconsistent with individual safety and the public peace, and condemned by every system of law and morality in the world. Yet it must be recognized that in a country where the habits and customs of the people are so closely bound up with their religious beliefs,

this attitude, however justifiable it may have been, has sometimes made it difficult for the government to carry into effect much social legislation in such matters as child marriage and the problem of the Untouchables. It has become increasingly evident in recent years that the obstacles to such legislation can only be removed by Indian hands."

—*Poverty in India. mim. Agent General for India. Wash. D.C. O. 10, '42.*

Forty-five centuries ago there were cities gray with age in the Indus Valley in Northwest India. Women with bracelets of silver, clad in garments of cotton or wool, bearing on their heads pottery jars to fill at tinkling fountains, walked past buildings fantastically sculptured. There were wise men setting down their thoughts in a lost language, there was music on stringed instruments, there was peace in a world torn, then as now, by violence.

India must have fascinated the imaginations of remote people, in 2500 B.C. as in A.D. 1942. The richness of her past, the majesty and charm of her associations, have been a magic in men's minds. Her conquerors bowed before her: the Aryan-speaking warriors of 2000 B.C., Alexander and his Macedonians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Mongols, the Turks. She was the mother of languages and of religions. The dreadful reality of life on the baked plains, the sublimity of the great northern hills, drove her toward mysticism. Gods, great and small, haunted and still haunt the minds of her inhabitants. Siva and Vishnu stood in the silence behind the great commanders. Tamerlane, the Mahrattas, Clive, Hastings, Dyer of Amritsar—these went by, but even in our own day Tagore wrote poems more powerful than deeds, and a handful of man named Gandhi ruled the thoughts of millions of East Indians.

Freedom, complete and unquestioned, India never found during historic time. She was not free when the British came. She has not been united except under the British raj. But the longing for freedom has grown among her millions of inhabitants, speaking their scores of languages, adhering to their two major religions and their dozens of minority faiths. The quest for the eternal and the struggle for the handful of grain

that keeps a man alive have been India's opposing preoccupations. The grain she has secured—why else should the population have more than doubled since the Mutiny? The eternal begins to take a temporal form—how shall this birthplace of civilization again be made fruitful and independent?

This is the question to which not only India but Britain, and not only Britain but the United States and the rest of the United Nations, must find an answer. . . . It is not easy to find a formula that will keep more than 70,000,000 Moslems and nearly 300,000,000 Hindus from each other's throats.

What is certain is this: that if India does not unite, with the help of the United Nations, to save herself, there is grave danger that she will become the victim of another barbarian invasion. The defeat of the Axis Powers will open her road to freedom. Their victory would close it for endless years.

An Indian nation may or may not be possible. Whether India is internally one people, or two peoples, or many peoples, is perhaps of less importance than whether she is allied, or not allied, with the forces on this earth now fighting for civilization. Her races, her religions have at least this motive for at least a temporary submergence of their differences.—*Editorial. New York Times. Mr. 15, '42. p. 8E.*

I have often thought that the most astonishing thing in history is the association of Great Britain and India. It is an association which has joined a people of 50,000,000 living on a foggy island in the Atlantic, beyond the northwestern verge of Europe, with a multitudinous people of over 350,000,000, living on a sun-baked subcontinent in southern Asia, between the snowy giants of the Himalayas and the soft breezes of Ceylon. It is an association which began, three centuries ago, in trade; which extended itself, a century and a half ago (let us say, from the battle of Plassey in 1757), to politics; which finally, over a century ago, from the days of Macaulay's famous minute of 1835, or even earlier, began to throw down its roots in the field of education and culture. There have been similar associations in the course of history. There was the association of ancient Rome with our own island, and with other parts of

Europe and of hither Asia, which lasted until the latter half of the fifth century of our era. There was the association of the Christian Franks of Western Europe with the Moslem inhabitants of Syria, during the epoch of the Crusades, from the beginning of the twelfth to the end of the thirteenth century. There was the association of the Spaniards and the Portugese with a great part of the continent of America, from the early part of the sixteenth century to the first quarter of the nineteenth. These are all analogous; and yet they are also different. The association of Great Britain and India is deeper and of a different quality. It is deeper because it has rooted itself, and may root itself still more, in the field of the mind. It is different in quality because it is already becoming, and will become even more, a free association, an association of two democratic polities, the one derived from the inspiration of the other, but either of them in the long run—either of them sooner or later (and better sooner than later)—the equal of the other. This basis of liberty and of equality, and this knitting of cultural bonds, which is all the easier and the more natural on such a basis, are the hopes of the continuance, and I would even venture to say the permanence, of the association.

It is of such cultural bonds that I now desire to speak. At the end of last year, while I was in India, I received a letter from an old Indian pupil, now high in the services of his country, which contained a memorable phrase: "India is much more likely to be kept within the British Commonwealth of Nations by cultural than by political bonds." At the beginning of this year, while I was still in India, I received another letter from a distinguished professor of philosophy, who had taken the chair at a lecture which I had given on "the Conception of Empire." Referring to a phrase I had used, that Great Britain and India could give infinitely to each other, he said, "I am not one of those (and they are, as yet, very few even in India) who wish that the connection between the two countries should be severed utterly. I wish that connection to become stronger. I earnestly and sincerely hold that those whom God has joined together no man should put asunder. But I equally strenuously hold that the joining together should be by the true God, the

supreme spirit of mutual love, mutual affection, both-sided help and cooperation, and not by the adversary of God, the enemy of man, the spirit of one-sided exploitation. I have repeatedly pleaded for the establishment of a genuine and sincere British-Indian or Indo-British Commonwealth of Nations, as contradistinguished from a British Empire." These were his words; and he clinched them by adding that were such a thing done—did the 350 millions of India stand shoulder to shoulder with the 50 millions of Britain—the world would perforce imitate the ideal and the practice of such an obviously beneficent Commonwealth.—*Ernest Barker. From Presidential address delivered to the Institute of Sociology. London, March 11, 1938. Sociological Review. Ap. '38. p. 105-7.*

THE CASE FOR INDIA

INDIA'S DAY OF RECKONING¹

If the next century is going to be the century of America, it is also going to be the century of Asia, a rejuvenated Asia deriving strength from its ancient cultures and yet vital with the youthful spirit of modern science. Most of us are too apt to think of Asia as backward and decadent because for nearly two hundred years it has been dominated by Europe and has suffered all the ills, material and spiritual, which subjection inevitably brings in its train. We forget the long past of Asia when politically, economically, and culturally it played a dominant role. In this long perspective the past two hundred years are just a brief period that is ending, and Asia will surely emerge with new strength and vitality as it has done so often in the past. One of the amazing phenomena of history is the way India and China have repeatedly revived after periods of decay, and how both of them have preserved the continuity of their cultural traditions through thousands of years. They have obviously had tremendous reserves of strength to draw upon. India was old when the civilization of Greece flowered so brilliantly. Between the two there was intimate contact and much in common, and India is said to have influenced Greece far more than Greece did India. That Grecian civilization, for all its brilliance, passed away soon, leaving a great heritage, but India carried on and her culture flowered again and again. India, like China, had more staying power.

Asia is no suppliant for the favors of others, but claims perfect equality in everything and is confident of holding her own in the modern world in comradeship with others. The recent visit of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang to India was not only of historic significance but has given us a glimpse of the future when India and China will

¹ By Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Nationalist Leader. *Fortune*. 25:67A-D. April, 1942.

cooperate for their own and the world's good. The Generalissimo pointed out a remarkable fact: that India and China, with a common land frontier of 3,000 kilometers, had lived at peace with each other for a thousand years, neither country playing the role of aggressor, but both having intimate cultural and commercial contacts throughout these ages. That in itself shows the peaceful character of these two great civilizations.

Keeping this background in mind, it will be evident how unreal and fantastic is the conception of India as a kind of colonial appendage or offshoot of Britain, growing slowly to nationhood and freedom as the British Dominions have done. India is a mother country, which has influenced in the past vast sections of the human race in Asia. She still retains that storehouse of cultural vitality that has given her strength in the past, and at the same time has the natural resources, the scientific, technical, industrial, and financial capacity to make her a great nation in the modern sense of the word. But she cannot grow because of the shackles that tie her down, nor can she play her part, as she should, in the war crisis today. That part can be a great one not only because of the manpower at India's disposal but because, given a chance, she can rapidly become a great industrial nation.

The World War is obviously part of a great revolution taking place throughout the world. To consider it in only military terms is to miss the real significance of what is happening. Causes lie deep, and it would be foolish to imagine that all our present troubles are due to the vanity and insatiable ambition of certain individuals or peoples. Those individuals or peoples represent evil tendencies. But they also represent the urge for change from an order that has lost stability and equilibrium and that is heartily disliked by vast numbers of people. Part of the aggressors' strength is certainly due to their challenge to this old system. To oppose these inevitable changes and seek to perpetuate the old, or even to be passive about them, is to surrender on a revolutionary plane to the aggressor countries. Intelligent people know these aggressors are out to impose tyranny far worse than any that has existed, and therefore they should be opposed. To submit to them is to invite degradation

of the worst type, a spiritual collapse far worse than even military defeat. We see what has happened in Vichy France. We know what has taken place in Central Europe and in Northern China. And yet that fear of a possible worse fate is not enough, and certainly it does not affect the masses of population who are thoroughly dissatisfied with their present lot. They want some positive deliverance to shake them out of their passivity, some cause that immediately affects them to fight for. A proud people do not accept present degradation and misery for fear that something worse may take its place.

Thus the urgent need is to give a moral and revolutionary lead to the world, to convince it that the old order has gone and a new one really based on freedom and democracy has taken its place. No promises for the future are good enough, no half measures will help; it is the present that counts; for it is in the present that the war is going to be lost or won, and it is out of this present that the future will take shape. President Roosevelt has spoken eloquently about this future and about the four freedoms, and his words have found an echo in millions of hearts. But the words are vague and do not satisfy, and no action follows those words. The Atlantic Charter is again a pious and nebulous expression of hope, which stimulates nobody, and even this, Mr. Churchill tells us, does not apply to India.

If this urgent necessity for giving a moral and revolutionary lead were recognized and acted upon, then the aggressor nations would be forced to drop the cloak that hides many of their evil designs, and new forces of vast dimensions would rise up to check them. Even the peoples of Europe now under Nazi domination would be affected. But the greatest effect would be produced in Asia and Africa. And that may well be the turning point of the war. Only freedom and the conviction that they are fighting for their own freedom can make people fight as the Chinese and Russians have fought.

We have the long and painful heritage of European domination in Asia. Britain may believe or proclaim that she has done good to India and other Asiatic countries, but the Indians and other Asiatics think otherwise, and it is after all what we believe

that matters now. It is a terribly difficult business to wipe out this past of bitterness and conflict, yet it can be done if there is a complete break from it, and the present is made entirely different. Only thus can those psychological conditions be produced that lead to cooperation in a common endeavor and release mass effort.

It was in this hope that the National Congress issued a long statement in September, 1939, defining its policy in regard to the European war and inviting the British government to declare its war aims in regard to imperialism and democracy and, in particular, to state how these were to be given effect in the present. For many years past the Congress had condemned Fascist and Nazi doctrines and the aggressions of the Japanese, Italian, and German governments. It condemned them afresh and offered its cooperation in the struggle for freedom and democracy. But it stated:

If the war is to defend the status quo of imperialist possessions and colonies, of vested interests and privilege, then India can have nothing to do with it. If, however, the issue is democracy and world order based on democracy, then India is intensely interested in it. The Committee is convinced that the interests of Indian democracy do not conflict with the interests of British democracy or world democracy. But there is an inherent and ineradicable conflict between democracy for India, or elsewhere, and imperialism and fascism. If Great Britain fights for the maintenance and extension of democracy, then she must necessarily end imperialism in her own possessions and establish full democracy in India, and the Indian people must have the right of self-determination to frame their own constitution through a Constituent Assembly without external interference, and must guide their own policy. A free democratic India will gladly associate herself with other free nations for mutual defense against aggression and for economic cooperation.

That offer was made two and a half years ago and it has been repeated in various forms subsequently. It was rejected—and rejected in a way that angered India. The British government has made it clear beyond a doubt that it clings to the past; and present and future, in so far as Britain can help it, will resemble that past. It is not worth while to dwell on the tragic history of these two and a half years that have added to our problems and the complexity of the situation. Events have followed each

other in furious succession all over the world and, in recent months, parts of the British Empire have passed out of England's control. And yet, in spite of all this, the old outlook and methods continue and England's statesmen talk the patronizing language of the nineteenth century to us. We are intensely interested in the defense of India from external aggression but the only way we could do anything effective about it is through mass enthusiasm and mass effort under popular control.

We cannot develop our heavy industries, even though wartime requirements shout out for such development, because British interests disapprove and fear that Indian industry might compete with them after the war. For years past Indian industrialists have tried to develop an automobile industry, airplane manufacture, and shipbuilding—the very industries most required in wartime. The way these have been successfully obstructed is an astonishing story. I have been particularly interested in industrial problems in my capacity as Chairman of the National Planning Committee. This committee gathered around it some of the ablest talent in India—industrial, financial, technical, economic, scientific—and tackled the whole complex and vast problem of planned and scientific development and coordination of industry, agriculture, and social services. The labors of this committee and its numerous subcommittees would have been particularly valuable in wartime. Not only was this not taken advantage of but its work was hindered and obstructed by the government.

Two and a half years ago we had hoped to be able to play an effective role in the world drama. Our sympathies were all on one side; our interests coincided with these. Our principal problem is after all not the Hindu-Moslem problem, but the planned growth of industry, greater production, juster distribution, higher standards, and thus gradual elimination of the appalling poverty that crushes our people. It was possible to deal with this as part of the war effort and coordinate the two, thus making India far stronger, both materially and psychologically, to resist aggression. But it could only have been done with the driving power that freedom gives. It is not very helpful to think of these wasted years, now that immediate peril con-

fronts us and we have not time, as we had then, to prepare for it. We may have to meet this peril differently now, for in no event do we propose to submit to aggression.

It is said that any transfer of power during wartime involves risks. So it does. To abstain from action or change probably involves far greater risks. The aggressor nations have repeatedly shown that they have the courage to gamble with fate, and the gamble has often come off. We must take risks. One thing is certain—that the present state of affairs in India is deplorable. It lacks not only popular support but also efficiency. The people who control affairs in India from Whitehall or Delhi are incapable even of understanding what is happening, much less of dealing with it.

We are told that the independence of Syria is recognized, that Korea is going to be a free country. But India, the classic land of modern imperialist control, must continue under British tutelage. Meanwhile daily broadcasts from Tokyo, Bangkok, Rome, and Berlin in Hindustani announce that the Axis countries want India to be independent. Intelligent people know how false this is and are not taken in. But many who listen to this contrast it with what the British government says and does in India. We have seen the effect of this propaganda in Malaya and Burma. India is far more advanced politically and can therefore resist it more successfully. She is especially attracted to China and has admired the magnificent resistance of the Russian people. She feels friendly toward the democratic ideals of America. But with all that she feels helpless and frustrated and bitter against those who have put her in her present position.

Some of the problems are of our own making, some of British creation. But whoever may be responsible for them, we have to solve them. One of these problems, so often talked about, is the Hindu-Moslem problem. It is often forgotten that Moslems, like Hindus, also demand independence for India. Some of them (but only some) talk in terms of a separate state in the Northwest of India. They have never defined what they mean and few people take their demand seriously, especially in these days when small states have ceased to count

and must inevitably be parts of a larger federation. The Hindu-Moslem problem will be solved in terms of federation, but it will be solved only when British interference with our affairs ceases. So long as there is a third party to intervene and encourage intransigent elements of either group, there will be no solution. A free India will face the problem in an entirely different setting and will, I have no doubt, solve it.

What do we want? A free, democratic, federal India, willing to be associated with other countries in larger federations. In particular, India would like to have close contacts with China and Soviet Russia, both her neighbors, and America. Every conceivable protection, guarantee, and help should be given our minority groups and those that are culturally or economically backward.

What should be done now? It is not an easy question, for what may be possible today becomes difficult tomorrow. What we might have done two years ago we have no time to do now. But this war is not going to end soon, and what happens in India is bound to make a great difference. The grand strategy of war requires an understanding of the urges that move people to action and sacrifice for a cause. It requires sacrifice not only of lives of brave men but of racial prejudices, of inherited conceptions of political or economic domination and exploitation of others, of vested interests of small groups that hinder the growth and development of others. It requires conception and translation into action, in so far as possible, of the new order based on the political and economic freedom of all countries, of world cooperation of free peoples, of revolutionary leadership along these lines, and of capacity to dare and face risks. What vested interests are we going to protect for years to come when the interests of humanity itself are at stake today? Where are the vested interests of Hong Kong and Singapore?

It is essential that whatever is to be done is done now. For it is the present that counts. What will happen after the war nobody knows, and to postpone anything till then is to admit bankruptcy and invite disaster.

I would suggest that the leaders of America and Britain declare: First, that every country is entitled to full freedom and

to shape its own destiny, subject only to certain international requirements and their adjustment by international cooperation. Second, that this applies fully to countries at present within the British Empire, and that India's independence is recognized as well as her right to frame her own constitution through an assembly of her elected representatives, who will also consider her future relations with Britain and other countries. Third, that all races and peoples must be treated as equal and allowed equal opportunities of growth and development. Individuals and races may and do differ, and some are culturally or intellectually more mature than others. But the door of advancement must be open to all; indeed those that are immature should receive every help and encouragement. Nothing has alienated people more from the Nazis than their racial theories and the brutal application of these theories. But a similar doctrine and its application are in constant evidence in subject countries.

Such a declaration clearly means the ending of imperialism everywhere with all its dominating position and special privileges. That will be a greater blow to nazism and fascism than any military triumph, for nazism and fascism are an intensification of the principle of imperialism. The issue of freedom will then be clean and clear before the world, and no subterfuge or equivocation will be possible.

But the declaration, however good, is not enough, for no one believes in promises or is prepared to wait for the hereafter. Its translation into present and immediate practice will be the acid test. A full change-over may not be immediately possible, yet much can be done now. In India a change-over can take place without delay and without any complicated legal enactments. The British Parliament may pass laws in regard to it or it may not. We are not particularly interested, as we want to make our own laws in the future. A provisional national government could be formed and all real power transferred to it. This may be done even within the present structure, but it must be clearly understood that this structure will then be an unimportant covering for something that is entirely different. This national government will not be responsible to the British government or the Viceroy but to the

people, though of course it will seek to cooperate with the British government and its agents. When opportunity offers in the future, further changes may take place through a constituent assembly. Meanwhile it may be possible to widen the basis of the present central assembly and make it a representative assembly to which the provisional national government will be responsible.

If this is done in the central government, it would not be at all difficult to make popular governments function in the provinces where no special changes are necessary and the apparatus for them exists already.

All this is possible without upsetting too suddenly the outer framework. But it involves a tremendous and vital change, and that is just what is needed from the point of view of striking popular imagination and gaining popular support. Only a real change-over and realization that the old system is dead past revival, that freedom has come, will galvanize the people into action. That freedom will come at a moment of dire peril and it will be terribly difficult for anyone to shoulder this tremendous responsibility. But whatever the dangers, they have to be faced and responsibility has to be shouldered.

The changes suggested would give India the status of an independent nation, but a peaceful change-over presumes mutual arrangements being made between representatives of India and Great Britain for governing their future relations. I do not think that the conception of wholly sovereign independent nations is compatible with world peace or progress. But we do not want international cooperation to be just a variation of the imperial theme with some dominant nations controlling international and national policies. The old idea of dominion status is unlikely to remain anywhere and it is peculiarly inapplicable to India. But India will welcome association with Britain and other countries, on an equal basis, as soon as all taint of imperialism is removed.

In immediate practice, after the independence of India is recognized, many old contacts will continue. The administrative machinery will largely remain, apart from individual cases, but it will be subject to such changes as will make it fit in with

new conditions. The Indian Army must necessarily become a national army and cease to be looked upon as a mercenary army. Any future British military establishment would depend on many present and changing factors, chiefly the development of the war. It cannot continue as an alien army of occupation, as it has done in the past, but as an allied army its position would be different.

It is clear that if the changes suggested were made, India would line up completely with the countries fighting aggression. It is difficult, however, to prophesy what steps would be most effective at this particular juncture. If the military defense of India, now being carried on beyond her frontiers, proves ineffective, a new and difficult military situation arises that may require other measures. Mr. Gandhi, in common with others, has declared that we must resist aggression and not submit to any invader; but his methods of resistance, as is well known, are different. These peaceful methods seem odd in this world of brutal warfare. Yet, in certain circumstances, they may be the only alternative left us. The main thing is that we must not submit to aggression.

One thing is certain: whatever the outcome of this war, India is going to resist every attempt at domination, and a peace that has not solved the problem of India will not be of long purchase. Primarily this is Britain's responsibility, but its consequences are worldwide and affect this war. No country can therefore ignore India's present and her future, least of all America, on whom rests the vast burden of responsibility and toward whom so many millions look for right leadership at this crisis in world history.

INDIA AND AMERICA ²

For the first time since the founding of the American Republic, the United States has been in direct diplomatic contact with India. Last April Colonel Louis Johnson, President Roose-

² By Syud Hossain, Former Editor of the *Bombay Chronicle* and of the *New Orient*; Lecturer in History, University of Southern California. *Survey Graphic*. 31:529-32+. N. 42.

velt's envoy, echoed old watchwords of America's own struggle for independence in a broadcast from New Delhi asking for India's help in winning the war:

There is no goal for us and for you except victory, and in that victory may I say on behalf of the President of the United States that we propose to bring to the problem of eventual peace, no less than to the battlefield of the immediate war, our aroused conscience, our highest resolves, and our loftiest ideals. To these high ends we have dedicated our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.

The coming together of America and India in this fateful hour of history—the youngest and the oldest living civilizations—is a fact of first significance. The practical problem before any such collaboration is how to enable India to pull her full weight in the crusade against the Axis menace—how to mobilize not only her enormous manpower and natural resources but also her vast spiritual energies without which mere material force cannot count.

China has given a magnificent account of herself, but that is because China is a free agent fighting veritably for her own freedom with a real stake in victory. India would do no less if, psychologically and spiritually, she had the same certitude that she would be fighting for her own freedom no less than for a free world. There is all the difference in the world between the morale of a free people (as in the United States) fighting for home, hearth, and principle and all that makes life worth living; and that of a repressed and demoralized people (as in India), balked in their internal hopes and rallied to fight half-heartedly for a distant cause.

There are things in common, on the other hand, between the United States and India. Both preempt great segments of a continent; both have peoples of widely different origins. For that very reason we hear much of the dissensions of India. Undoubtedly there is dissension, and on vital questions. How else, when it is remembered that India is nearly as extensive as the whole of Europe minus Russia, with a population greatly in excess of that of Europe. But disagreements among her peoples should be viewed in honest focus, and not exploited for extraneous purposes.

India, first of all, is a geographic unit. Not only is it a subcontinent, but for all practical purposes it is an island—surrounded on three sides by the sea and on the north by the all but impassable Himalayan ranges. These natural barriers gave her long spans of immunity from attack—enabling her to build up her great culture over a vast area. India was never attacked from the sea. Only in comparatively recent times did she come under the control of a European naval power which first came to her shores for trade.

Most of the so-called invasions by land—all of them from the northwest—were in the nature of raids, including that of Alexander the Great, leaving no permanent impress on her life or thought. Only two became part and parcel of her national, racial, and cultural existence. First, the Aryans who came from central Asia in successive waves from 1800 B.C. on. Then, the Mohammedans, who began settling there in 1000 A.D. Both Aryans and Mohammedans made India their home permanently. They were not birds of prey or passage.

India, of course, represents the indelible Aryan tradition of more than three milleniums. But for nearly a thousand years there has been fused with it the contrasting, challenging, and no less virile spirit of Islam. Hardly more than 2 per cent of the people in India (that means, strictly, the English-speaking proportion) use or understand the word "India." But *Aryavarta* or *Hindustan* (more colloquially *Bharat* or *Hind*) are still names with a dynamic import for millions of men and women. In Mohammedan times, there were no discriminations along religious or racial lines at the court of Akbar the Great, who not only unified India politically but created among the people what may be described as a sense of modern nationalism.

Despite all the diversities among its 389,000,000 people, India today is essentially an economic unit with broad cultural and spiritual unity. It also represents increasing political unity in the sense that all sections and factions desire *Swaraj* (self-rule). The Cripps proposals were rejected last spring not only by the Indian National Congress but by the Moslem League; and by the so-called "untouchables" as well as by the latter's ancient adversaries, the orthodox Hindu groups represented by

the Mahasabha. Each section is naturally playing for the maximum concessions in any devolution of political power to a new regime; but none desires the perpetuation of an alien domination superimposed by force, without roots in the soil, without community of culture or tradition, and with economic interests demonstrably at variance with those of the people of India.

Every civilized country in the world has had its minority problems. Those of India are neither unique nor less susceptible of statesmanlike solution, the essential prerequisites being a good faith and integrity of purpose. Towards this, no motivation could be stronger than the common wish to attain full stature of free nationhood. There can be little doubt that with this prospect firmly assured, India would iron out her internal differences, and constitutional guarantees would dispel such misgivings as now assail any of her constituent elements.

There is ample evidence to show that Hindu-Moslem differences have been exploited and exaggerated for political purposes. Sir Bampfylde Fuller, British governor of the Eastern Bengal province, once said in a burst of candor: "The British government in India has two wives, one Hindu and the other Moslem. Sometimes it courts the one, sometimes the other."

Harold Laski, London analyst, has thus summed up the matter:

There is not one popular leader in India to whom we can appeal for support for the continuance of our paramourty. . . . The main interest we support in India apart from our own financial interest, is a mass of feudal princes. . . . So long as every vested interest in India is, like the Moslem interest, encouraged openly or secretly to believe that it will get better terms from dependence upon us than from a real attempt at accommodation with other Indian interests, of course agreement between them is not forthcoming. . . .

As recently as September 10 last in the House of Commons, Mr. Churchill still was saying: "Outside that party (the Congress Party), and fundamentally opposed to it, are the 90,000,000 Moslems in British India who have their rights of self-expression. . . ." Yet the picture drawn in 1940 by his recent emissary to India, Sir Stafford Cripps was this:

We must ask ourselves whether 250,000,000 Hindus are to be denied self-government in a United India because 80,000,000 Moslems either are afraid of it or put forward an unpractical suggestion for the division of India in order to prevent the Indian peasants and workers from obtaining the control of their own country. In truth, if the 80,000,000 Moslems were left to make their own political decisions without any injection of communal animosity, the great majority of them would support the Congress Party's program. In fact many of them do today

As a Moslem I can testify that the persistent representation that Hindus and Moslems are irreconcilably opposed to each other is not true. Nor is it true that the Moslems constitute a separate nation within India. More than 80 per cent of them are of the same race as the Hindus. They have gotten along together for the better part of a thousand years and India's modern civilization is a synthesis of the ideals and cultures of Aryavarta and Islam. Tagore, the most representative Hindu of our times, acknowledged Islam's contribution in these words:

To our music, our architecture, our pictorial art, our literature, the Mohammedans have made their permanent and precious contribution. Those who have studied the lives and writings of our medieval saints, and all the great religious movements that sprang up in the time of the Mohammedan rule, know how deep is our debt to this foreign current that has so intimately mingled with our life.

Today Hindus and Moslems are living side by side in every town, village and hamlet of India, sharing a common life and heritage, and linked in a common destiny. A few fanatics or political partitionists can no more alter that historic reality than they can bring about the artificial separation and segregation of Catholics and Protestants in the United States of America. Nor, if they could, would it be a desirable consummation.

Not fragmentation but federation must increasingly be the key to human affairs. Republican China, a far larger numerical unity even than India, points the way to the type of national unity which India must and will attain. Even now, notwithstanding political feuds and communal bickerings, India has a greater sense of essential national solidarity than she ever had known before.

Indians are conscious of the ties of blood and speech, of common law and common ideals, which unite the British Commonwealth of Nations of today. Conscious, also, that these things of the spirit infuse the British-American alignment against Axis aggression the world over.

Not only may India become the pivot of that struggle in Asia; but her people, in turn, are linked by ties of race, culture, religions, to peoples throughout the Near East and the Far East.

These are some of the wider bearings of the British-Indian dispute; and if the United States is to play an important, perhaps even a decisive part in composing it, then Americans should be well informed about its elements, about India's past, and her present situation—of which Hindu-Moslem relations are but one facet.

This is bound to be a tremendous adventure in friendship for the United States, reaching back on the one hand to its earlier Anglo-Saxon origins, and on the other, half way round the world to approximately one-sixth of the human race. Huge as India's population, and unique as her record of continuous survival, India has still greater claim to consideration. Namely, her contribution to civilization.

In common with Egypt, Assyria and Persia, India appeared in the earliest records of history as in a high state of progress in terms of arts, crafts, social organization, religion and philosophy. The scriptures of India, known as the *Vedas*, are the oldest religious documents of the human race; and are still today the inspiration for the living faith of millions of human beings. Wrote C. F. Andrews:

It is no empty phrase to call India the mother among the civilizations of the world. She gave liberally to China and the Far East out of her own spiritual wealth. She implanted seeds of thought, of philosophy, and religion, in the soil of Persia and Greece. Egypt has perished; Babylon has perished; but India, which was their contemporary, has not perished. She is still producing men of genius in religion, philosophy and art. This vast antiquity and perpetual youth of India is a phenomenon almost unique in the history of mankind.

With India spanning five or six thousand years, the British connection in any shape or form barely exceeds three hundred.

During the first of these three centuries the East India Company carried on a very profitable but legitimate trade. Let me turn the next pages of British-Indian history so that you can see them through Indian eyes. I can only sketch them in brief strokes.

From Moguls to Viceroy: During the second of those centuries, as the great Mogul Empire began to crumble and a period of civil strife followed, the British and the French fished in troubled waters. At the end of a long drawn out conflict, with the Indians exhausted and their resources depleted, the British emerged with a dominant margin of military strength. Diplomatically and politically, too, they had outstripped any other rival for power, whether Indian or European; and gradually consolidated their position through a series of alliances with Indian princes, as well as through some outright annexations. Says Professor Herbert Adams Gibbons, in his *The New Map of Asia*: "The title of no people to rule over another is more questionable in its origin and its development than that of the British to rule over the Indians."

The Sepoy Mutiny: By the close of the Napoleonic Wars the British control of India was for the most part complete; but beneath the surface, there was smoldering resentment and discontent. These flared up in 1857 in what British historians describe as the Sepoy Mutiny, but what to the Indians was their last organized, militant attempt at independence. Before the uprising was crushed, as Sir George Otto Trevelyan, the British historian, put it in his book *Cawnpore*, "British soldiers in India had killed more of the Indian people in a single year than missionaries had converted in a century."

The year following (1858), the sovereignty of India was vested in the British Crown. But it was in 1871 that Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress—the British imperial title derives exclusively from India.

Relapse: For a whole generation after the mutiny, India lay stunned and inert. Retribution took the form of eliminating,

as with a fine comb, the elite of the patriotic leadership of the nation—all the way from Delhi, the imperial capital in the north, to the Bay of Bengal. The people were systematically disarmed, and every semblance of national life seemed to have departed from the country.

Gradually, however, a few farseeing and devoted men realized the plight of the country and saw that India would die as an entity if it were not roused from its coma of shock and despair. These men had no alternative but to accept the *fait accompli* of British rule, but, within that iron limitation, they did what they could to restore the morale and constructive functioning of the people. In this task they were supported by some English friends of liberal and humane instincts.

Revival: From these beginnings sprang the Indian National Congress—an organization that for more than fifty years has been the champion and the spokesman of the Indian national cause. To it have belonged most of the ablest sons of India of our time.

On the Indian side, the struggle for the most part has been carried on by constitutional processes and procedures; sometimes by passive resistance, civil disobedience, economic boycott, and non-cooperation; occasionally, by resort to homicidal violence on the part of desperate young revolutionists. On the British side, the technique for coping with the agitation for national rights consisted in alternating between coercion and concession. When a particular movement could not be crushed, the British sought to conciliate it by constitutional reforms or by the offer of public office to the nationalists.

Time and again the Indian National Congress has been penalized by proscription and suppression by the British government; but, phoenix-like it has always risen from its ashes. It has again now (as I write) been outlawed and its leaders branded as "seditionists," but it is true to say that probably never before has its influence been so widespread and strong as it is today.

World War I: A turning point was reached with the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914. The British government

proclaimed that this was a war for the vindication of democracy, and called upon the people of India to cooperate. Indians responded, withholding neither life nor treasure in what they conceived to be a crusade for human freedom in the results of which they, naturally, expected to share. India sent 800,000 combatant and 400,000 non-combatant troops overseas. Tens of thousands of Indians laid down their lives on European and other battle fronts. The loyalty of Indians was so dependable that during this crisis English garrisons in India were at one time reduced to only 15,000 troops.

Five days before the armistice was signed, Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, one time chief of staff of the British Army wrote in *The New York Times*: "It is to India that our recent victory was due." His statement had reference to the fact that when war was declared, an Indian army of 200,000 men was the only trained reserve available in the Empire. Lord Harding, then Viceroy of India, said: "They filled a gap that could not otherwise have been filled. And there are few survivors."

Amritsar and after: The war over, victory won, the British authorities went back on their promises and clamped down even more rigorously. That is how Indians regarded the response to their wartime spending of themselves and to their growing demand for putting the principle of self-determination to work in India. Agitation on the one hand, repression on the other, culminated in the gruesome massacre of Amritsar in the spring of 1919, when, in the words of the English author, Edward Thompson, "General Dyer shot down nearly two thousand people." . . . and "the wounded were left all night to crawl and cry out."

Gandhi re-emerged from his retirement (he had practically dropped out of public life a year or two earlier) to head the "non-violent non-cooperation movement," as it was called, to compel recognition of India's right to *Swaraj*, or self-rule. The British authorities retaliated by drastic attempts to crush the movement. In a debate on India in the House of Commons on June 15, 1922, following Gandhi's first imprison-

ment, Ben Spoor, M.P. for Durham (afterwards a member of Ramsey MacDonald's government) said:

At the present moment, over 20,000 political prisoners are in jail. They include men of high culture, men whose character has never been questioned. . . . The crime of these 20,000 people is not that they are anti-British, it is simply that they are pro-Indian. . . . The policy of blood and iron can no more bring peace in India than it brought peace in Ireland. . . . India simply wants to be master in her own house, and until she is master in her own house there will be no peace.

Spoor's warning was not heeded. Repression was in full blast during all the decade that followed. By September 1932, political prisoners in British jails in India had reached the staggering total of 191,858. . . .

I have already referred to the deep political distrust that divides Britain and India. There is also an economic cleavage. To what extent does this militate against honest efforts to do justice to India which have been made from time to time by enlightened British statesmen and by publicists of all parties?

In an address at the Town Hall in New York this year, an outstanding British diplomat maintained that for all the material benefits which India had allegedly received, India "pays not a cent to England except the interest earned by British loans and ordinary commercial investments, and the cost of the small British Army in India." This statement has a familiar ring to me, for a dozen years ago, in the course of a debate at the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, I was confronted with a similar claim from a similar source. Fortunately enough, I could cite the current analyses of two American writers in sweeping refutation.

In *India Without Fable*, Kate L. Mitchell recently called attention to other aspects of the financial situation: the "inordinate expensiveness of British Indian administration"; the "military expenditures which consumed half of the entire budget"; and to—

. . . the profits accruing to Britain through her control of Indian currency and banking, the manipulation of the exchange value of the rupee, the administration of the Indian tariff for the benefit of British interests, and the many other hidden profits which are derived from

British control over Indian industry, trade, shipping, insurance, etc. It is no mere coincidence that . . . the India Act of 1935 effectively prevents any Indian interference with British control over Indian finance.

One can very well understand the political and economic sacrifices, the racial and psychological concessions involved in any voluntary relinquishment of such "glory and strength" of empire. But in the last analysis the whole of the present struggle gets down to an issue between democracy and dominion, between freedom and subjection. Political disagreements or economic conflicts can be harmonized, if first the moral ground is cleared.

No one has seen this more clearly than Gandhi; and no one has put a more sustained and unvarying emphasis upon it through the years than he. His essential plea has been, in his own words, for "a change of heart" on the part of the British rulers of India. Fantastic as it may seem to hard-boiled practitioners of power-politics, Gandhi actually believes in the principle of spiritual conversion for nations as well as for individuals. Thus on February 8, 1940, after a two-hour interview with the British Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, Gandhi sent a message to the *London Daily Herald* with the following characteristic appeal:

Britain's moral victory will be assured when she decides upon a mighty effort to abandon her immoral hold on India. Then her other victory will follow as day follows night. For then the conscience of the world will be on her side. No makeshift such as is now being offered can stir India's heart or the world conscience.

Since then the pendulum has swung forward and then far back in reaction.

On September 25, 1942, an *Associated Press* dispatch from New Delhi reported:

Indian mobs have been machine-gunned five times from the air since the independence movement broke into violence last month, General Sir Alan F. Hartley, deputy British Commander-in-Chief in India disclosed today.

So we have Britain simultaneously claiming the role of champion of world democracy and human freedom, and seem-

ingly denying both in India—and before the world. Upon the margin of difference between a familiar and an unfamiliar tyranny it is presumably sought to enlist the full moral and material support of the people of India, and evoke a spirit of sacrifice in behalf of the most fateful struggle for human freedom the world has ever known.

AN INDEPENDENT INDIA ³

When we face certain basic realities they help to clarify many of our problems. A first realization is, that the changes which are taking place in the world today are relatively permanent. They will be permanent in the sense that they will continue, and will become the basis of further change.

The fond belief that many still seem to have, that after the war things will go back to the old ways, is an illusion. There is no going back in this universe. The great wheels of cosmic function and action have no reverse gears.

Human reaction in the main supports the pattern. Many of you who have been away from your birthplace or childhood home save up and dream forward to the time when you can go back. Maybe after twenty years you at last make the great trip. And after two days in the old home town you are bored to extinction. There is no going back. Nothing is more impossible to revivify than the past.

We all feel we would love to go back to something, somewhere, sometime; but when we get there it is not there. We have gone beyond it. That is because of constant emergence of potentials through ourselves; because we all are ever changing within our consciousness, and because this changing is a pattern changing forward. We can return to the scene of yesterday, but we cannot bring back the associated condition and state of consciousness that once was so significant to us. It is gone.

³ From lecture by Manly Palmer Hall, Philosopher and Author. *Horizon*. 2:28-31. November, 1942.

And so it is with the great political change of empire: that which is gone cannot come back. The world of the past forty years is gone; the changes and patterns of things which we have known are deep and significant changes; they are foundations for a continuous change that will go on to the end of time. One of the things most certain today is, we are not going back to the smug conceit of empire. Accepting this as obvious and inevitable, we have some background for an estimation of the plan Mahatma Gandhi is working with.

There is no question that India is going to express itself on the determination for political freedom. There is no doubt either that it is a misfortune that such a crisis should arise at this time in this critical period in history, a crisis unavoidably painful to the United Nations in their hour of stress. But, from the standpoint of the people of India, this is their golden opportunity.

Promises with a string tied to them won't go this time. The relationships between nations in the past have not been such as to inspire confidence over promises. Nothing is more easily given and more worthless than the ordinary political promise. Today India is in a neat position to make ordinary or extraordinary demands, trying and uncomfortable for us, but very strategic for India.

An estimation of a political concession is very largely a matter of viewpoint, very largely a matter of which country you are in and of; what appears to be high treason on one side is the most intense patriotism on the opposite side. But now we must more and more realize something that we have not realized before, and that is, that the power or privilege of any one people to assume that it can establish *the* standard of right is past! Along with other pleasantries of the post-Victorian era, it is gone. The power of any one nation, or any one race, to assume rulership of the world physically, morally, financially or politically, is gone. We might just as well face it.

The one solution we have to our present problem is to recognize the absolute right of all people to their political integrity. By this concession only shall we ever be able to bind together a commonwealth of nations capable of preventing a

recurrence of conditions such as those through which we are now passing. We are no longer in a position to believe or feel that our world is a world of advantage, and that what we express in fashions, styles, attitudes, represents that which is superior for all men.

This is no longer a white man's world. It is one in which the white man, the brown man, the yellow man and the black man, can and will get along together. And not only get along together, but flourish like the green bay tree together. This is no longer the world where the white man was master and all others his slaves; that's all gone, finished. We taught well, and our students learned their lessons only too well. We industrialized whole nations of backward people, and our end was to exploit them; but they gradually reached a degree of culture and political development where they now want their own place in the sun. And we will now accord them this place; for they will demand it in a very forceful way.

We are confronted with the rising of a great Asiatic state, which will probably and ultimately make the European Axis confederation of nations look puny and pathetic. And in this great rising of Eastern power we are confronted with the evidence of a continued weakening of Occidental power. At a time when the coordination and cooperation of nations is necessary and desirable to the preservation of these very nations, our race is hopelessly divided. A great war rages, in which the whole Occidental world is engaged in a frantic struggle for its own survival against the parts of itself. And there, across the broad face of the map extending from European Russia to beyond the Japanese Islands, lies the great continent of Asia—an area incredibly vast, and within it an immense populational potentiality, still so like seed in the ground it is hard to know what the harvest will be. And on we go, as we have for many years, with the constant tearing down of our own potential wealth and strength by ourselves, and by our own actions against each other. The strife of the competitor is destroying the competitor.

As we view emerging Asia, an immense potentiality no longer to be denied, it is well to consider the attitude of

Mahatma Gandhi. First recognition is of the fact that he is an Asiatic; regardless of his schooling, his experience, regardless of anything we know, he is an Asiatic with the Asiatic viewpoint on the problems of life. We must then realize he combines with his nature a dedication to certain basic principles: he is an ascetic in his personal life, living by certain principles of asceticism which are well established in Asia, but about which we know almost nothing in this country. And again, he is basically, temperamentally, and nationally a Hindu. This means his allegiance is to his own people, that it is basic with him to preserve the viewpoint of his own people. In addition to these general considerations, we must remember that he, like every other leader in world affairs, is also involved in a political structure of human weakness and limitation.

The Indian National Congress is not one big, happy family. Like any other congress, any other political structure it has within it sincerity and insincerity, political climbers and patriots; it has little men trying to be big and big men trying to understand them; it has all the factions and factors that go to make up the intrigue of politics. Yet involved and very intricate is the pattern of Indian civil life and Indian internal politics, complicated by the rajahs, and by every government in the world being represented somewhere in India; and also, every state of intelligence and ignorance. In the midst of this pattern is the little man Gandhi, weighing less than a hundred pounds, already advanced in years; and he, the only point of general cohesion in the great nationalist movement, is torn between allegiance to his own country and allegiance to a world cause.

I think personally we are likely in the Indian crisis to greatly exaggerate its significance and importance, and to allow propaganda to influence our opinion. Basically, the ideology of Gandhi remains unchanged. It is the same ideology he had in South Africa, the same thing he has been working with since the beginning of his career. But now his relationship to the popular mind has changed, because of the crisis built up around him. In times of comparative peace his pacifism was regarded as a virtue. Now, because we would like to see India linked for safety with the other United Nations, his pacifism seems

to be a vice; but his pacifism remains the same as always, quite understandable to the Asiatics but not understandable to us.

Think back a few years, and you will remember the consternation Mahatma Gandhi's pacifism created in England. He came near to causing an economic panic. Possibly excepting the thirteen American Colonies, he was the one political problem that England had not been able to handle—Gandhi, his dollar watch and his safety pin. There was no way to cope with him, and England had been coping with political problems for quite a time and had considered itself rather good at coping. The nation had built up an empire covering over half of the earth, had developed an immense potentiality of wealth and authority, and here was a little man, who came over steerage and slept with the ship's cat, and nobody could do anything about him. The date of the great round table conference fell on Gandhi's day of silence, and he would not talk. With a man who will not talk politicians are in a bad way; talking is one of the best things they do, the one thing they know; Gandhi sat quietly munching his dates and drinking goat's milk. There just is no way of handling such a person.

Definitely beyond the ability of England to administer, Gandhi would not be any easier for the Japanese. He is much more difficult as a pacifist than he would be as a militarist.

If Europe at the beginning of the war had been able to take the attitude of non-violence, non-cooperation, where would Germany be?—if the Czechs, the Poles, the French, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Norwegians, and the Danes, had just sat; would not turn a hand to do anything, would not even stoop to ignore Germany; just sat?

We of the West are not temperamentally capable of doing that, so there is no use wondering what would have happened. It could not happen here, but it could happen in Asia. It could happen when Oriental meets Oriental.

To Gandhi's forty or fifty million followers must be added his admirers, which probably include 200 million more, in any estimate to be made of the difficulty coming to anyone who attempts to break up the solidarity of Indian psychology. What makes us unhappy is, Japan will try to cope with it in the only

way that physical violence can cope with metaphysical values—aim at extermination. India will be very difficult to exterminate. Even if a campaign of non-violence is held, and many die, that will have no effect upon the ultimate results. And accepting that Gandhi is not going to cooperate in a military way with the United Nations, there is in India a sufficiently large body of people essentially military in their own psychology, to supply all the manpower we could hope for, and want from India—and still leave this little nucleus of true world pacifism, probably the only skilled, administered pacifism that ever existed, to work out its own peculiar chemistry in Asia.

It is quite possible that this little nucleus of non-cooperation resistance, bound together by this one strange, little man, may prove to be more powerful than all the dictators put together. But in no way does it appear to be for us a cause of great worry, for India's 390 million people include an abundant amount of manpower without looking to those involved in Gandhi's movement. India's position, it is also clear, is for independence, and not for dependence upon Japan. In fact, India's opinions coincide very well with the opinions of Vice-President Wallace and Cordell Hull, that one way to break Axis power is to preserve the idea of the absolute integrity of individual nations' sovereign power.

A free India is dangerous to Japan. India will fight for its own freedom. But it will not fight for anyone else. Any nation fighting for freedom is understandable to us, it is fighting for a cause we believe in, whether allied with us or not. We know too that the pages of history are not going to run backward toward the old monopolistic trend. The world we confront is a world striving to preserve itself for itself, and not for anyone else. Our real worry is not whether India and Gandhi will cooperate; it is less a question of whether or not India wins the war than if we want the war won we will have to win it.

India is never going to be enslaved again; India will see to that. If it can get out from under the domination of the British Empire, it is dedicated to freedom. And when it is

free, India will not accept the domination of Japan any more than it will the domination of England.

A free India is a wall between Asia and Europe that can be very vital and significant. As India wins freedom for itself it will help preserve balance of world power. And I do not think we need to be too much concerned over the damage India is going to do. It is subtle enough to recognize and do that which is the greatest good for the Hindu. A free India represents to us a bulwark of power in Asia. And a free India is inevitable.

AN ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF INDIA ⁴

I am not an "expert" on India, but I am not going to apologize on that account. I shall try, rather, to show that an "expert" in economics can really have something to contribute to an understanding of the Indian problem.

The bare facts leading up to the present Indian crisis are easily summarized.

On the outbreak of the war three years ago, India was declared a belligerent by its British Viceroy without any consultation with the representatives of the Indian people. The Indian National Congress, which speaks for the national movement, repudiated the British action, and while condemning Fascist aggression, called upon the British to state their own war aims, particularly with regard to the future of imperialism and of British rule in India. The British reply was unsatisfactory, and there ensued a period of disagreement and conflict, with the Congress asking for Indian freedom and the British replying by a policy of strong repression. This was the situation right up to Pearl Harbor and the spread of the war to the Pacific. In January of this year, the Congress reiterated its sympathy with the Allied cause but declared that India could not effectively participate in the anti-Axis struggle except on the basis of independence and equality. In February, Chiang

⁴ By Paul M. Sweezy, Economist, Harvard University. *Harvard Guardian*, 7:2-8. November, 1942.

Kai-shek visited India and urged the British to grant "real political power" to the Indians so that they might fully co-operate in the war effort.

On March 11, the British government announced the Cripps mission. Sir Stafford, then newly taken into the war cabinet following popular dissatisfaction with the defeats in the Indies and at Singapore, offered terms to the Indians which included dominion status after the war, but in such a form as to make extremely difficult if not impossible the achievement of the nationalist goal of a united Indian nation. Moreover, no "real political power," to use Chiang's phrase, was offered during the war. The offer was rejected by the Congress, essentially because the leaders did not believe in the possibility of arousing the Indian people to resistance against aggression except on the basis of "real power" in the hands of the Indians themselves.

From that time, there has been a steady deterioration in the state of Anglo-Indian relations. The failure of the Cripps mission threw the Congress into the arms of Gandhi and his doctrines of passive resistance, which indeed appeared to be the only weapon which the unarmed Indian people could use to oppose to an invader. Under Gandhi's leadership, the Congress projected a new campaign of civil disobedience, which in turn was countered before it was even opened by a renewed wave of repression by the British government. This is the state of affairs which obtains at the time of writing; a dangerous deadlock, while the threat of Japanese invasion once again looms up with the approach of the dry season.

To understand this situation, and the attitude of the Indian people in the present world crisis, I think it is essential to have some sort of picture of the economic system of modern India: and that in turn requires a brief excursion into history. Indian society before the British conquest—which is traditionally dated from the Battle of Plassey in 1757—rested on the foundation of a self-sufficient village economy which combined agriculture with handicraft industry. Alongside the villages there existed large and flourishing towns where manufactured goods of a very high quality were produced. It is

well known that before the nineteenth century, the highest quality textiles in the world were produced in India, and that European manufacturers were in no way able to compete with them. The names that we give to different kinds of cotton cloth (muslin, calico, etc.), testify to this day to the fame which Indian manufacturers once enjoyed throughout the world. The English conquerors thus found in India a rigid and inflexible but relatively advanced economic system. During the second half of the eighteenth century, the heyday of the famous East India Company which was the instrument of British penetration, Indian society was racked by internal conflict and warfare. The British took advantage of these conditions to extend their sphere of domination and to carry off as much wealth as they could lay hold of. The warfare and drain of wealth, which characterized the second half of the eighteenth century, left India in a weakened and exhausted state: but internal conflict and external spoliation were not in themselves sufficient to destroy the traditional bases of the Indian village economy. It was only during the nineteenth century that a decisive change took place in the character of Anglo-Indian relations which goes far to explain the modern situation.

The first period of English rule may be said to end with the termination of the East India Company's trading monopoly in 1813. From this time for a half-century, more or less, India became important to England not as a source of plunder but as a market for England's rapidly expanding machine industry and as a source of vitally needed raw materials. The consequence was a profound change in the Indian economy. Handicraft industry was unable to compete with the fundamentally more productive machine industry of the metropolis. The balance of the old village economy was destroyed, and an ever larger proportion of the Indian people was forced into agriculture as a means of making a livelihood and in order to provide exports to pay for the flood of manufactured imports. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that this process has been going on right down to our own time. Reliable statistics are not available before 1891, but the census of that year showed that the proportion of the population dependent on agricul-

ture was 61 per cent, which is almost certainly higher than it was a century earlier. By 1921 the figure had reached 73 per cent. The apparent drop to $66 \frac{2}{3}$ per cent by the census of 1931 is entirely accounted for by a statistical reclassification, and we may assume that there has been no substantial change since 1921. Thus a century and a half of British rule has transformed India from a balanced agricultural-handicraft economy exporting a high quality of manufactured products into an overwhelmingly agricultural economy importing manufactured goods and exporting raw materials for processing abroad. When we compare this record with what has happened in the advanced Western countries, where the same century and a half was a period of unprecedentedly rapid industrialization, we may well believe that we have the key to the backwardness and poverty of modern India. I must say more presently about the structure of Indian agriculture, but this seems a good place to present a few simple figures illustrating the degree of that poverty, so profound and unlimited as to be almost unimaginable to one brought up under Western European or American conditions.

The highest estimate of the Indian national income that has ever been made by a responsible agency is that of the Simon Report on the basis of which the latest Indian constitution—that of 1935—was framed. This sets the figure at 8 per capita, or approximately 5d per day per person. In American money this would be about 10 cents a day. But most authorities agree that this figure is greatly exaggerated, and that something like $2\frac{1}{2}$ d per day would be much nearer the truth—in other words a nickel a day instead of a dime. But this is by no means the end of the story, for it takes no account of the inequality in the distribution of income; if this were taken into account we should find that the daily income of the vast majority of the Indian people is not much more than 1d a day. It is not surprising that the Indian people live permanently on the thin edge of starvation. And this after a century and a half of foreign rule! Is it any wonder that the Indian people have no love for their rulers?

It is not sufficient, however, to diagnose the Indian problem as one of poverty and arrested economic development: so much is known to every serious student of the problem, and yet not all agree as to what needs to be done. In order to get at this question we need to know more of the structure of agricultural relations and the position which the British hold therein. In the old village economy private ownership of land was a completely unknown institution: the modern system of landlordism has been superimposed on the Indian economy by the British. The system differs in different provinces and has been built up over a long period of time. Speaking generally, however, we can say that landlordism in one form or another is all but universal in India, and that it plays no constructive role whatever in the Indian economy. The landlord class has been created, in good part deliberately, by the British in order to provide a solid social basis for their rule in India. As the population has grown, and as the proportion dependent on agriculture has increased, the exactions of the landlords have steadily risen—an inevitable outcome of the famous law of supply and demand. Concomitantly, and equally inevitably, there has gone forward a fragmentation of agricultural holdings and a steady rise of agricultural debt as the land-hungry peasantry has sought to keep its head above water against staggering odds.

I cannot analyse this process in the detail that it deserves in the space available to me. Suffice it to say that the tragic state of Indian agriculture, burdened with heavy taxation, paying tribute to a parasitic landlord class and hopelessly in debt to the ever-present moneylender, is the key to the present-day Indian social structure. And, what is perhaps most significant, British rule is inextricably intertwined with this uneconomic and disastrous land system. The first prerequisite of genuine economic and social advance in India is a drastic reform of the land system. But the British raj is deeply committed to the preservation of just this land system. This explains in the profoundest sense why real independence—not merely “responsible self-government” under British rule—is the first and paramount demand of the Indian national movement.

It may be said that I am presenting only one side of the picture, that I have neglected to mention the role of British investment in India which many claim has had a progressive effect on the Indian economy. In a sense this is unquestionably true. British investments in India, according to pre-1939 estimates, amounted to something like the huge sum of 1000 million—about a quarter of all British foreign investments—and it cannot be denied that the real capital represented by this sum played a very important role in Indian economy. But most of it is in railroads, banking, trade, plantations and other types of activity which are primarily important in allowing India to play its part as an exporter of raw materials. Very little has gone into industry, and almost none into the all-important sector of heavy industry which is so vital to a modern well-balanced economy. Despite British capital investments, Indian development has been very one-sided. Modern industry has, to be sure, advanced—but slowly, and almost always against the opposition of Britain. So slowly, in fact, that the increase in employment in modern machine industry has not kept pace with the decline in the ruined handicrafts so that, as we have already seen, the proportion dependent on agriculture has shown a persistent tendency to increase.

The sad economic plight of modern India, I think I have shown, is not due to any natural and inevitable laws applicable to backward countries. Indeed, the whole history of the last century shows clearly that backward countries can lift themselves out of the rut of traditional poverty and ignorance—provided they are free to pursue an economic policy designed to meet their own needs. The example of Japan is not without its instructive lessons in this respect: and even more decisive is the enormous development which has taken place in Soviet Russia in the last two decades. What India shows is that a country which has its economic system geared to the needs of a foreign power, and not to the balanced development of its own resources for the benefit of its own people, is inevitably doomed to frustration and to a relative decline in the world scale of nations. In the long run, Indian progress depends upon two fundamental measures: a complete change in the land system, and rapid in-

dustrialization to raise the productivity of the nation and to absorb a part of the present swollen surplus agricultural population. Unhappily, British economic interests in India as well as the presuppositions of British power, and the whole cast of British ruling-class mentality built up over two centuries of association with India, are all so many obstacles in the way of Indian progress in the only way it can possibly be realized. It is against this background that we must attempt to assess the pros and cons of the present crisis in India.

It is obviously quite impossible to give more than a very brief sketch of the political forces now at work in India, and between India and Britain. Indian nationalism may be said to date from the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885. It grew gradually until the First World War during and after which Indian nationalism made enormous strides forward. A second great wave of advance came during the years of bitter strife from 1929 to 1934. Then, after a period of recession, the movement gathered momentum again with the elections to the provincial assemblies in 1937 and has been going forward with temporary setbacks, ever since. There can be no question among serious students of the problem, I think, that the Congress is the only genuine national political organization in India and that it speaks for—if it does not formally represent—the great majority of the Indian people. Membership in the Congress is actually about five million which may seem small in relation to the total population of British India of nearly 300 million. But, of course, the influence and importance of a political party can never be measured by its actual membership figures—for one thing, in India, the number who can afford even the very low dues of the Congress is strictly limited. The only groups in India of whom it can certainly be said that they are definitely opposed to Congress are the landlords, the native princes, the British rulers and certain miscellaneous elements whose interests are irrevocably tied up with maintenance of the *status quo*. From this it can be seen that Congress necessarily represents a sort of United Front among many groups, with diverse philosophies and outlooks, who are firmly united on only one point: namely, the necessity to have India governed

by Indians and not by foreigners. This accounts for much which would otherwise be inexplicable in Indian politics.

There are in the Congress two clearly distinguishable points of view as to the path which India should follow. On the one hand there are those who look back on an imaginary golden past before the incursion of Western ideas and influence. They think of the future of India in terms of a rejection of modern ideas and culture, a return to the agricultural-handicraft society of the pre-British period. Their leader is Gandhi. On the other hand, there are those who look forward to a democratic, progressive India which will accept Western technique and ideas but which at the same time will develop according to its own needs. Their leader is Nehru. Both factions are united in opposition to British domination: and the leaders of the progressive faction admire and respect the accomplishments and personality of Gandhi. But in relation to the present world crisis, there is an enormous difference between them. Gandhi's outlook is fundamentally pessimistic and backward-looking: his doctrines of pacifism and non-violence, so out of place in a world ruled by force, are merely reflections of this fact. Nehru, on the other hand, is a modern left-wing democrat, fully aware of the forces at work in the world of today and just as fully aware of the dangers of the most recent form of imperialism as expressed in Nazi Germany and Japan. His great desire is to see India capable of taking its place as an equal partner in the struggle for freedom now going on all over the world. Gandhi represents the harassed and played-out strata of the old order, bitter against the new but incapable of meeting it on its own terms. Nehru represents the mass of the working peasantry the small but vigorous working class, the youth and the intelligentsia of India. This, I think, is one way, and a valid but not the only way, of describing the set-up of the Congress today.

Now it is a fact, and an easily understandable one, that the kind of defeatism and pessimism which Gandhi represents surges forward among the masses of India at times when the national movement is suffering setbacks and discouragement, when it is meeting with repression from without and sees but

slight hope of attaining the objective of a modern progressive nation moving forward to the solution of its most pressing economic and social problems. On the other hand, in times of militant struggle when the goal of independence seems within sight, Gandhi recedes into the background and the more progressive elements in the national movement come to the fore. In such a spirit and under the leadership of men like Nehru, the Indian national movement could go forward to the achievement of a united nation taking its rightful place in the world struggle for freedom, and in the full knowledge that after the present difficulties, it would have the possibility for the first time of really devoting the great energies and talents of the Indian people to the solution of their own desperately urgent and centuries-old problems of economic and social reconstruction.

If this analysis is correct, what are we to say of the present British policy of refusal to negotiate with the Congress leaders, of repression and imprisonment of the spokesmen of the Indian people? Can we doubt that it vastly strengthens the hand, not of our potential ally, the progressive democratic mass movement of India, but rather of the backward-looking, defeatist Gandhi faction? Can we doubt that the people of India are being profoundly disillusioned about the aims and protestations of those who claim to be fighting for freedom while at the same time jailing those in India who stand for freedom? Can we count on the people of India to be our allies in the desperate struggle against Japan and Nazi Germany when they do and must ask themselves for some token of sincerity that this is their fight as well as ours?

I think to ask these questions is to answer them. India must be given the substance—I do not speak of the immediate form, which is unimportant and can be worked out given the will—of real political power. This is her elementary demand, a necessary demand, and a just demand. We have no right to refuse to throw all our influence on the side of its immediate concession. Britain should be made to feel in no uncertain terms that while we value her as our close and indispensable ally, nevertheless we also value the help and friendship of

that one-fifth of mankind that lives in India and can become a no less important partner in the struggle for victory and a firm associate in building the prosperous and peaceful world we all want to see after the war.

The reader is probably asking: But how about the Hindu-Moslem problem? Can Britain give India independence without precipitating a bitter civil war? And would this not bring the Japanese in more certainly than any other course?

I do not for a moment deny the existence and the seriousness of these ugly communal difficulties in India, and it is of little use today to point out that they have been carefully fostered by the British as a part of the policy of "divide and rule" which is ever the tactic of the foreign overlord. But even so, I have never yet seen a serious factual argument to back up the claims so freely made by British spokesmen that the Moslem League, which is played off against the Congress, represents more than a small fraction of the Moslem population of India. On the other side, there is much evidence; for example, the Constitution of 1935 reserves for Moslems 480 seats out of a total of 1581 in the 11 provincial assemblies. The Moslem League was able to capture only 104 of these seats, *i.e. less than 25 per cent of the seats specifically reserved for Moslems*. It does not look as though the League could properly claim to speak for the 80 million Moslems in India. I can see no reason not to accept Nehru's judgment that "Hindu and Moslem communalism is in neither case *bona fide* communalism, but political and social reaction hiding behind the communal mask" (*Autobiography*, p 459). It is, of course, true that the Moslem League might be able to stir up trouble, and its leader Mr. Jinnah has recently threatened to do so, if the British granted Indian independence on Congress terms. But I should think that the British or the Indians themselves might consider taking Mr. Jinnah and his friends "into custody" for a time in such a case: the British have never been backward about dealing with the Congress leaders in this way, though the purpose might seem less worthy.

Finally, I may say that one cannot take great steps today without running risks. But the most fatuous view of all, as the

course of the war has already demonstrated if it has demonstrated anything, is that a blind clinging to the *status quo* is the sure way of avoiding risks.

THE WAR COMES TO INDIA ⁵

Sir Stafford Cripps's effort to settle the Indo-British dispute, was hailed by liberals in all parts of the world and by the political leaders of India themselves. Sir Stafford was not only well known in India, but was regarded as a friend who believed in Indian freedom. Previously, in 1939, he had visited India and talked with Indian leaders, especially with Mr. Nehru, who was a schoolmate and an old friend. At that time he had also visited China, holding very sympathetic views toward the Chinese in their struggle. Afterward he visited the United States, where he freely stated, in public and private conferences with responsible Americans, that he favored Indian freedom and even advised Indians to have influential Americans bring pressure to bear on the British government with regard to the Indian issue.

Because Sir Stafford's mission to India failed, it is necessary to keep in mind the change that occurred in his views about the Congress, the Moslem League, and the demand for Indian independence between 1940 and 1942. In 1940, before he held the office of Lord Privy Seal, Sir Stafford made the following points clear: (1) Gandhi is moderate in his methods and demands. (2) Nehru is a great statesman. (3) The Congress Party is not solely a Hindu party, but has large Moslem support and stands for the masses and a democratic India. (4) The Moslem League is led by reactionary, well-to-do Moslems who are anxious to establish a Moslem rule in India and who otherwise prefer an undemocratic British rule. (5) The idea of a "partition of India" is impractical, and the majority of Indian people should not be denied self-rule in a

⁵ From article by Taraknath Das, Ph.D., Special Lecturer on Oriental History and World Politics, The School of Education, College of the City of New York; Author of "India in World Politics." *Antioch Review*. 2:473-90. September, 1942.

united India. (6) The British government was consciously or unconsciously supporting the Moslem League on the issue of partition to prevent a settlement of the Indian question on the basis of Indian self-rule.

To the amazement of Gandhi, Nehru, Azad, and other Indian leaders, however, Sir Stafford Cripps—in 1942, after the Japanese conquest of Burma—not only proposed the partition of India to satisfy the Moslem League leaders, but proposed that Indian princes who did not want to join the Indian federation could remain out of it and still enjoy their present relations with the British government. Thus India would be divided into a half a dozen or more "Ulsters." In opposition to this proposal Gandhi, like Lincoln, said in substance that he would prefer chaos in India to partition.

The question of the "partition of India" has great significance for India and world politics. The Moslem League leaders advocate the formation of separate Islamic states under the name of "Pakistans" in those provinces of India where the Moslem population is in a majority because Moslems do not wish to be dominated by Hindus. But how can Moslems in those provinces where they have a majority (such as Punjab, the northwestern frontier provinces, Beluchistan, Sind, and Bengal) be dominated by a Hindu minority? In fact, Hindu domination in these provinces is impossible, for the Moslems will have a dominating position through the majority rule of the democratic process.

A second reason why the Moslem League leaders want partition is that, if these provinces join a federation forming a united India, they will be dominated by a central government which will have a Hindu majority. The argument boils down to this: Because of their religion, the Moslems want to secede from a united India. But if the idea were accepted, then Moslems in China (thirty millions) might also secede from a united China, and Moslems in Soviet Russia might ask for the same right. By the same argument, Jews, Protestants, Catholics, or various racial elements in the United States might establish separate states and break up the federal union.

Mr. Jinnah, the leader of the Moslem League, presented his idea of Pakistan in 1940, a time when the British authorities, in order to counteract the efforts of Mussolini and Hitler to use the Arabs against British interests in the Middle East, took serious steps to appease the Moslem world. By catering to the Moslem League's plan for the partition of India, the British authorities believe they are killing two birds with one stone: first, they are widening the gulf between Hindus and Moslems, thereby checking the movement for Indian independence; and second, they are convincing the Moslem world that the British are not only willing to give up the cause of the Jews in Palestine, but also are willing to partition India, thus creating a Moslem state which will politically strengthen the international Islamic world. The move may possibly have served those purposes, but it has widened the gulf between Indian Nationalists and the British. There is every reason to believe, however, that the Moslems of the Middle East still may aid the Axis Powers in a crisis.

Sir Stafford's proposals offered no opportunity for the formation of a national government of India at the present time. Furthermore, they did not provide for Indian control of Indian national defense. Sir Stafford's mission therefore convinced the Indian people as a whole that the British were not sincere in their offer of Indian independence after the war. Some of the people, in fact, openly said that if the British won the war with American, Russian, Chinese, and Indian aid, it would be easy for the British to put down a postwar rebellion in India if they did not agree to Indian independence. This feeling has been expressed, for example, by leaders of the Indian peasants.

Gandhi, who is in closest touch with the masses of India, felt at that time that it would be wise to demand that the British, Americans, and Chinese quit India now. Like many other Indians, he was not certain of the role of American soldiers in India. But after careful consideration of the whole situation, he modified his "quit India" program: India was to have freedom at once; and if the British and Americans made India an ally, then the British and American forces could stay in India, not only to defend India but to aid China and Russia. Gandhi

made it clear that he would do nothing to jeopardize the freedom of China.

The Working Committee of the All-India National Congress made the position of the Congress clear in a resolution which was published in *The New York Times* on July 18. Its substance was as follows:

The All-India National Congress and its leaders are for world freedom and are therefore anti-Axis and particularly in favor of Chinese and Indian independence; (b) [the Congress] has no objection to receiving the support of Britain and the United States for the defense of India provided Indian independence is recognized and India is accepted as an ally; (c) the only way India can be defended effectively is through a national government of the Indian people who will be willing to make every sacrifice for their own freedom—India must not be another Burma, where the people did not have any faith in Britain; (d) if Britain refuses to relinquish her political authority over India and recognize Indian independence, the All-India Congress will start non-violent non-cooperation against the British government in India, under the direction of Mahatma Gandhi.

This resolution was formally approved on August 7, when Gandhi said that he would try to arrange a conference with the British Viceroy. Gandhi also suggested that the Congress should seek the support of China, Russia, and the United States for mediating the Indian problem on the basis of the recognition of Indian independence. But before any steps could be taken for the settlement of the Indian situation by the leaders of the United Nations—even before Gandhi could write a letter to the Viceroy—he and all of the important leaders of the All-India National Congress were arrested.

The arrest and imprisonment of Gandhi and other leaders without trial is hardly in line with the four freedoms and the Atlantic Charter. The arrests and the following acts of repression (such as use of the "flogging edict") have provoked indignation and greater unrest. . . .

Instead of dropping bombs on Indians from airplanes, shooting down unarmed mobs, and taking other measures of repression the British government might well follow Russia's example. The Soviet Russian government (which, as a virtual ally of Nazi Germany, raped Poland) has changed its policy toward that

country. First it recognized Polish independence, then it made an alliance with Poland. It is giving aid to the Poles in developing a national army. The establishment of a provisional national government of independent India—with certain modifications of the existing machinery and civil and military positions—is not an impossibility, provided the British rulers undergo a change of heart and are willing to give up their domination over the nearly four hundred million Asiatics in India.

It is claimed that it is unwise for Indians to ask for a change of government now: if India were conquered by Japan and Germany, she would be treated much worse than she has been by the British. This argument does not go to the root of the Indian question. Indians do not want to *change* masters—they believe the British have treated them as an "inferior people," and they want to rid themselves of British domination now. If the British are sincere about giving freedom to India later, why not now? The Indians do not ask the British to get out of India now. But they do ask for considerably more responsibility for their own defense and their own government than they have had to date.

The greater part of the world has now expressed itself as opposed, in varying degrees of vigorousness, to fascism as a world order, and thoughtful people in all lands have indicated not only the necessity for liquidating the present Fascist drive for power but the need for clearing the way to a new society in which men everywhere may find security from want, from special privilege, and racial discrimination. Yet Britain, one of the powers committed to fighting fascism, is also committed to imperialism, and surely no one can pretend that imperialistic domination of colonial peoples, imposition of rule from above, and denial of civil liberties differ essentially from some of the principles of fascism.

Truly there should be a "United Nations"—to promote freedom and a just international peace and to replace the existing state of chaos and anarchy that has prevailed among civilized nations (especially of the West). But are the "United Nations," as they are now constituted, the instrument to establish a new world order based upon the ideal of freedom for all? Judging

from actual practice rather than from professions and speeches, the "United Nations" seem to be merely a loose-jointed combination of powers, a kind of *grand alliance* hurriedly thrown together to defeat the rival alliance of powers—the Axis alliance under the leadership of Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese war lords.

The Atlantic Charter is the only foundation of the United Nations so far in existence. Mr. Churchill, of course, has said that the principles of the Charter were worked out for those European states now under Nazi rule and do "not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India, Burma, and other parts of the British Empire." But President Roosevelt, Vice-President Wallace, Secretary of State Hull, and Under-Secretary Welles have asserted that the Charter's provisions would apply to all nations and all parts of the world. Is this the natural momentary confusion of desperate allies or is it something else?

If it is set down as confusion, what becomes of later expressions by international authorities about India? Soviet Russia, by the Molotov-Churchill agreement, consented not to interfere in Great Britain's internal affairs, and on the present crisis in India has remained silent. Even the Chinese government with its recognition of the need for a Pacific Charter, helplessly looks on the situation in India as Great Britain's "domestic affair." And the warning sent by the American State Department to the American armed forces stationed in India not to interfere or participate in internal affairs also indicates (at least to Indians) that America's official stand is: "Britain owns India; Britain is our ally. Therefore, we cannot interfere with Britain's private affairs in India."

This is not to indicate that American opinion is at all unified on the question. On August 17 Senator Elbert D. Thomas, member of the Senate Foreign and Military Affairs Committee, called for a showdown on India, and added that "it is time for the United Nations, who say that they are fighting for the right, to settle some of these international or inter-United Nations questions on the basis of ethics and moral right." Two days

later Senator Robert R. Reynolds, chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, maintained that "we can convince the people of the world of our seriousness and good faith only by requiring our ally, Britain, to grant immediate independence to the 370,000,000 people of India." However questionable were Senator Reynolds' motives in making the speech, there was no doubt in the replies which it evoked from Senators Barclay, Connally, George, Bridges, and Norris that in their opinion Indian independence was still "Britain's affair."

It is also true, of course, that not all the people of Britain agree with Mr. Churchill. The Very Reverend Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, remarked recently that "we might invite all the Allied Powers to join in a guarantee to India that we are really sincere this time in the intention to give the people of India a postwar constitution they desire." But in spite of such friendly protests, the Indians and other Asiatic peoples note that the British government still acts to maintain its system of empire. They still take account of the refusal of the United Nations to recognize the provisional government of Korea established at Chungking as the European governments in exile have been recognized. And from these and other bits of evidence Asiatics ask among themselves: Is it true that this war is being fought to end imperialism? Is it really true that this war is being fought to promote world freedom? Is it really true that this war is being fought to crush the doctrine that *Herrenvolk*, or a superior race, is to dominate the world?

To these peoples the most convincing answer will lie in the attitude of the leaders of the United Nations. If Indian independence is denied, then the peoples of Asia will be justified in regarding the United Nations, like the League of Nations, as an organization to maintain the *status quo*, as supporting Anglo-American imperialism and not forming a solid basis for a new world order.

Since the above was written, Mr. Churchill has made it clear that the British government's settled policy will be to stick by the Cripps proposals. Mr. Amery has charged the Congress Party with indirectly aiding the Japanese invaders and has characterized Mahatma Gandhi as an "arch-saboteur." And Mr.

Cripps has blamed Mr. Gandhi for influencing the Congress to adopt the policy of civil disobedience. The British government refuses to deal further with the Congress leaders or to do other than continue its policy of repression. Its collective mind is closed.

Nevertheless the successful defense of India must in the nature of the case take some other form than forced dispersal of mass Indian demonstrations, levying collective fines on those cities where civil disobedience takes place, public flogging, and shooting. Now the big rains in Bengal are ended, and the Japanese are at the gates. Even if the Indian resistance to British suppression deteriorates in force and as few as ten per cent of the people remain in opposition, the situation will be critical. An American reporter in India has suggested that it is unlikely that the British can take on the Japanese and any part of the Indian people at the same time.

How are the Indians to be rallied to their own, their country's, and the United Nations' defense? The following, not perhaps in natural chronological order, are my suggestions:

a. The British government should be induced to abandon its policy of repression and unconditionally release all Indian political prisoners, including the leaders of the Congress.

b. The British government should make a declaration, approved by the Parliament, recognizing Indian independence. The declaration should be reaffirmed by the United Nations. The civil disobedience campaign will then be automatically called off.

c. To take the place of the present government, arrangements should be made to form a national coalition government in India, represented by all political parties and minority interests. (India will frame her own permanent constitution by an elected constituent assembly on a later date.)

d. The Viceroy of India should at once abandon his veto power and agree to act as governor general, responsible to the Indian legislature.

e. The defense of India in this war affects not only India but others in the United Nations. Therefore a defense council or advisory board, composed of experts from Nationalist India,

Great Britain, the United States, China, and Soviet Russia, should be appointed to explore all possibilities of developing India's military strength in the cause of the United Nations.

f. The above five developments are most likely if President Roosevelt, General Chiang Kai-shek, Premier Stalin, and other leaders of the United Nations take the initiative to see the Indian impasse settled by negotiation and mediation. The British government and the political parties of India should be asked to present their case before a commission of representatives of the United States, China, and other members of the United Nations. The Congress Party would ask, of course, that the case be settled in conformity with the basic principles of freedom for all peoples, recognition of legitimate minority rights (but without partition of India), and recognition of India as an independent nation in alliance with other United Nations.

For the defense of India and the United Nations, negotiations must be reopened. Will the United States, China, Russia take the necessary initiative? Will Britain be induced to accept mediation? Or will it again be "too little and too late"?

A POLICY FOR INDIA ⁶

Nearly four months have passed since the jailing of Nehru, Gandhi, and the leaders of the Indian National Congress, together with the leaders of several other Indian political organizations. During this period we have had an opportunity to judge how successful has been the British policy of intransigent determination to surrender none of the essentials of power to authentic Indian politicians. News from India is meager and even the *London Times* has protested against the severe and uncompromising censorship which has shut off practically all information from this unsettled part of Asia. However, what little information we have seems to indicate that the Churchill policy of future promises, coupled with a present retention of power, has produced something approaching a state of civil

⁶ By Henry Stanley, pseud., Member of the Canadian government. *Free World*. 4:221-4. December, 1942.

war. It seems pretty obvious from all accounts that the British determination to smash Indian nationalist resistance before it has had an opportunity to organize effectively has been successful. There does not appear to be any prospect of a widespread armed revolt by the Indian people. In spite of this "success" of Mr. Churchill's policy it also seems apparent that rioting, bloodshed, and violence have not subsided. It has been casually admitted that Bengal, which has a population four times that of the State of New York, was cut off from the rest of India by the militant activities of Indian partisans. Reports of bombing and sabotage continue to come from the Bombay Presidency. Comments on the loyalty of the Indian police by British officials leave the suggestion that there has been some disaffection even among these people.

The total effect of these hazy details of violence is a feeling of grave uneasiness on the part of a very large number of people. A growing number are in like manner extremely disturbed, not only by the accounts of riot and disorder but by the swing away from Britain and the United Nations of Indian moderates: men like Mr. Rajagopalachariar, the former Premier of the Madras Presidency, the Moslem Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh, the Premier of the province of Sind, and the Indian liberal leader, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. This indicates pretty clearly that men who want a compromise on almost any terms are either fed up or are being driven into opposition by rising popular pressure. There seems to be some defection even in the ranks of the "loyal" Indian princes. The deposition of the Maharajah of Indore may mean anything, but it is disquieting to say the least.

The classic reply to criticisms of British policy in India is that no one except a few Englishmen understand the Indian situation and its vast complexity. It is quite true that India and its problems are not well known and are largely misunderstood, but it is doubtful whether repeated statements about the stubborn separatist character of the Moslems and the evils of the Indian National Congress will assist us along the path of brotherhood with the Indian people.

In his speech of September 10 in the British House of Commons, Mr. Churchill had this to say about the Indian National Congress:

The Indian Congress Party does not represent all India; it does not represent a majority of the people of India; it does not even represent the Hindu masses. It is a political organization built around a party machine and sustained by certain manufacturing and financial interests.

How does this description square with the facts as it is possible to ascertain them from published documents?

The only test of Indian opinion which has ever been permitted by the British government was the election of 1937 held under the authority of the India Act. The high property qualifications for voters excluded all but 20 per cent, or 30 million, of the people of voting age in British India proper, and it can be argued that any vote under such conditions is not representative. In so far, however, as the voting minority is representative of India, the Indian National Congress speaks for the people because it won an overwhelming electoral victory. The Congress had large absolute majorities in six of eleven provinces and the largest single vote in three more. In eight out of the eleven of the provinces of British India the Congress leaders had sufficient popular support to form ministries.

There are no means of measuring accurately the support for the Congress among the unenfranchised masses. The fact that the Congress is committed to the introduction of universal franchise would seem to argue that the Congress leaders are at least not afraid of the unenfranchised people. In so far as it is possible to ascertain opinion in a non-democratic country, it can be justly said that the Indian National Congress is the most representative political organization in India.

Mr. Churchill's references to party machines and financial backing require scrutiny. Like the British Conservative Party, and the Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States, the Indian National Congress receives financial assistance from what may be described as "interests." The principal financial supporters of the Congress are Messrs. Birla and Sarabhai, who have a considerable interest in textiles, life insurance, and several other undertakings. The "interests" are very close to Mr. Gandhi, and it is generally understood that his policies are the most agreeable to them. The friends of Indian business do not, however, run the Indian National Congress. Like the Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States, there

are both reactionary and progressive elements within the Congress. There is a group known as the Congress Socialist Party which operates inside the Congress. Its representative is Jawaharlal Nehru, whose support for democratic socialism is well known. Since 1938, the All-India Trade Union Congress has had a working agreement with the Indian National Congress very similar to that existing between the British Trade Union Congress and the British Labor Party.

The Indian National Congress is, of course, predominantly Hindu, which must necessarily be the case in any country where the Hindus constitute 70 per cent of the population. The Congress is not, however, a sectarian organization. Its president is a Moslem born in Mecca and widely respected as a theologian among Mohammendans. There are several Moslems on the Working Committee, the best known of whom is Dr. Ansari. These men are not just show pieces. They represent the Moslem supporters of the Congress who voted for Congress candidates in the elections of 1937. Moslem candidates endorsed by the Congress won twenty-six of the seats set aside for Moslem voters, and in the Northwest Frontier Province, which is inhabited predominantly by Moslems, the Congress won an absolute majority. The movement of Moslems is toward the Congress. Abdul Gaffar Khan, the leader of the Moslem Red Shirt Organization, has joined the Indian National Congress, and, it should be added, he has recently gone to jail. The Congress has been officially endorsed as the representative Indian political organization by the religious organization of the Shias, a Moslem sect numbering 16,000,000.

There is a prevalent impression that the vast majority of the ninety million Moslems in British India are opposed to the Congress policy of working for an independent, united Indian state. This impression does not square with the facts. Apart from those who support the Indian National Congress, Moslems are organized in a number of political parties. The best known of these is the Moslem League. In the election of 1937, candidates supported by the Moslem League secured 321,772 votes of the 7,319,445 Moslem votes cast. Contrary to popular belief, the greatest concentration of Moslems in India

is in Bengal, where there are 27,000,000 of them. In this province the Moslem League won 40 seats, the Indian National Congress 50 seats, Moslem independents, 43 seats, and the Proja Party (a poor peasants party) 38 seats. In the provinces of Sind and the Punjab, where there are also large concentrations of Moslems, the Moslem League won only one seat. The by-elections of the last five years in these two provinces have revealed a considerable increase in the League's strength in this area, but their gains have not been sufficient to alter the general picture. In the United Provinces, which, next to Bengal, is on the basis of the electoral record, the League's strongest area, the League won 27 seats, the Indian National Congress 134 seats, and the Moslem independents 30 seats.

These electoral figures show that the Moslem League is not the representative Moslem organization. It is very largely a landowners and lawyers party and it has practically no following among the poor Moslem peasants who constitute the vast majority of Indian Moslems. The League supports Indian independence, however, and Mr. Jinnah, its spokesman, associated himself with Nehru and Azad in rejecting the Cripps proposals. The Moslem League's stand on the question of a separate Moslem state has become well defined in the past two years, but from his recent statements it seems equally clear that Mr. Jinnah would not reject office in any provisional government of a united India provided he was given real power.

The Moslem League is the only Moslem political organization which has flirted with the idea of a separate Moslem state. The other organizations: the Proja Party in Bengal, the Jamiat Ul-Ulema, the Ahrars, and the Red Shirt Organization of Abdul Gaffar Khan support Indian *independence and unity*. This is also the case of the religious organization of the Momin sect, the All-Indian Momin Conference. This organization speaks for 45,000,000 Moslems, and it has gone on record as favoring Indian independence and the convocation of a constituent assembly.

A good many Moslems, particularly in northwestern India, are not within any political organization. These independents provide the support which exists for the governments of the

Punjab and Sind which remained in office when the Congress ministries in the other provinces quit on the outbreak of war in 1939. Today the Premier of the Punjab, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, is still in office and presumably supports the policies of the Viceroy's government. The Premier of Sind, Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh, has resigned since the beginning of the armed repression of the Indian National Congress and other militant Indian political organizations. He has also returned all honors and decorations given him by the British.

When the facts relating to the political position of the Moslems are carefully examined, it becomes clear that the Moslem population, far from constituting a danger to any authentically Indian provisional government which may be set up, is so well disposed to Indian unity and independence that Moslems are likely to be active supporters of such a national government. Separatist Moslems are a small minority of the Moslem community, and the one Moslem organization which has toyed with separatism has only recently dared to advocate a separate Moslem state in categorical terms.

No serious person can help regretting the civil disobedience campaign which has broken out in India. It is possible, however, to understand if not to approve it. Whatever Mr. Gandhi may be in politics, he has become a symbol for the Indian people: a symbol of poverty, simplicity, and austerity. His arrest at a time when he had offered to negotiate with the Viceroy has driven many Indians crazy with exasperation. It is not hard to believe that, were a foreign government to imprison Mr. Churchill, not a few Englishmen would start throwing stones at the police, blowing up railway lines, and chopping down telephone poles. They would do this whether it was in their ultimate interest or not, and such action would be a worthy manifestation of the human spirit.

The unrest in India today is a testimony to the fact that Indians can and will fight. In a recent letter to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Gandhi states that the majority of the Indian people do not accept his policy of non-violent, non-cooperation. This being so, the problem for us is to canalize

these fighting energies against the enemy and away from Britain, which already has enough to do.

It seems pretty evident that the present Indian policy of the British government in all its integrity can accomplish little more than the suppression of the immediate threat of internal anarchy. It contains within it no political dynamic capable of rallying the people of India for the attack and the defense. In many respects the policy laid down by Mr. Churchill on September 10 resembles that of the Czar following the abortive uprisings of 1905-06. It differs in this important respect, that the Czar had the advantage of being at least a symbol of Russian nationalism. Neither the King-Emperor nor the Viceroy has this advantage.

More and more people in North America, Britain, and China are becoming from all accounts gravely worried by the state of affairs in India. There seems to be emerging from this anxiety a belief in the necessity of some common action by the United Nations; some action of international readjustment which rises above national sovereignty and demonstrates that the United Nations stand for a new international order.

The concrete suggestions made under this head are worth looking at. There should be formed at once an international body representative of the United Nations on which there would sit men from Great Britain, the British Dominions, the United States, China, the U.S.S.R., and at least one representative of the exiled European governments and at least one representative of the Latin American States. This body should have plenary powers to assist in the establishment of a provisional government in India drawn from the ranks of authentic Indian politicians with a popular following who are prepared to fight against the Axis and preserve Indian unity. It should be frankly agreed that defense policy must be entirely within the power of the provisional government, and Chinese advisers, because of their familiarity with the problems of mass resistance as they exist in Asia and because of their record of successful resistance to Japan, should be sent to help guide the steps of the new government.

There is growing support for such a policy. From all accounts, Colonel Louis Johnson, President Roosevelt's representative in India, did all he could to insure agreement between Cripps and the Indian leaders. This indicates that Mr. Roosevelt would welcome a solution of the Indian problem. Mr. Willkie has demonstrated that he will support any steps that may be taken to draw India into the world front against the Axis. In Canada, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation has called for a solution based on joint action by the United Nations. In Britain, no political party has yet advocated joint action, but the liberal *Manchester Guardian*, the socialist *New Statesman and Nation*, and the communist *Daily Worker* have spoken out strongly in support of some action by the United Nations; the *London Economist* seems well disposed to some humane settlement, although it has not specifically endorsed the policy suggested.

The Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, has said: "Much is being said about a new world order to take the place of the old world order when the war is at an end. If that new order is not already on its way before the war is over, we may look for it in vain." This seems to apply exactly to our relations with India, and indeed with all the peoples of Asia. We have to build a new order to win the war, and that order will make the peace good and true.

INDIA: OUR DANGER AND OUR DUTY ⁷

A year ago Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter, pledging their countries to "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." Today all the peoples of all the United Nations are menaced with irreparable calamity by the tragic conflict between alien government and an unfree people which has been allowed to break out in India.

The British decision to outlaw the Indian National Congress at a time when no overt act of disobedience had taken place

⁷ Letter by Frederick L. Schuman, Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government, Williams College, to the *Washington Post*. *Congressional Record*. 88:7119-20. August 20, 1942.

and Gandhi was preparing an appeal to the Viceroy and to the United Nations for further negotiations is regarded by many as justified. Leopold Amery defends the decision as necessary to "save India and the Allied cause from a grave disaster," threatened by the "wicked folly" of the Mahatma and his colleagues. Yet even those who accept this view know in their hearts that there could be no graver disaster to the cause of freedom than what has happened in India and no folly more wicked than the folly which seeks to save India from her enemies through a policy of terrorization indorsed by her friends.

All Americans have a solemn duty to themselves, to their sons, and to their comrades in arms against tyranny all over the globe to demand that this road to ruin be abandoned at once, regardless of responsibility for past mistakes. To "wait and see" will be to commit once more the crime of "too little and too late" in an arena of battle which is the home of one-sixth of the human race. An India ruled by force and torn by rebellion is an India mortgaged to the common enemy. Shame-faced silence on the part of Americans and Britons of good will may indeed enable Mr. Amery and those of like mind to restore order by crushing the Congress movement. . . . A sullen and beaten India will go the way of Malaya, Java, and Burma, where many of the natives, in sharp contrast to the Filipinos, saw nothing to choose between our cause and that of the foe.

Such an India will never be saved by British or American troops. To lose India tomorrow by American default today will be to doom China to subjugation, to deliver all the Middle East to the Axis, and to force the armies of Russia behind the Urals, regardless of any second front. The sequel for Britain can only be invasion. The sequel for America can only be an endless and all but hopeless war against opponents who will rule the world.

These strategic consequences will flow inexorably from the moral blindness of those who believe that the armed coercion of subject peoples, however misled they may be, is compatible with a world-wide fight for freedom. The Tory mind which once courted catastrophe by meeting Nazi violence with non-violence is now courting an incalculably greater catastrophe by

meeting Indian non-violence with violence. "The age of imperialism," declared Sumner Welles only two months ago, "is ended." "The four freedoms of common humanity," asserts President Roosevelt, "are the rights of men of every creed and every race, wherever they live. The belief in man, created free, in the image of God, is the crucial difference between ourselves and the enemies we face today. Here is our strength, the source and promise of victory."

That strength and that promise cannot be cast away for any reason, good or bad, without giving victory to the foe. Every Indian who languishes in a British jail, who screams under a British lash, who dies before a British gun, will become a symbol of despair for millions of the colored peoples of the earth. These silent and waiting multitudes will conclude, wrongly, no doubt, but nonetheless irrevocably, that Western white men offer them only fair words and foul deeds, that the darker peoples have no stake in a war between rival oppressors, and that Axis arrogance may be more tolerable than democratic hypocrisy. Men of all races cannot work or fight effectively for freedom if their leaders care so little for the cause as to permit the torment which is being suffered by India today.

The time to act is now. A year ago a group of Americans privately urged upon Lord Halifax and the Department of State American mediation between Britain and the principal Indian political groups. Events have confirmed the impossibility of successful negotiations limited to Britishers and Indians. "We have tried our best to agree," said Sir Stafford Cripps last April. "We have failed. Never mind whose fault it is." Agreement through outside action has now been rendered much more difficult and infinitely more imperative by the obstructive policies of the Congress leaders and, in even greater measure, by the rash action of London in imprisoning those leaders and shedding Indian blood in the name of India's defense.

These difficulties cannot conceivably be resolved either by the forcible suppression of the Congress nor by the forcible overthrow of British rule. They can only be resolved by all the United Nations insisting upon an immediate settlement under United Nations auspices. "Our allies," writes the *Manchester*

Guardian, "the United States, China, and Russia, should help us to compose a quarrel which injured every one of them."

This is America's opportunity, for only America enjoys the confidence of all. Let Americans everywhere ask their President to join with the leaders of China and Russia in proposing arbitration of the Indian conflict. Let the proposal expressly contemplate the preparation by a United Nations tribunal of a plan for the establishment within the next 3 months of a provisional government of an independent India, linked in war and peace alike to the British Commonwealth and the United Nations as a free and equal partner. This will be no more than the British government has promised for the future and no less than the Indian leaders have asked for the present. Let the tribunal include an American, a Britisher, a Russian, and a Chinese, plus representatives of the Moslem League and the Congress. Let all pledge themselves in advance to accept whatever plan may be proposed by the tribunal. A settlement acceptable to all can be realized only by pooling the wisdom and goodwill of all. As a pledge of good faith, let the present government of India cease all repression and release all political prisoners and let the Congress leaders suspend their campaign of non-cooperation. No leader anywhere will dare to reject a proposal for such a tribunal. No leader anywhere will dare to reject its conclusions. In no other way can India be saved.

To shirk this opportunity is to invite defeat. To seize upon it will be to pave the way to victory by showing all mankind that the United Nations can translate freedom into creative action and can plan now, by democratic means, for the free world of the future. India has become the acid test of our fitness to survive. To fail here will be to fail everywhere. To succeed here will be to prove the truth of the President's words: "We of the United Nations have the power and the men and the will at last to assure man's heritage."

EXCERPTS

The antagonism between Hindu and Moslem is much less acute than it used to be; it is India's problem to work out its

own solution to the best way to govern itself. American interest in the progress of this effort should remain one of keen interest, non-interference. What is most important is that we of the west should better understand and evaluate the lives and customs, of these peoples, the cultures of Asia, for they are going along with us in the world fight for freedom.—*Manly Palmer Hall, Philosopher. Horizon. Ap. '42. p. 4.*

Mr. Churchill also mentioned that "95,000,000 subjects of the Indian princes, to whom we are bound by treaty, are outside and fundamentally opposed" to the Congress Party. It is only fair that the British public should be reminded that these treaties were not made with those vast masses of people, but only with the few princes. Being also a subject of an Indian state, I know how some of the princes, backed up by British power, ruthlessly suppress all movements supporting the Congress.

If the "settled policy of the British government" to which "no one can add anything," is to be based upon treaties which were made long ago when imperialistic conquest was the approved order of the day, one is driven to the tragic feeling that all this loss of millions of lives and the sad tears shed by mothers and children may be in vain. The final list of fifth columnists in this gigantic struggle for human freedom and world peace, compiled by the stern hand of Time, may be very different from the one which the present British government may compile.—*Dr. G. D. Boaz. London. New Statesman and Nation. S. 19, '42. p. 189.*

We want independence and not dominion or other status. Every thinking person knows that the whole conception of dominion status belongs to past history; it has no future. It cannot survive this war, whatever was the result of this war. But whether it survives or not, we want none of it. We do not want to be bound down to a group of nations which has dominated over and exploited us; we will not be in an empire in some parts of which we are treated as helots and where racialism runs riot.

We want to cut adrift from the financial domination of the city of London. We want to be completely free, with no reservations or exceptions, except such as we ourselves approve, in common with others, in order to join a federation of nations, or a new world order. If this new world order or federation does not come in the near future we should like to be closely associated in a federation with our neighbors—China, Burma, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Iran. We are prepared to take risks and face dangers. We do not want the so-called protection of the British Army or Navy. We shall shift for ourselves.—*Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Nationalist Leader. Asia. N. '40. p. 599.*

The people of the United States view the situation in India with great alarm because it threatens the victory of the United Nations. With increasing numbers of our troops and vast quantities of our supplies in India, we have been offered and have accepted a large share of her defense which may involve the fate of China and her continued ability to participate in the war. Failure to use the full might of India's 400,000,000 people in the all-out war effort against the Axis would be paid for by the lives of Americans and of our allies.

We are well aware of the efforts of all parties to reach a solution and of the immense difficulties involved. We are bound by the closest ties with our British allies in their gallant struggle for human freedom. We are in fullest accord with the people of India in their legitimate aspirations for self-government.

We therefore urge that President Roosevelt tender the good offices of the United States in cooperation with other members of the United Nations to obtain the full participation of the Indian people in the war and to assure their political freedom.—*Statement signed and endorsed by 151 prominent Americans. Congressional Record. O. 6, '42. p. A3854.*

The cause of India is the cause of all supporters of democracy throughout the world. It is peculiarly the cause of all us Americans who, since our own struggle for independence, have

supported the aspirations of all other peoples battling against alien rule. Her cause squares with the declared aims of the war and of the peace in terms of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter.

The argument that freedom should not be accorded in war-time is to us wholly without merit. The problem of the transfer of power presents no insuperable obstacles. India is sufficiently united under the leadership of the National Congress to maintain order and to help in her defense. The lesson of other colonial countries which have not offered resistance to aggression could be sufficient argument in itself of the imperative need for meeting India's aspirations now. In no other way can her will to resist be mobilized.

The whole struggle for democratic freedom hinges upon mobilizing the democratic forces throughout the world against fascism. Not words but deeds will arouse the enthusiasm of masses of men who doubt the professions of democratic aims without their reality. In this spirit we urge the greatest possible expression of American support of the cause of India's freedom. —*From Resolution adopted at Town Hall Meeting, New York, August 6, 1942, and sent to President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Mr. Nehru. "Freedom for India Now." Post War World Council. '42. p. 25.*

Probably the last hope of India taking her proper place in the war disappeared with the 1931 election. One of the many casualties of that unhappy affair was the Indian Minister of Defence. This obvious reform had the support of nearly every delegate to the Round Table Conference. If that concession had been granted, as it nearly was in 1930, we might now have an Indian army drawn from all parts of the country, a better balanced, far more efficient force. . . . The Conference wilted immediately after the election. The India Office once more took control. Indian defence remained in the hands of the old gang at Simla, the successors of those responsible for the Mesopotamian fiasco.

I have always found Indian politicians intensely interested in army affairs, and completely realist about them. Nehru is

far keener on modernizing the army than on Indianizing it. Dr. Moonji, of the Hindu Mahasabha is fantastically keen about organizing the manpower of the Deccan. It is unfortunate that Gandhi's pacifism should have confused the issue. His outlook is that of a Jain and not of a typical Hindu. Other Indian publicans criticize the Army Department and grumble at their estimates. This is not because they do not want an army, but because they believe that it is not being organized in the interests of India. It is useless to blame them for being destructive critics. They have never been given a chance of being anything else. It is worth considering what they chiefly dislike about the present arrangements.—*Captain Geoffrey T. Garratt, Indian Civil Service. New Statesman and Nation. My. 9, '42. p. 300.*

Let us try to distinguish between certain fictions and the facts. . . . The facts: India, which is as big as all Europe minus Russia, speaks no more languages than other territory of similar size and population: there are eleven languages and a common speech in Hindu-Irdu (the tiny Philippines alone have eight languages and 87 dialects); that India is composed of a highly civilized people who have not been invaded and conquered any more frequently on the average than other peoples in three thousand years of recorded history; that India had a highly developed economy eminently suited to her geographic needs; that there is a historical tradition of freedom and democracy at least two millennia old in India that has survived and flourished during all invasions, including the English; in ratio to its population, there are comparatively few religions in India, the religious level is remarkably high and tolerant, and the Hindu-Muslim problem . . . is an artificial English irritant.

According to the English fiction, there is a double standard of democracy, that which applies in England and other conveniently located countries, and that which applies in India. When a Scottish marquis rules India with power of absolute veto, that's democracy; but should the major political party of India rule India, that, say the English, would be dictatorship. (In April, 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps actually said that a re-

sponsible Indian national cabinet government "would in fact constitute an absolute dictatorship of the majority.") In England people vote as Englishmen and do not vote as Catholics or Presbyterians; but in India, Indians may not vote as Indians but must vote only as Muslims or Christians, etc. In England, the peerage has renounced its feudal rights; but in India feudal rights are "guaranteed" to Indian princes as a British "obligation." In England, the freedom of the press is a sacred right; but in India the press may be suspended, muzzled, heavily fined and prohibited at all times. . . . The self-determination of peoples, great and small, is England's battle cry; it applies everywhere—except in India. Even Abyssinia has been declared as "now fit to be free"—but not India.—*Frances Gunther (Mrs. John Gunther). Common Sense. O. '42. p. 328.*

We have recently been hearing from the British spokesmen in this country that the 60 million Untouchables are perturbed over the growing demand for freedom lest they, without the protecting hand of the British, be delivered to the tender mercies of the Hindus. It is rather strange that the British, having acted as the super-Brahmins of India, should suddenly become solicitous about the plight of India's down-trodden.

Let Dr. Ambedkar, the much advertised leader of the Untouchables and for the moment *persona gratissima* with the British speak: (*Depressed Classes Congress, Aug. 1930.*)

I am afraid that the British choose to advertise our unfortunate conditions, not with the object of removing them, but only because such a course serves well as an excuse for retarding the political progress of India. . . . Before the British you were in the loathsome condition due to your untouchability. Has the British government done anything to remove your untouchability? Before the British you could not draw water from the village well. Has the British government secured you the right to the well? Before the British you could not enter the temple. Can you enter now? Before the British you were denied entry into the police force. Does the British government admit you in the force? Before the British you were not allowed to serve in the military. Is that career now open to you? Gentlemen, to none of these questions can you give an affirmative answer. Those who have held so much power over the country for such a long time must have done some good. But there is certainly no fundamental improvement in your position. So far

as you are concerned, the British government has accepted the arrangements as it found them and has preserved them faithfully in the manner of the Chinese tailor who, when given an old coat as a pattern, produced with pride an exact replica, rents, patches and all. Your wrongs have remained as open sores and they have not been righted.

Nobody can remove your grievances as well as you can, and you cannot remove them unless you get political power in your own hands. No share of this political power can come to you so long as the British government remains as it is. It is only in a *Swaraj* constitution that you stand any chance of getting the political power into your own hands without which you cannot bring salvation to your people.

—*India To-Day*. D. '42. p. 2.

The vast majority of the world's opinion is in full sympathy with India's aspirations for freedom. This sympathy, which is so valuable and so difficult to obtain, cannot be appraised in terms of money or material, and should therefore by all means be retained. The present struggle is one between freedom and slavery, between light and darkness, between good and evil, between resistance and aggression. Should the anti-aggression front lose the war, the civilization of the world would suffer a setback for at least 100 years, and there would be no end to human sufferings. . . .

In these horrible times of savagery and brute force, the people of China and their brethren the people of India should, for the sake of civilization and human freedom, give their united support to the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter and in the joint declaration of the 26 nations, and ally themselves with the anti-aggression front. I hope the Indian people will wholeheartedly join the Allies—namely, China, Great Britain, America and the Soviet Union—and participate shoulder to shoulder in the struggle for survival of a free world until complete victory has been achieved and the duties incumbent upon them in these troubled times have been fully discharged.

I sincerely hope, and I confidently believe, that our ally, Great Britain, without waiting for any demands on the part of the people of India, will as speedily as possible give them real political power, so that they may be in a position further

to develop their spiritual and material strength and thus realize that their participation in the war is not merely an aid to the anti-aggression nations for the securing of victory, but also the turning-point in their struggle for India's freedom. From an objective point of view, I am of the opinion that this would be the wisest policy, which will redound to the credit of the British Empire—*Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, China. Message to the Indian People, Feb. 21, '42. Inter-Allied Review. Mr. 15, '42. p. 47-8.*

India today is America's problem. It is the common problem of the United Nations, but as Washington has become the center of the United Nations, the responsibility rests heavily upon the shoulders of America. But because America is a democracy, and because every individual comment of American editors and public men is carefully studied in London, India's problem is peculiarly the responsibility of the American public.

It is a plain fact that today London will not do a single thing that the American public would not stand for. If, therefore, the British government has gone ahead with the policy of suppressing the Indian revolution by ruthless force, it is because London thinks she has America's tacit approval. It is not a mere figure of speech to say that when whips descend on the bare backs of Hindus, all the allies of the United Nations are whipping them, and when Hindu women or children are shot, it is we, and not England alone, who are shooting them.

Whatever the effect of this rule of force in India may be on the outcome of the war, Americans and Chinese and all other allies will reap its benefits or share its disaster. If India is made perfect for a Japanese invasion by further whipping and shooting of Indians, and if Japan invades Calcutta, China is the first country to be vitally affected.

But the more ugly fact is that the diplomacy of the United Nations, instead of rising to the occasion, continues with the fiction that what happens in the British Empire is, according to peacetime tradition, not the affair of the United States or of China. Consequently, an event of the greatest importance to the cause of the Allies is allowed, through an unrealistic sense

of wartime necessities, to drift toward certain catastrophe. While the settlement of the Indian question in terms of justice will affect the faith or suspicion of one billion Asiatics and hundreds of millions of the South Americans in United States leadership, we continue to wash our hands of the matter in order to be scrupulously and diplomatically "correct." In other words, we are still conducting the global war of the United Nations with a Bourbon psychology.

A still uglier fact arises out of the situation. From the assumption that India is England's private affair, we have gone ahead, under the false sense of unity, to assume that loyalty to the United Nations means loyalty to England, and loyalty to England in the India question means loyalty to the English Tories, and loyalty to the English means loyalty to Amercy.—*Dr. Lin Yutang, Chinese Author. Radio address under the auspices of the Post War World Council, August 18, 1942.*

The Congress challenge, in present circumstances, is to be judged not against the background of political disputes between this party and the British power in India, but solely with regard to its effect on the fortunes of the United Nations and, ultimately, on the fortunes of India herself. There is little to commend in an "open rebellion" which is likely to imperil the cause of freedom the world over. Much can be said for a policy of resistance to such rebellion in order that freedom may prevail everywhere.

The immediate outlook in India may appear dubious and dark. But in the long perspective of human affairs it is not only undesirable to give way to pessimism; it would be imprudent to let passing shadows permanently obscure the future.

Whatever the trials and anxieties of the weeks and months ahead, two conclusions may be stated with certainty.

First, India after the war will be free. Not only is Great Britain committed to the transfer of power to Indians, but Indian patriotism will not indefinitely suffer with patience the distrust and differences which have so far hampered the full realization of Indian self-government. The return of peace will create opportunities for discussion, for adjustment and for

experiment which, under the fearful stress and hazard of war, are difficult to accomplish.

Second, this free India will not be of the totalitarian but of the democratic pattern. The ideology of its political leaders, formed by the study of the liberal literature of the West and inspired by a firm faith in democracy as a beneficent force, is sufficient guarantee of that. Those who have been nurtured in the literature of liberty which glows from the pages of Milton and Burke and Mill, of Diderot and Condorcet, of Jefferson and Lincoln, may be trusted to resist the crude seductions of Herr Goebbels and Signor Gayda or the sibilant propagandists of Japan.

Along with free China, free India may be relied upon to play, in the economic reconstruction of the postwar world, a part commensurate with her resources, and in the new international regime which all free men hope will emerge from their victory to preserve both moral and material security in a decent world, a part commensurate with her immemorial tradition of a serene and immutable loyalty to the cause of peace and goodwill among men.—*Sir Girja Bajpai, Agent-General for India in the United States, in address before the World Federation of Educational Associations. Bulletins From Britain. Ag. 12, '42. p. 12.*

Americans are surprised by and indignant over Gandhi's latest move because they were never told the real truth behind the Cripps failure. They have never been told that Cripps failed primarily not because, as has so much been advertised here, Indians could not agree among themselves, but because Britain flatly refused to curtail the dictatorial powers of the Viceroy in India, without which curtailment any provisional Indian government would have been an impressive farce. They have never been told that Cripps failed not because Indians grudged British military control—as has been widely broadcast in America—but because they insisted upon sharing military responsibility so that Indian leaders could galvanize the Indian masses to fight for the common cause of freedom. The Americans have not been told that Indians were willing to give even

more power to General Wavell, provided a genuinely representative, responsible Indian were made Minister of Defense. And Americans have never been told that India's leaders have openly accused Cripps of going back on the assurances he originally gave them. But most revealing of all, it has never been stressed here that Cripps made the admission in the House of Commons that the question of minorities—on which the whole negotiations are supposed to have fallen through—was never once discussed with the Congress leaders.

Whatever Americans may think of Cripps offer, to the Indians it was final proof of Britain's reluctance to relax even ever so slightly her imperial control over India now, whatever her promises might be for the future, and in the last analysis India's reaction is what counts.

Cripps failure engendered in India a wave of bitterness. Some people are even showing delight over Japanese victories. The Japanese have for some time been maneuvering a puppet government for India. India was in danger of falling an easy prey to Japan. Gandhi had to stem the fatal tide in India, and this he is doing by revitalizing the fight for freedom. If this is granted, India is committed by her solemn pledge to unconditionally fight shoulder to shoulder on the side of the United Nations.—*Dr. Anup Singh, Research Director, India League. Freedom for India Now. Post War World Council. '42. p. 18-19.*

We believe that it is the inalienable right of the Indian people as of any other people to have freedom and to enjoy the fruits of their toil and have the necessities of life so that they may have full opportunities of growth. We believe also that if any government deprives a people of these rights and oppresses them the people have a further right to alter it or to abolish it. The British government in India has not only deprived the Indian people of their freedom but has ruined India economically, politically, culturally and spiritually. We believe therefore that India must sever the British connection and obtain *Purna Swaraj* or complete independence.

We recognize that the most effective way of gaining our freedom is not through violence. India has gained strength and self-reliance and marched a long way to *Swaraj* following peaceful and legitimate methods, and it is by adhering to these methods that our country will attain independence.

We pledge ourselves anew to independence of India and solemnly resolve to carry on non-violently the struggle for freedom till *Purna Swaraj* is attained.

We believe that non-violent action in general and preparation for non-violent direct action in particular require successful working of the constructive program of *khadi* (weaving), communal harmony and removal of untouchability. We shall seek every opportunity of spreading goodwill among fellow men without distinction of caste or creed. We shall endeavor to raise from ignorance and poverty those who have been neglected and to advance in every way those who are considered to be backward or suppressed. We know that though we are out to destroy the imperialistic system, we have no quarrel with Englishmen, whether officials or non-officials. We know that the distinction between caste Hindus and Harijans (Untouchables) must be abolished, and Hindus have to forget these distinctions in their daily conduct. Such distinctions are a bar to non-violent conduct. Though our religious faiths may be different, in our mutual relations we will act as children of Mother India, bound by common nationality and common political and economic interest.

Charka (spinning-wheel) and *khadi* (hand woven home-spun cloth) are integral parts of our constructive program for the resuscitation of the 700,000 villages of India and for the removal of the grinding poverty of the masses. We shall, therefore, spin regularly and use for our personal requirements nothing but *khadi* and as far as possible products of the village handicrafts only, and endeavor to make others do likewise. We pledge ourselves to the disciplined observance of Congress principles and policies and to keep in readiness to respond to the call of the Congress whenever it may come for carrying on her struggle for the independence of India.—*India's Declaration of Independence, with recently adopted revisions. Prepared by*

Mahatma Gandhi and originally proclaimed December 31, by Jawaharlal Nehru, then President of the Indian National Congress; renewed as a yearly pledge in January. India To-Day. Ja. '43. p. 1.

The danger has been present and evident that should Great Britain suddenly step out there'd be civil war among these states—religious war, bitter, evil, and vile, without principle. Every native prince would consider himself a potential conqueror of India, in the superstition of the second coming of Genghis Khan. Extremely dangerous as this situation is to 360,000,000 people, it is almost a certainty that in a day when India will be completely independent and left alone, the Indian princes will unite to reconcile most of their differences under a powerful leader like Gandhi.

Attention thus focuses on the point that India can arise, and when and if it does the force of that rising will be great. If it is accompanied with a hearty hatred of things Western, we will have earned it as peoples who have exploited the East. Europe, in gradual return to feudalism, has been losing its position of world power. America is younger and stronger. But to the eyes of India our weakness would stand revealed in our desperate effort to build our young nation on a basis of economics and rule of money; we have signally failed to evolve a civilization fortified in culture, one that rests on the soul. And this we must recognize: Any nobility of the American national purpose is one thing, the actions of individuals are something else; it would be difficult indeed to find a more individually selfish people than we who reside in the U. S. This is a time for America to watch her step. Asia is awakening. It means that the day is not far distant when human beings must come into a new pattern of adjustment with each other, and the time is now for realization that this earth is too small for factions, for race prejudice, for nationalism's destructive moods.

We in this generation are pioneers in a world building toward the sure knowledge that on this earth is room enough for everybody, things enough for everybody, to a recognition

of the need for motives nobler, truer, more rational, saner, finer. India points now to the necessity for us to bind ourselves with the bonds of fraternity to peaceful nations that may soon be forced, under new order ideologies whose origin is in the Western world, to take over and dominate the world's warring factions. We may well watch with anxious eyes the awakened might of a long somnolent East.—*Manly Palmer Hall, Philosopher. Horizon. Ap. '42. p. 3.*

Of the total area of India, 1,576,000 square miles, the [Native] States occupy 690,000 square miles. Of the total population of India, 388,800,000, the people of the states number 92,973,000. There are 584 states. A 1939 report of the States' Peoples' Conference says that these range in size.

from Hyderabad with a population of 14 millions and an annual revenue of eight and a half crores of rupees (£6,315,975) to the State of Bilbari, a tiny speck too small for the map, having a population of 27 souls and an annual revenue of eighty rupees (£6).

Only sixteen out of almost six hundred states have a population of more than a million. About 325 have a population of less than 10,000. The states territories are so situated geographically that unless they are politically compatible and allied with the rest of the country, there can be no hope of a unified, strongly democratic India.

The Congress leaders and the people of the states cry out for action. The princes talk louder and louder about their treaties. "They have always flourished them whenever it came to the question of meeting the demands of their subjects of participation in the task of government," says the *Hindustan Times*. The British government still talks about these treaties. Lord Halifax has recently told an American audience that "the independence of the princes is enshrined in solemn treaties between them and their King-Emperor." And Mr. Churchill, on September 11, made the astonishing statement that:

Outside that party [Congress], and fundamentally opposed to it, are [various groups including] the . . . 95,000,000 subjects of the princes of India, with whom we are bound by treaty . . .

There is nothing to be gained from blaming history for having "imposed" these treaties on England. The question for us today is whether a legal obligation to the Indian princes takes precedence over a moral obligation to the Indian people—and to the whole cause of democracy. For in practical terms, if Britain cannot see its way clear to divest itself of its obligations to the princes of India, what will be the consequences for India, for the United Nations, and for America?

The answer is clear. Whatever their historical justification, these treaties today perpetuate an anachronistic, minority bloc of nearly 600 princes who—for the most part—stand in the way of representative government for their 93,000,000 subjects, who delay a union between these millions and the other millions of India which is a necessary condition of their further social progress. Any bloc which opposes democracy and unity for India is an enemy of the United Nations, no matter how many rupees it gives to the war fund, no matter how many soldiers it sends to the front. Any tacit support which is given that bloc is a blow at the cause for which we fight. The maintenance of outworn and anti-democratic treaties is too high a price to pay for victory in a people's war.—*Jenny F. Poleman. Far Eastern Survey. S. 21, '42. p. 201.*

Being myself an East Indian and a former member of the Bombay Legislature, I know that all Indians want freedom. India's national consciousness is the greatest gain India has had from British rule. Differences of opinion on the type and time of freedom only deepen India's eagerness for it. If Britain is determined to give India her freedom, she can find enough reasons to give it or just as many and more reasons for not giving it.

I am sure that the following plan will help solve the question of India's freedom:

1. India be declared free now.
2. The Central and Provincial Legislatures be composed of representatives of the different political, communal and religious groups, which are known to be fourteen in number, viz: National Congress, Moslem League, Depressed Class

Federation, Indian Christian Conference, Sikh Union, Jewish Union, Parsee Panchayat, Anglo-Indian Association, Liberal Federation, Native States Council, Labor Federation, Trade Union, Hindu Maha Sabha, European Association.

3. The nationally accepted spokesmen of such groups be appointed as the first Central Legislature, with power to form Provincial Legislatures, responsible to it.

4. The Viceroy and Provincial Governors to be retained as now for the duration of this war.

5. The Central and Provincial Executive Councils be formed of members of legislatures chosen by the Viceroy and Governors on the merit of influence and cooperative spirit.

6. The Commander-in-Chief be in charge of India's war effort, with an Indian Defense Minister.

7. All recruitments for the Indian civil and military service hereafter be of Indian nationals.

8. Each native state be considered a province, with its ruler as the governor and an administration similar to other provinces.

9. All states together form a central states federation for co-ordination, which should act jointly with the other central legislatures on matters of general policy and appeals.

10. Britain retain her freedom of trade in India for the present as heretofore.

11. Matters of disagreement between the two legislatures or the Viceroy be referred to an International Court of the United Nations.

12. National executive presidents chosen by the respective legislatures to succeed the Viceroy, Governors and Commander-in-Chief after this war.

13. In case of a civil war in India, an International Court of the United Nations should step in and make adjustments.

14. The present British employes in the Indian government be retained in service according to their contracts if they choose to stay.

15. After the war the British Army be retained in India or not according to the decision of the joint session of the two central legislatures.

16. A Central War Council be formed of representatives of the two central legislatures, with branches in provinces, states and elsewhere.

17. The Central War Council may be represented at the Pacific and Atlantic War Councils of the United Nations.

18. All political prisoners be freed and the present ordinances against the nationalist movement be removed.

19. An Indian national committee to frame the postwar constitution for India be formed by the central legislatures, this constitution to be later acted upon by the joint session of the legislatures.

20. India's envoys to Washington, Moscow, London, Chungking be selected by the Viceroy's Executive Council.

Finally, if India's freedom is now withheld only in order to insure her greater participation in this war on the side of the United Nations and for her defense, neither of these can be facilitated by even temporarily repressing her aspirations for freedom.—*Letter by R. S. Modak, Buffalo, N.Y. New York Times. Ag. 18, '42. p. 20.*

Many [people] asked me the question which has become almost a symbol all through Asia: What about India? Now I did not go to India and I do not propose to discuss that tangled question tonight. But it has one aspect, in the East, which I should report to you. From Cairo on, it confronted me at every turn. The wisest man in China said to me:

When the aspirations of India for freedom were put aside to some future unguaranteed date, it was not Great Britain that suffered in public esteem in the Far East. It was the United States.

This wise man was not quarreling with British imperialism in India when he said this—a benevolent imperialism, if you like. He does not happen to believe in it, but he was not even talking about it. He was telling me, and through me, you, that by our silence on India we have already drawn heavily on our reservoir of goodwill in the East. People of the East who would like to count on us are doubtful. They cannot ascertain from our government's wishy-washy attitude toward the problem of India what we are likely to feel at the end of

the war about all the other hundreds of millions of Eastern peoples. They cannot tell from our vague and vacillating talk whether or not we really do stand for freedom, or what we mean by freedom.

In Africa, in the Middle East, throughout the Arab world, as well as in China and the whole Far East, freedom means the orderly but scheduled abolition of the colonial system. I can assure you that this is true. I can assure you that the rule of people by other people is not freedom, and not what we must fight to preserve. . . .

India is our problem. If Japan should conquer that vast subcontinent, we will be the losers. In the same sense, the Philippines are a British problem. If we fail to deliver, by force of arms, the independence we have promised to the Filipinos, the whole Pacific world will be the loser. We must believe these simple truths, and speak them loudly and without fear. Only in this way can the peoples of the world forge, in this war, the strength and the confidence in each other which we will need to win the peace.

There will be lots of tough problems. And they will differ in different mandates, different colonies. Not all the peoples of the world are ready for freedom, or can defend it, the day after tomorrow. But today they all want some date to work toward, some guarantee that the date will be kept. For the future, they do not ask that we solve their problems for them. They are neither so foolish nor so faint-hearted. They ask only for the chance to solve their own problems with economic as well as political cooperation. For the peoples of the world intend to be free not only for their political satisfaction but, also, for their economic advancement. . . .

When I say that in order to have peace this world must be free, I am only reporting that a great process has started which no man—certainly not Hitler—can stop. Men and women all over the world are on the march, physically, intellectually and spiritually. After centuries of ignorant and dull compliance hundreds of millions of people in Eastern Europe and Asia have opened the books. Old fears no longer frighten them. They are no longer willing to be Eastern slaves

for Western profits. They are beginning to know that men's welfare throughout the world is interdependent. They are resolved, as we must be, that there is no more place for imperialism within their own society than in the society of nations. —*Wendell L. Willkie, Republican Presidential Candidate, 1940, Vital Speeches of the Day*. N. 1, '42. p. 37-9.

THE CASE FOR GREAT BRITAIN

A BRITISH VIEW OF INDIA'S PROBLEMS¹

Destiny set India beside the Allied countries in the struggle to defend the world's civilization, and her Agent-General in Washington, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, signed the 26 Nations Agreement in January of this year. If she plays her part in the common effort, nothing can prevent her from achieving full nationhood and becoming in due time a guardian of liberty and culture in the East.

None would deny that the problems involved in such an achievement are serious, and that there are two sides to most of them deserving serious consideration. Many of them also have deep roots in history as well as in controversy that have made movement towards solution slow and painful. They have been presented freely from the nationalist point of view. This article will present them from a British point of view, in the hope of contributing something to eventual understanding.

Sir George Schuster, in his recent book *India and Democracy*, says that although the Government of India Act of 1935 admittedly fell short of conferring on India a full dominion constitution, "yet many experienced judges held that, if the major parties had shown a reasonable disposition to cooperate with Great Britain and with one another, the transition to a stage completely satisfying India's aspirations would have been smooth, easy, and rapid." The writer, recently returned from India after a year's study of the political situation, is convinced that Sir George was right although, unfortunately, party feeling, especially between Hindus and Muslims, was so acute at the time that even if the leaders had grasped the possibilities of the federal plan they would have found it no easy task to convert their followers to a "reasonable disposition."

¹ By Sir Robert Holland, formerly Civil Administrator in India. *Yale Review*. 31:569-87. March, 1942.

The experience of Indian Ministries in the provinces during two and a half years of provincial autonomy, from 1937 to 1939, showed that safeguards and special responsibilities and reservation of powers did not impede the cabinets in carrying out their programs. The federal government, if created, would have travelled the same road. The special powers of the Governor-General would have sloughed away from disuse; and since he could not have administered the reserved subjects of defense and finance without the cooperation of his cabinet, the Ministers responsible to the central legislature would gradually have gathered all reins of power into their hands. No policy could have been negatived by the Governor-General which was demonstrated to be in the interests of India and which was laid before him by his Ministers with the support of Indian public opinion. India would quietly have attained the same status as the self-governing members of the British Commonwealth, by a process which would have had the hearty approval of British public opinion and would have tended to checkmate communal friction in India.

Eminent Indians in many walks of life have admitted to the writer that if the Congress Party and the Muslim League had been able to compose their differences, if they had chosen to act in concert with the rulers of the Indian States instead of frightening them off the track, and, lastly, if they had viewed in a spirit of reasonable compromise the safeguarding provisions which the British Parliament had thought it necessary to insert in the federal part of the Act, Indians might even under the Act have controlled the government of the country in every department, through Ministers responsible to the legislatures.

Indian nationalist objections to the federal plan as formulated were based on quite natural apprehensions. They were mainly as follows. First, the Governor-General was to rule India autocratically, under the Secretary of State, in respect of the important subjects of foreign affairs, defense, and finance. Second, even in the field in which the Governor-General had to consult his Ministers, he would be at liberty to act on his own judgment and to ignore their advice, in fulfilment of his special responsibilities. Third, the central legislature would

not be a representative body, owing to the fact that the system of election prescribed for the British-Indian element would make the upper chamber more democratic in its composition than the lower chamber, while the Indian States representatives, being appointed by the sovereign rulers, would be responsible to them alone. Fourth, there would be danger of indefinite postponement of truly responsible government if the eleven autonomous provinces were federated with autocratically ruled states. The British government was suspected of an intention to pack the central legislature with nominees of the princes, so as to secure a reactionary influence at the center and the Congress Party held that federation with the states would be impossible unless the states fell into line with the provinces in regard to political institutions, election of representatives, and methods of government. Fifth, the constitution would be rigid, since it contained no provision which might encourage the development of truly responsible government, and since it could be amended by the British Parliament alone, after paying due regard to the terms upon which the states might have acceded to the federation. Sixth, the Act contained no assurance that India would eventually achieve either independence or dominion status.

The ostensible objections to federation were not the real obstacles to its achievements. The true position can be understood in the light of recent happenings in India.

After the outbreak of war in 1939, the Viceroy was authorized by the British government to explain Britain's war aims generally, to reiterate that the intentions and aims of His Majesty's government were to assist India to achieve dominion status with the minimum delay, and to promise that the disliked Act of 1935 would be reconsidered after the war in collaboration with Indians. In his statement of August 8, 1940, the Viceroy clarified and expanded his previous utterances. He offered seats on his executive council to a certain number of representative Indians, and announced that a war advisory council would be established containing representatives of the Indian States and of other interests in the national life of India. First, to allay the misgivings of minorities, whether

political or religious, in respect of revision of the constitution, he made it plain that the British government could not contemplate transfer of its responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority was directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life; nor could the British government be party to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a system. Second, it was recognized that the framing of the new constitutional scheme after the war should be primarily the responsibility of Indians themselves, subject to the due fulfilment of Britain's obligations, and that it should originate from Indian conceptions of the social, economic, and political structure of Indian life. An undertaking was given that, as soon as possible after the conclusion of the war, a body representative of the principal elements in India's national life would be set up in order to devise the framework of the new constitution. Meanwhile the central government would promote to the best of its ability any steps that might be taken by Indian leaders to reach a basis of friendly agreement about the setting up of the representative body and the outlines of the new constitution.

The two stipulations—that full weight should be given to the views of minorities in any constitutional revision, and that provision should be made for the due fulfilment of Britain's obligations—represented the British government's design that Indians of their own accord should weld into their new constitution the principles underlying the cumbersome and unpalatable "safeguards" embodied in the Act of 1935 by the British Parliament. The British government considered that the charter of India's freedom must be based upon these principles in her own interest as well as in that of her British partner.

The first stipulation is concerned primarily with Hindu-Muslim tension. Behind this there is a painful tale of inter-communal struggle which commenced nearly a hundred years ago.

Muslim military power dominated India for hundreds of years before the British came, but when the doors of the public services were thrown open to all, without distinction of race

or caste or creed, Muslims stood apart and allowed the immensely more numerous Hindus to monopolize administrative posts. The Muslims began to redress the balance when they were galvanized into action by their great leader, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, but their uneasiness received fresh impetus as it became apparent that the British regarded their rule as a trust, and were aiming at the goal of democratic self-government for India.

During the years that followed, tension between Hindus and Muslims steadily increased, except during brief intervals when the Muslim League and the Hindu Congress fell into an uneasy alliance for ephemeral ends.

In 1916, the Congress and the League, conscious that political advance was being retarded by their mutual hostility, came to an agreement, known as the Lucknow Pact, regulating the method of elections and the allotment of government appointments. The substance of this arrangement was embodied in the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, which came into force in 1919.

It soon became apparent, however, that the Hindu and Muslim signatories to the Lucknow Pact had not been at one as regards the essential object to be achieved by it. The Muslims, even when they referred to themselves as a minority, believed themselves to be a distinct nationality which would be preserved intact in all circumstances. The Hindus, on the other hand, looking to the ultimate union of India under a democratic constitution, expected that the Muslims would be absorbed as a mere minority, subject to the dominance of the Hindu majority in all important matters, and would eventually lose their separate electorates when outstanding controversies were settled.

When the Government of India Act of 1935 was on the anvil and it became clear that no friendly agreement would be reached between the two great communities on essential points, the British government felt compelled to embody in the Act what is known as the "communal award." By this, the principle of separate electorates was maintained for Muslims (and certain other communities), subject to revision by consent of parties at the end of ten years.

The attitude of Hindu nationalists towards Mohammedan separatism is very definite, and is backed by some powerful arguments. The Congress Party has fostered Indian nationalist aspirations by yeoman work during the past fifty-six years, and has created a highly efficient India-wide political machine which had a membership of four and a half millions in 1938-39. It unites many interests and diverse programs, and is recruited from every stratum of society. The common bond is nationalist feeling—the desire to free India from any semblance of foreign rule—but there are also more sectarian ideals, in particular, the preservation and rehabilitation of Hindu India's cultural and political heritage.

The ideal aimed at by leaders is that members of the Congress Party should regard themselves not as Hindus or Muslims or Brahmans or outcastes, or as owing any other particular allegiance, but simply as Indians. The new constitution, they have said, must be framed in India by a constituent assembly of Indians elected on an adult franchise, and it is in accordance with democratic principles that the political party which is the strongest numerically (that is to say, the Congress Party) should impose its will as a matter of divine right on the minorities as regards both the framing of the constitution and the formation of Ministries under the new regime.

They have denied that there is any real antagonism between Hindus and Muslims, since the communities have a common ideal in the achievement of India's freedom from British imperialism. And they have charged that British rule is directly responsible for such manifestations of tension as have occurred.

No person who wishes to apply his mind to the Indian problem in a candid and impartial spirit can honestly, in the light of the facts stated above, attribute the cleavage between Hindus and Muslims to machiavellian plotting on the part of Great Britain in pursuing a policy of "divide and rule." The Englishman may be vulnerable to the charges that, having set the course for India's self-government, he has taken little interest in the development of political thought in the country; that he has been always too deeply engrossed in his administrative duties and too concentrated upon his responsibility for maintaining law and order; that he has failed to think about or to

encourage scientific study of India's psychological, racial, economic, or industrial problems, in order that due warning may be had of dangers ahead; and, lastly, that he has stood socially aloof from Indians. But it is not true that he deliberately fostered communal cleavage for imperialistic purposes.

In India, this outworn charge is now hardly ever repeated. The magnitude and reality of the differences between Hinduism and Islam could not be ignored because, unfortunately, the situation between 1937 and 1939 worsened rapidly as the result of the Congress rule in seven of the eleven provinces during those years. Bitter dissatisfaction was felt at the decision of the Congress in 1939 to compose the provincial Ministries mainly of Hindus, and to include in them only such Muslims as were members of the Congress Party. Muslims asserted that in the United Provinces, the Congress, before its surprising success at the polls, had informally agreed to form coalition Ministries but afterwards repudiated the pact and admitted to office only such Muslims as were, or agreed to become, members of the Congress Party.

Sir Jagdish Prasad, an eminent Hindu leader who is not in sympathy with the Congress program, deplored the results of this policy in an article which he wrote for the *Twentieth Century* magazine. He said that when the Congress Ministry was being formed in the United Provinces, it was believed that two prominent members of the Muslim League would be included in it. The Congress high command favored this. In the end, however, party purism prevailed over political expediency, and allegiance to a common party was considered more important than adherence to a common program. Muslim Leaguers were not taken into the Ministry, with the result that the League was thrown into opposition and soon assumed the role of the chief opponent of the Congress. The League blamed the British government heavily for its disappointment.

Before the provincial Ministries were formed, the Congress leaders demanded an assurance from the British government that the Governors of the provinces would in no circumstances use their special powers under the Act of 1935, or act in discharge of their special responsibilities, or interfere in any way

with the workings of these Ministries. No such assurance could be given without violation of the provisions of the Act, but a friendly understanding was reached between Congress leaders and the government, to the effect that the Governors would use their powers discreetly and reservedly. The League held that this understanding had a deadly result from the Muslim point of view, because it "gave a long rope to the Congress to proceed with its nefarious game of subjugation and vassalization of Muslims and other minorities."

Muslim grievances were summarized by a member of the Berar Assembly, K. S. Abdur Rahman Khan, as follows:

The fact that by "India" the Congress contemplates only Hindu India, by "nation," it means only the Hindu nation and by "democracy," it desires the rule of the Hindu majority, was demonstrably and conclusively proved during two and a half years' rule of the Congress in seven provinces. At the very outset, the Muslims were discounted as a force to be reckoned in Indian politics.

Lesser grievances, relating to the treatment of Muslim populations under the Congress Ministries, were voiced in language which was often very bitter. Muslims were sore at the zonal dictatorship exercised by the Congress high command over the Ministries in the seven provinces; at the measures taken to discourage the Urdu language and supplant it by sanscritized Hindi; at Mr. Gandhi's scheme of vocational instruction in primary schools, which they regarded as intended to wean Muslim boys away from Islamic beliefs and traditions and turn them into Hindus; and at the attempt to enforce general use of the Congress Party flag and anthem.

Mr. Jinnah, the President of the All-India Muslim League, was quick to take advantage of the situation. He galvanized the League into feverish activity, and stirred his ninety million fellow Muslims throughout India by rousing speeches. The burden of his orations was that for Muslims, besides the questions of religion, culture, language, and personal laws, there is another question, equally fateful for them, namely, that their future destiny is dependent upon their securing their political rights, their due share in the national life, the government, and the administration of the country. "They will not be submerged

or dominated," he said; "... nor will they agree to any all-India constitution that is based on majority rule."

In March, 1940, the so-called Pakistan (Land-of-the-Pure) scheme was formulated by the Muslim League. The whole idea of guarantees and safeguards under federation was rejected, and the proposal was put forward that India should be divided into two spheres, Muslim and Hindu, each to be autonomous internally, and to collaborate as equals in the central government. The scheme was rather nebulous and does not seem to have been fully thought out, but the general idea was that the two areas in which Muslims are in a numerical majority—in the northeastern and northwestern parts of India—should be constituted as federal "independent states," the provincial units composing each state being autonomous and having the residuary powers, after the necessary delegation to the central government was completed. The most serious objection to Pakistan, of course, was that it denied the possibility of nationhood for India. It provoked a storm of opposition on that score, but many practical difficulties also arose.

Even within the ranks of Islam, there have been dissentient voices. Pakistan was disparaged on the ground that the setting up of independent sovereign states would ruin the economy of the country; that some of the predominantly Muslim provinces were so poor that they could not survive unless subsidized by a central government; that minority difficulties would still persist; that the problem of India's defense would become insoluble; and, finally, that the vivisection of India would mean its Balkanization, with constant danger of civil war and indefinite continuance of British arbitrament at the center. These were very serious criticisms; so serious that Mr. Amery, British Secretary of State for India, speaking in the House of Commons in August, 1941, referred to the scheme as a "counsel of despair"—to the great annoyance of the Muslim League.

But though sober statesmen might regard the scheme as impracticable, the idea behind it was a banner of hope for the Muslim masses. In short, Mr. Jinnah organized a very powerful party by copying the Congress Party's tactics; the Pakistan movement has grown with extraordinary speed, and it has been of a

very turbulent nature, obstructing the way to India's unity and freedom.

Unfortunately, also, other separatist movements sprang into being in emulation of Pakistan. The Dravidians of South India clamored in bellicose language for Dravidistan and freedom from Aryan domination; the Sikhs asked for Sikhistan, because they did not wish to live under the rule of a Muslim majority. And the Depressed Classes, who number sixty millions, were afraid of a Hindu Raj. Their leader, Dr. Ambedkar, wrote a book favoring the partition plan of the Muslim League as the only practical remedy for Hindu-Muslim and other rivalries.

The attitude of the Hindus naturally hardened in answer to Pakistan. The Hindu Mahasabha representing orthodox Hinduism, though it strongly disapproved of the Congress policy and tactics, stood for Hindu rule throughout India, and its General Secretary frankly said, "We want Home Rule, so that Hindus and Muslims can fight out their quarrel"; Mr. K. M. Munshi, formerly a Minister in the Congress government in Bombay, appealed for an Akhand-Hindustan Front to consolidate opinion against the division of India; and the great Congress Party, of course, consolidated its forces to oppose Pakistan to the last ditch.

Neither the Congress Party's demand for a constitution based on the divine right of the majority nor the Muslim League's demand for separate states could then be granted by the British Parliament. Britain would have earned the world's condemnation if she had abandoned India to the horrors of civil war, which would have been the inevitable result of acceding to either alternative. The British Parliament could not arbitrate a settlement by means of another "communal award," because to do so would have stultified the very idea of a constituent assembly. If such a settlement were imposed, its survival would depend upon the maintenance of British power in India, and that would not be consistent with India's freedom.

When Japan entered the World War, the Viceroy appealed again to the people of India to forget domestic differences and work together "at this crucial moment in the history of mankind." In reply, the well known Congress leader, Mr. Nehru,

said, "We can have no relations with Hitlerism, which is brutal and wants to dominate the world." The President of the National Liberal Federation urged Indians to join all branches of the fighting forces, despite grievances against British rule, and Mr. Rajagopalachari, a Right-wing Congress leader, pledged with Indians to organize themselves for armed defense.

In general, however, the leaders of the Congress and Muslim League groups, ignoring signs of dissent in their ranks, passed committee resolutions which in effect continued their policy of non-cooperation with Britain's war effort. The Congress Committee decided to suspend the civil disobedience movement for the period of the war, thereby releasing Mr. Gandhi from a responsibility which had become increasingly embarrassing to him as an exponent of the purest form of *ahimsa* (non-violence). The decision, however, merely withdrew Congress support from action which had proved powerless to hamper the Indian war effort. Cooperation with the central government was still left conditional on British acceptance of the Congress Party's demand for a nationalist government, but instructions issued to party members "to avoid conflict with the authorities, and carry out instructions issued to them for the preservation of lives and property and the maintenance of public order" showed that the Congress leaders were recognizing the gravity of the situation. Mr. Gandhi, in explaining why he withdrew from leadership, expressed his astonishment at finding that most members of the Congress Committee differed from his interpretation of *ahimsa*. He clearly realized then what the writer vainly tried to impress upon him a year ago during a personal talk, that the Congress leaders have constantly regarded the use of non-violence as a "technique of action" in a political struggle, and not as a spiritual movement. While reiterating his belief in his mission to preach non-violence to the world, Mr. Gandhi dissociated himself from any attempt by the Congress Party to drive a bargain with the British government by demanding India's independence in return for party cooperation in the war. He went so far as to say that war-resisters "dare not keep still in the midst of the inhuman slaughter that is going on. They must

not only speak and write against it; they must, if need be, sacrifice themselves in an attempt to stop the torrent of blood."

The Muslim League resolution took the form of a warning to the British government that any new policy on the basis of a central government with India as a single unit, and the Muslims as an all-India minority, would be strongly resented by Muslims, who would be compelled to resist it with all the force at their command. The League Committee, however, asserted its willingness to "shoulder the defense of the country alone, or in cooperation with other parties, on the basis of a real share in the government." Mr. Amery, commenting upon these resolutions in the House of Commons on January 8, regretted that he could not discover in them "any satisfactory response to the Viceroy's appeal for unity and cooperation in the face of common danger"—adding that the government would not abate its efforts to promote that measure of agreement essential to fulfilment of its pledges of ultimate dominion status for India.

The outlook for compromise between the opposing leaders was thus undoubtedly gloomy, but left, nevertheless, ground for hope that the contest between the two great parties would finally be by-passed by the people of India in their advance to freedom. Both Hindu and Muslim leaders have known in their inmost hearts that their extreme ideals were unattainable. In each party, there have been rifts and discontents. Mr. Jinnah's position was shaken by the misgivings of the Mohammedan intelligentsia as to the practicability of Pakistan, and by the sullen dissatisfaction manifested when three Muslim premiers were forced to resign their appointments on the India defense council in obedience to Mr. Jinnah's ukase. The Hindu world rang with complaints of the Congress Party's bad leadership. The "zonal dictatorship" exercised by the Congress high command over the Congress Ministries in the provinces between 1937 and 1939 antagonized many of its adherents and was denounced as Fascist in tendency and subversive of responsible government. The Congress policy of trying to "squeeze" the British government, at the beginning of the war, by withdrawing the Ministries in several provinces and by refusing war

aid, was attacked as a grave error. In so far as the restricted campaign of civil disobedience had a political aim (this was never Mr. Gandhi's aim), it failed for many reasons, but chiefly because Indian public opinion is, and always has been, wholeheartedly anti-Nazi. The government of India announced on December 3, 1941, the decision to release all civil disobedience prisoners whose offenses had been formal or symbolic in character, because responsible opinion in India appeared to be determined to support the war effort until victory was gained. Many members, including prominent leaders, resigned from the Congress Party, and the membership fell from a maximum of four and a half millions in 1938-39 to a million and a half in 1941.

The spirit and efficiency of the Indian Army have been proved on many fields. The pride that Indian troops are participating in a righteous cause is working on men's minds in India, and when the troops return, they will be a powerful influence for unity.

Another and even greater hope of substantial progress towards India's freedom arose out of the changes in the central administration announced by the British government on July 22, 1941. After the Congress Party and the Muslim League had scorned the Viceroy's offer of August 8, 1940, concerning the expansion of his cabinet and the establishment of a war advisory council, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, one of the greatest statesmen of India, instituted a conference of India's "non-party leaders." At the first session, which was held in March, 1941, a resolution was passed urging that the Viceroy's cabinet should be formed solely of non-official Indians drawn from important elements in the public life of the country; that all portfolios, including those of finance and defense, should be committed to their charge; that during the war the reconstructed center should remain responsible to the Crown, but should deal with all important matters of policy on a basis of joint and collective responsibility; that for the time being India should be treated on the same footing as Dominion governments in regard to all external affairs; and, finally, that a declaration should be made by the British government, within a specified

time limit, that after the conclusion of the war India would enjoy the same measure of freedom as Britain and the Dominions.

The changes actually made, comprising cabinet expansion and the establishment of a defense council, did not satisfy in full the requirements of this resolution but went a long way in that direction. For the first time, Indian non-official opinion, save in very exceptional circumstances, became paramount at the center, the Indian members having a majority of eight seats out of twelve in the cabinet. Under the 1935 Act, the Governor-General was bound by the decision of a majority of his cabinet on any decision brought before a meeting of it, but in very exceptional circumstances could suspend or reject measures proposed by the cabinet. This proviso cannot be expunged by amendment of the Act until the time comes for framing the new constitution, but in the light of provincial autonomy experience, there was every reason to expect that the reserve power, rarely used in any case, would not be used at all by the Governor-General under the changed conditions. The machinery of internal administration is, of course, mainly controlled by Indians as there are only 573 Europeans now serving in the Indian civil service. As regards external affairs, India has been increasingly regarded as on the same footing as the Dominion governments. Quasi-diplomatic relationship between the United States and India was established in 1941, by the exchange of representatives; and India was offered representation in the Imperial War Cabinet. The "time limit" request for the declaration of India's freedom after the war could not then be granted, because behind any such declaration there loomed up the inescapable corollary that in the event of "the principal elements in India's national life" failing to achieve agreement, the dissentients would be herded into line by the British government.

At the second session of Sir Tej Bahadur's conference in July, 1941, the demand, since reiterated, was pressed for transfer of the remaining cabinet portfolios to Indian hands, and especially the key portfolios of defense and finance, which were then held by English officials, but the keen-sighted chairman said, in his closing speech, that the "time limit" might

have to be "of an adjustable nature," to be moved backwards or forwards according to circumstances after the war. Other portfolios, including those of defense and finance, would doubtless pass to Indian hands in due course, but in view of the war situation and British interests in India, the stand was only natural that, until the new constitution is framed, there should be some British representation in the cabinet. It is, of course, essential that key posts, especially in wartime, should be filled by the best men available, irrespective of nationality. The establishment of a national defense council, announced simultaneously with the cabinet changes, was also very significant. The council, of twenty-nine members, twenty-seven being Indian, included representatives of the Indian States as well as of the provinces and of other elements in the national life, thus associating Indian non-official opinion as closely as possible with the prosecution of the war.

The change made in the spirit of the constitution by these measures was of tremendous importance. Within the four corners of the Act of 1935, there remained a wide field for exploratory progress, through rule-making powers and the adoption of conventions, and through the implementation of the King's "Instruction" to the Governor-General regarding the attainment by India of "its due place among our Dominions."

After the Congress Party and the Muslim League had shown their hands, Sir Tej Bahadur, on behalf of his group, appealed directly to Mr. Churchill for "some bold stroke of far-sighted statesmanship without delay," in order to avert a political crisis in India and to ensure her full cooperation in Britain's war effort. His recent proposals, which corresponded in the main with those previously put forward by his conference, were that the central executive council should be converted into a truly national government responsible only to the Crown; that popular government should be restored in the provinces, or in the alternative, that non-official executive councils responsible to the Crown should be established in the provinces; that India's right to direct representation in Allied war councils should be conceded, and that consultation should be carried on with the national government on the same footing

as with the Dominion governments. It is very significant, however, that Sir Tej Bahadur dropped the request, previously made, for a "time limit" for India's freedom, and merely recommended that the question of a permanent constitution should be shelved until after the war, though he has lately asked for recognition of an equal footing for India with the Dominions at imperial conferences.

The proposals, in broad outline, could hardly fail to commend themselves to the British government, but unfortunately the restoration of responsible government in the provinces from which the Congress Party had withdrawn Ministries was still obstructed by the Party. Sir Tej Bahadur's approach certainly helped to clear the way for further constitutional advance.

The problem of the amalgamation of the Indian States with British India, in order to create the Dominion, is one of great complexity, but the difficulties to be encountered are capable of solution given goodwill on both sides. The states cannot, of course, be forced into dominion partnership, but it would be to their interest to adhere upon suitable terms.

There is little substance in the Congress Party's contention that the states representatives in a central legislature, being nominated by the rulers, would be an undemocratic element and a reactionary influence. It is unlikely that the rulers, having appointed their delegates, would either desire or be able to influence the disposal of their votes; nor would there be any possibility of such representatives being capriciously dismissed from office. In due course, as responsible government takes root in the states—and it has already done so in some states—the selection of representatives will doubtless be entrusted to popular bodies.

It is now up to the political parties and the Indian rulers to make a supreme effort for harmony. Self-government with universal suffrage would be a new source of division and strife, instead of a blessing, unless it were firm-based upon a mutual understanding which excluded the use of *force majeure*.

When India recognizes that unified nationhood cannot be merely the gift of a suzerain power but must be sought with the will to unity, through sacrifice, she will find that such

nationhood is hers for the taking. Will India stretch out her hand for it, forgetting the things which have sundered her peoples in the past, and regarding only those things, far greater in number and importance, which have drawn them together for nationhood? The writer believes that she must and will do this.

Expectation of early action by the British government on the lines of Sir Tej Bahadur's latest proposals was strengthened by the recent inclusion in the British cabinet of Sir Stafford Cripps, who was known to desire ardently the achievement of self-government for India with the least possible delay. General Chiang Kai-shek's stirring message on his departure from India also helped to lower the last barriers to that great and difficult achievement.

THE CHOICE BEFORE INDIA ²

Since March 1942, the Indian people have had before them two plans for the achievement of independent self-government in India. The first was the plan which Sir Stafford Cripps brought with him. The second was the resolution of the Working Committee of the Congress Party which was passed by the All-India Congress Committee on August 8, as a prelude to the launching of the present "mass disobedience" movement.

These two sets of proposals differed widely in practicability and in the manner in which they were expounded. The Cripps plan was founded upon a peaceful and evolutionary progress, designed in the short run to consolidate Indian opinion behind a strong government for the prosecution of the war and the defeat of the enemy. The Congress Party's resolution also appealed to the need for rallying Indian opinion behind the government and the conduct of the war; but it was presented under the threat of a campaign whose success in its purpose of bringing government to its knees would have been a great victory for the enemy and would have led to an open exposure of India to aggression.

² By A Constitutionalist. Reprint from *The Civil & Military Gazette*. Lahore, India. 20p. 1942.

Despite this contrast, the plans were alike in their express objective of independent self-government for India. The British government pledged itself to afford India the opportunity and means of devising her own form of independent self-government after victory has been won. The Congress Party's resolution sought to anticipate this by a declaration of independence now.

The choice that lies before the Indian people, therefore, is one that concerns the period of the war, and the test by which both these plans are alike to be judged by reasonable men is: Which is the more realistic and effective in its capacity to defend India from conquest and enable her to play her part in securing the final victory over Fascist aggression?

That this is the test by which the Congress Party's plan, no less than that of the British government, is to be judged has been emphasized by Congress Party spokesmen themselves. Thus, in his interview with the Press on July 16, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru declared, "The whole point is how to function in an effective manner to avert aggression." Therefore the question which the Indian public has to ask itself—and ask itself with a sense of the gravest responsibility, since a wrong answer might result in agonizing consequences for the people of India and for the future of freedom everywhere—is whether the Congress Party's proposal is genuinely calculated to avert aggression and win the war; and whether, if so, it represents a more effective or a less effective way of doing so than the British government's policy.

In applying this test, we must obviously look to the terms of the resolution passed early in July as the authentic policy of the Working Committee of the Congress Party. We are not entitled to accept as authentic the glosses put upon the resolution by individual Congress Party leaders. Some of them, indeed, are plainly inconsistent with the words of the actual resolution.

The key passage in the resolution, regarded as a genuine proposition for the political future of India, reads as follows:

On the withdrawal of British rule in India, responsible men and women of the country will come together to form a Provisional Govern-

ment, representative of all important sections of the people of India, which will later evolve a scheme by which a Constituent Assembly can be convened in order to prepare a constitution for the Government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. Representatives of free India and representatives of Great Britain will confer together for the adjustment of future relations and for the cooperation of the two countries as allies in the common task of meeting aggression.

This passage lucidly represents to Indian opinion a picture of a chronological sequence of events, which, it is suggested, would follow upon a verbal declaration of India's independence by the British government.

The first stage is the withdrawal of British rule. The second stage, which follows it, is the formation of a provisional government. The third stage is the evolution by that government of a scheme for a constituent assembly. Finally comes the preparation of an acceptable constitution. The chronological place of the suggested Indo-British Conference in this sequence is not clear, but it is manifestly intended to come after the first two stages.

Informed opinion will not have failed to notice that the Congress Party's plan is in essence the Cripps plan for the attainment of India's independence, but in looking-glass order. His sequence was a constituent assembly, a constitution, a new Indian Union government, and the relinquishment of British rule to that government. This was a logical chain of causality. Compared to it the Congress Party's prophecy seems like a movie film which is run through the projector in reverse, so that food is forked out of diners' mouths to their plates, and is eventually carried backwards into the kitchen to be uncooked. It bears the same kind of relation to the real practical world of cause and effect.

Let us examine the imagined sequence of events, link by link. The withdrawal of British rule, which is placed first, must imply either an end of all rule in India or the transfer of British rule to another authority. It follows that if the withdrawal of British rule is not to mean chaos, civil disorder, murder and looting, and of course total exposure to Japanese aggression, it must be *preceded* by the establishment of an

alternative government. This, however, is plainly contrary to the terms of the Congress Party's resolution.

The resolution is therefore, on the face of it, a plea for anarchy and an invitation to Japan to conquer India. If, on the other hand, this plea is rejected, the resolution threatens the achievement of the same result by another means, namely, a nation-wide effort to bring about the abdication of government.

This is what has been put before Indian people. It is clear, however, from their own statements that even the Congress Party leaders who accepted the resolution do not believe in its terms. We are entitled to assume that the Congress high command still contain patriotic Indians, and that this part of the Congress Party's resolution is not to be taken at its face value. If then, it is agreed that the withdrawal of British rule cannot take place until there is an alternative government to which to hand over power, under what authority is this government to rule?

The Congress Party's resolution is so couched as to imply that a government can operate in a constitutional vacuum, without legal authority or support. This is false. Our whole civilization is based on law. The only alternative to a constitution is revolution, which, until it makes itself constitutional, rests upon force in place of law. All civil government and order, all rights of property and contracts, all police and public services, all money and security, all rights and duties of the military and of others who wield power in the state, derive and depend upon law. The law in turn derives from and depends upon the constitution. Without a constitutional basis there is no law, and without law there is no order. Authority becomes the mere exercise of physical power, and the land is delivered over to those who possess force and are not afraid to use it.

Thus—to return to the Congress Party's vision of a new provisional government—unless and until that government is founded upon and validated by a constitution, in the physical power that it can wield lies its only defence against such a breakdown of all ordered life as would at once call in the Japanese like jackals to a rotting carcass.

Again, therefore, the Congress Party's resolution, on the face of it, by postponing the framing of a new constitution until after the provisional government has evolved plans for a constituent assembly is a plea for anarchy and an invitation to the Japanese to invade India.

Again we must turn aside from the actual terms, and assume that the Congress Party, if it still contains a patriotic element, does not mean what it says, and that it does not intend the provisional government to operate without the foundation of a constitution beneath its feet.

Mere constitutional generalities will not do. Though details may be subject to adjustment, there must be a complete constitutional structure. The need to accept, or to construct anew, a complete constitution, before power is transferred from the present legal government to a so-called provisional government, is all the more vital in India, where for historical reasons little of the governmental system is on a common-law basis, and where a vast country lives under a quasi-federal constitution.

At present the system of government is founded upon a statutory division of powers between provinces and center. Subject to this, there is a conditional devolution of powers to subordinate authorities. If, from this system, the supreme central authority, at present residing ultimately in British hands, the authority which guarantees the constitution itself, is withdrawn, the various powers are no longer legally apportioned but are at the disposal of those who can seize them.

To take a hypothetical example, the Punjab government might seize all powers in the Punjab, including those fields of power which are now central. Or local authorities or local magnates might set themselves up as dictators in their own areas. But for the timely action taken against the Pir Pagaro and his Hur gangsters; they would certainly have been among the likely heirs of British power in the localities where they exerted the force and terror necessary to seize it.

The reapportionment of power would thus depend upon the mere possession of physical strength. Since we are to imagine that the Indian Army would be automatically disbanded, as Mr. Gandhi has told us, and that the British Army,

though still present for the purposes of external defence, would no longer be responsible for internal security, it is clear that the repositories of physical strength would tend to be local rather than central. Thus the Congress Party's resolution, taken at its face value, is an invitation not only to civil disorder and external invasion but also to the break-up of India.

Was it with this prospect in mind that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru admitted, at his press conference on July 16, that there were "risks" in the sudden withdrawal of the existing governmental apparatus? Was it with this prospect in mind that Mr. Gandhi wrote in *Harijan*: "I would end the present state of things even at the risk of *anarchy reigning supreme* in India?"

Perhaps our patience is called upon for a little more exercise. Perhaps we are again to assume that this part of the Congress Party's resolution does not say what the majority of the Working Committee mean (though it apparently says what Mr. Gandhi means), and that some form of interim constitution would be acknowledged, to validate the "provisional government."

Even so, the resolution implies that there is to be a completely new order in India and a total severance of the British connection. "I am convinced," wrote Mr. Gandhi in *Harijan*, "that the time has come . . . for the British and Indians to be reconciled to *complete separation* from each other." This is not the conviction of many of his fellow-countrymen, but, if it is accepted, then the imagined interim constitution must rapidly give way to a permanent and independent constitutional code.

It is a flagrant weakness of the Congress Party's proposal—regarded as a practical scheme, not as party propaganda—that no draft scheme for such a constitutional code is put forward, not even a tentative plan for calling a constituent assembly. The Cripps proposals went far beyond the resolution, in putting forward a detailed and specific plan whereby India could achieve independence. It was rejected for conflicting reasons by the different parties. Now the Congress Party offers nothing in its place.

Assuming, however, that a constituent assembly could be successfully called, what is the expected basis of the resultant constitution? Indians themselves are entitled to know at least what hazy ideas the Congress Party leaders may have in their minds.

The number of open questions which such a constituent assembly would have to face is enormous. Is there to be a United India or Pakistan? Is the system to be unitary or federal or con-federal? What is to be the division of powers? What may be the form of communal representation in legislatures and executives? What protection is to be afforded to minorities and backward peoples? What are to be the relations of the Indian States to the new India, or what is to be their place in it? For these and dozens more problems of equal importance and complexity there is yet no agreed basis of solution.

To reach agreement upon them and to work out the necessary terms and details, must, at best, take months. It would be unwise to allow less than a year. Allowing no more than six months for the calling of the constituent assembly, including the holding of the necessary elections, here is at least 18 months gone before Indian independence could have any secure basis, or before Indian statesmen, soldiers and administrators could turn from the problem of framing the constitution to that of winning the war.

Once again we are driven to conclude that the Congress Party's resolution is not to be taken at its face value, and that for the period of the war the "provisional government," if it could be brought into being, would have to work under the existing constitution with such rough-and-ready amendments as were generally acceptable to Indian opinion.

The task of the proposed Indo-British Conference "for the adjustment of future relations and for the cooperation of the two countries as allies" would be no less complex or arduous. Despite the seeming enthusiasm of the Congress Working Committee's resolution for the cause of the United Nations, it is only prudent to anticipate certain difficulties in the way even of the proposed alliance. It is of the essence of the

alliances hitherto sealed between the several United Nations that they pledge themselves not to make a separate peace but to pursue the war to the end with their utmost resources. Is this truly the attitude of the Congress Party? Its language is ambiguous. The July resolution refers to "resisting aggression and helping China," not to finally overthrowing the Fascist enemy. Mr. Gandhi has referred to "*defensive operations* against aggressive powers," and in the same breath talked of negotiating peace with Japan.

Are even the terms on which the armies of the United Nations are to be allowed to remain in India clear and certain in the corporate mind of the Congress Working Committee? It was only on May 1st, 1942, that at Allahabad, the All-India Congress Committee passed a resolution declaring that "It is harmful to her (India's) interest and dangerous to the cause of her freedom to introduce foreign armies in India."

Granted that an alliance on general terms can be concluded, the questions of detail and the long-term problems which the Indo-British Conference would have to consider are many and involved. There is the question of the control of the huge British forces in India—their operations, supplies, accommodation, etc. There is the question of the finance of British forces in India and any remaining Indian forces outside India. There are questions of great delicacy relating to the forces of the Indian States and to the Gurkha soldiers, subjects of the independent state, Nepal.

Among the long-term problems would be those of the financial relations between Britain and India, including the public debt, the outstanding pensions of civil and military officers, etc.; of treaty relations with the Indian States; of British pledges to minorities; of the establishment of diplomatic and consular corps and other administrative apparatus for the conduct of external affairs by an independent India; and scores of others.

It is obvious that these negotiations would be liable to take as long as the framing of the constitution itself. Meanwhile, even if an alliance could be quickly concluded, there would be no proper or durable basis for the interim conduct

of these affairs, many of them vital to the prosecution of the war. It was one great virtue of the Cripps plan that it left all these complex problems in abeyance, while India, confident of the prospect of achieving complete self-government after the war, concentrated her mind and energies upon the achievement of victory.

By contrast, the Congress Working Committee's resolution, if taken at its face value, is either a piece of Alice-in-Wonderland nonsense or an attempt to create, by the voluntary or by the forced abdication of the constitutional government, a condition of disorder and anarchy in India. This could only be contemplated in the hope that the Congress Party itself might then seize power, either in time enough before the Japanese entered, or afterwards with Japanese connivance. If the second interpretation of the resolution is correct, there is nothing more to be said, though it is pitiful that men should be found to plot such things in the name of patriotism.

If we accept the first interpretation, then we must look behind the nonsense, giving the framers of the resolution the benefit of the supposition that they looked upon it as mere propaganda for the gullible. We must seek in the gist of the resolution some scheme, plausible at least, which the Congress Party might be supposed to want to put forward under cover of the general demand for immediate independence. Some of the glosses put upon the resolution relate, not to its own terms, but to such a plausible substitute.

It might perhaps be expressed as follows:—

Britain will forthwith make a declaration that India (or possibly British India) is in principle independent henceforward. She will accompany this with an offer to hand over all power at once to a provisional government representative of the principal parties and communities. This government will function under the existing constitution shorn only of the overriding powers of the British government, the Governor-General and the provincial Governors, until it can arrange for the framing of a new constitution by a constituent assembly, probably after the war.

This, it must be emphasized, is *not* the Congress Party's plan: it is not what has been submitted to the judgment of

the Indian people and of the world. It is a suppositious, rationalized version of what the Congress Party might have demanded had their motives been sound and their intentions constructive. Nevertheless, in order to give the Congress Party the benefit of all doubts, we may examine this revised version in order to see, first, whether it is practicable, and secondly whether, if practicable, it would result in more effective or less effective conduct of the war in and from India.

On the test of its practicability, the first stage in it—the verbal declaration of independence in principle—involves no one in any immediate concrete difficulties, though it would manifestly offend and perturb those many large sections of the Indian public who still believe in the British connection. Even Congressmen will admit that complete independence, in the sense of final and formal severance from the British Crown, is *not* an agreed demand of the people of India. This fact is no doubt what Mr. Gandhi had in mind when he referred in his statement of July 14 to “unconditional withdrawal of British power *without reference to the wishes of the parties or the people as a whole.*” Congress Party leaders, nevertheless, are exceedingly intransigent and partisan on the point. “Short of our complete independence,” said Pandit Pant, one of the members of the Working Committee, at the Allahabad session, “we do not want *any settlement with anybody.*”

Such a declaration, however, would be meaningless unless it could be implemented, that is to say, unless there emerged a “provisional government” to exert the independence, sufficiently strong and representative of the main elements in India to govern effectively and avoid civil war or communal disorder. “The present political parties,” asserts the Congress Party’s resolution of July last, “will then probably cease to function.” This is a curious piece of Gandhian philosophy, contrary to all experience and calculation. For the principal cement of political parties in practice is not policy alone but the opportunity, given by party cohesion, of carrying out the policy, and the possession of a political machine. These factors are not going to disappear at a stroke of the pen.

Nor do the Congress Party leaders themselves believe it. This is what they say:

The only kind of provisional government would be a composite government representing the major parties in India to their satisfaction, namely, the Congress Party, the Muslim League and other important groups.³ "Any person who is responsible for making that government will have to satisfy these groups. Otherwise he has to face great difficulties at a time when the greatest measure of agreement is essential."—*Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Press Conference, July 16.*

The British might turn to the Congress Party or the Muslim League to accept the responsibility, and the Congress and the League, he was sure, would consult each other to form a government.—*Maulana Azad, President of Congress Party, July 16.*

The acknowledged minimum, then, for a successful "provisional government" is the participation of the Congress Party and the Muslim League. In the light of their known policies and aspirations, is there any basis on which they could join together in an independent government?

"If there was no third party to give or take away," said Pandit Nehru in his press conference of July 16, "the pressure of events would make them (the different sections of the Indian people) come to terms very rapidly."

This of course is a favorite theme of the Congress Party.

What does it mean in plain language? Does it not mean that, if there were no one to hold the ring and watch over the interests of the under-dog, the relative strength—in numbers and physical power—of the different communities and groups would settle the matter? If he does not mean this, it would be interesting to ask Pandit Nehru what he does mean by "the pressure of events."

Reasonable people will not look forward hopefully to such a trial of strength. Instead they will seek a means of accommodation based on the known policies of the several parties. Now the Muslim League has made its position perfectly plain. Provided it gets what it regards as its fair share of power forth-

³ The important political groups in India today, according to their party strength, are: The Congress Party, the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha (An organization of caste Hindus), the Scheduled Castes (also called the Depressed Classes or "Untouchables"), the Sikhs, the Anglo-Indians and the Liberals. The last-named is a small group of individual politicians, holding moderate views, who though fairly influential, have no party backing.

with, it is ready to come into an interim central government on either of two bases. The first is the acceptance of Pakistan now; the alternative is government within the framework of the existing constitution, on condition that nothing is done to prejudice the future attainment of Pakistan under a new constitutional settlement.

Obviously the acceptance of Pakistan now is out of the question for the Congress Party, although their doctrine of anarchy would lead to a far worse fragmentation of India. At Allahabad they pledged themselves to have no truck with schemes of partition. Can they accept the alternative terms for the cooperation of the Muslim League? The conditions that the present constitution should remain, and that the future constitutional settlement should not be prejudiced against the Muslim demand, are intimately linked. For the future is inevitably prejudiced if the present constitution is abandoned, or even radically modified by the abolition of all reserve powers in the hands of the British. Power to influence decisively the shape of a future constitutional settlement, to be achieved at some unknown date and by some unknown method, must pass to those who control an interim independent government.

That this interim government would be controlled neither by Hindus nor by Muslims, but would be a coalition of all main elements, is part of the Congress Party's case, and one which all will applaud. But in the last resort who is to be the arbiter? Or what is to happen if the coalition splits?

There has been talk of responsibility to the people of India, since the Muslims and other minorities reject responsibility of such an executive to the legislature. It is a fine concept, but unless it is translated into institutions whereby the people of India can assert control over those responsible to them, it has no different meaning from the sense in which the Viceroy is now responsible to the people of India. Responsibility in the constitutional sense implies the power to remove by adverse vote. If the majority of the Indian people are to have this power over an independent central executive, is not this the very form of government which the Muslim League and other minority interests at present sternly repudiate?

Thus if one version of the Muslim League terms is incompatible with India's unity, the other version is incompatible with India's immediate independence. Either way the Congress Party's policy frustrates itself.

Failing a League-Congress coalition, the possibilities for a "provisional government" under a regime of independence are either a government dominated by the Muslim League, without the Congress Party, and *a fortiori* without the Hindu Mahasabha, or a government dominated by the Congress Party, and maybe the Hindu Mahasabha, but without the Muslim League. Can anyone doubt that either of these possibilities would lead within a short space to the gravest communal strife?

This infection would soon spread to the armed forces; for the militant arm of Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam in India, enlisted in the armed forces, would not stand as idle spectators of the political struggle. All this would be to the gravest detriment of India's war effort. British authority would have to be reasserted, and again this Congress Party's policy would have frustrated itself.

Pandit Nehru is indeed right in insisting upon a Congress-League agreement as essential to the effective exercise of independent power. But has not Mr. Rajagopalachariar⁴ been obliged to resign from the Congress Party because he said the same thing, but in a sane, logical context? And is there not a better chance of building Hindu-Muslim unity under *de facto* self-government "within the framework of the present constitu-

⁴ Chakravarthi Rajagopalachariar, former President of the Congress Party is one of the most brilliant and probably the most astute of the Indian leaders. He was Premier of Madras in the prewar "Congress Government" under Provincial Autonomy.

In a statement following his resignation from the Congress Working Committee, Mr. Rajagopalachariar condemned as futile the policy of "non-violent, non-cooperation" which the Congress, India's dominant political party, recommended in a resolution.

Mr. Rajagopalachariar said: "I am now free to hold views differing from those of the Working Committee, and say the nation must get together to face current difficulties which the official policy of the Congress does not meet."

That policy, he said, is merely one of "pointing out the faults of the British and other parties, plus a policy of war neutrality against Axis aggression."

"I must therefore work to make Congress change its policy. I must cultivate public opinion, as that policy depends upon public opinion."

"And since I realize I cannot achieve anything by personal negotiations with the Muslim League, I must convert the people of India to cooperation with the Muslims."

Mr. Rajagopalachariar said that "even an unarmed national army" would be better than the measures advocated by the Congress Party.

tion," such as British policy offers if only Indian leaders could take advantage of it, than in the fierce arena of sudden and unpracticed independence?

Hindu-Muslim agreement will come in time, if the leaders of both communities work for it. But what dupes are the hopes of the Congress Party leaders for a Congress-League coalition after an immediate declaration of independence! Nevertheless, if we are to be left with anything to test by the standard of effectiveness for the prosecution of the war, we must disregard the probabilities and assume, for the moment, that such a coalition can be brought into being, perhaps with the addition of other elements. Compared with what is possible within the framework of the existing constitution, would this enhance or diminish India's contribution to the power of the United Nations to wage war against the enemy? Practical men will know how to answer this practical question.

Beyond any doubt a government of popular political leaders is better able than an official or externally manipulated government to arouse the enthusiasm of the people, to stamp out defeatism and fifth columnism, to check subversive movements among labor, and generally to raise the civilian morale. But that is not the point at issue. A government of popular political leaders with genuine *de facto* autonomy, is possible under the existing constitution. The point is the condition of *de jure* independence, and the assumed predominant place of the Congress Party in the government.

That the Congress Party leaders do assume this is proved by the resolution itself, which, could be justified only on the theory that the Congress Party represents the Indian nation, in whose name it can take these fearful risks; if this theory is false, the whole resolution is a fraud, but if it is true the Congress Party would have a fair claim to dominate an independent national government. Would such a government, compared with a national government under the existing constitution, be better or less able to lead India in war?

Reasonable opinion may be forgiven some doubt whether the Congress Party, even excluding the 100 per cent non-violent wing, are unanimous in their determination to wage the war

until final victory has been won. By their very adoption of the July resolution, the Working Committee have shown their subservience to Mr. Gandhi, who has declared, by way of comment on it, that if he could possibly turn India to non-violence, then he would do so. (Press Conference of July 14.) The mind of the Congress Party is authoritatively expressed in the main resolution passed at Allahabad last May.

While India has no quarrel with the people of any country, she has repeatedly declared her antipathy to nazism and fascism, as to imperialism. If India were free, she could have determined her own policy and might have kept out of the war, though her sympathies would in any case have been with the victims of aggression.

Antipathies and sympathies are no substitute for action as an effective means of waging war. Such declarations, to say the least, are not likely to inspire confidence in the Congress Party's will to fight.

They are, indeed, calculated to have the gravest effect on the morale of the Indian troops. The future of these gallant forces would be thrown into the melting pot at the very moment of their keenest trial and finest opportunity. "It should be understood," wrote Mr. Gandhi in *Harijan*, "that the Indian Army has been disbanded with the withdrawal of British power." He told two American press correspondents that the disbandment would be "*automatic*" from the moment of the withdrawal. If by this he meant that the disappearance of all British officers from the Indian Army, including all the highest ranks, would automatically result in its administrative and operational collapse, he was speaking with an unwonted realism.

Assuming that it escaped total disbandment—a fate scarcely likely to increase the war strength of India and the United Nations—the Indian Army will not be galvanized and inspired by confidence in party leaders who have declared:

The present Indian Army is in fact an offshoot of the British Army and has been maintained till now to hold India in subjection. It has been completely segregated from the general population, *who can in no sense regard it as their own.*—Allahabad Resolution of the A.I.C.C., May 1, 1942.

The July resolution, which makes no mention of the Indian Army or other armed forces, does nothing whatever to mitigate the shattering effect which this doctrine of their disassociation from the Indian people would have on their morale.

Apart from the unrest and uncertainty in the Indian forces, the war effort would further be handicapped by the detachment of the British forces in India from the same higher command, by the necessary separation of states forces and thousands of Gurkhas from the Indian Army, and by all the other consequences of breaking up the present coherent system of military command, administration and supply in India. When Pandit Nehru says that the Congress Party's proposal seeks to make no change from the military point of view, he is not only flying in the face of its terms, but also revealing that he does not speak for the Congress Working Committee as a whole, certainly not for its all-powerful mentor, Mr. Gandhi.

On the political side, a handicap to the prosecution of the war would be the uneasiness of the communal situation, in default of a permanent constitution with solid guarantees for minorities. Even with a Congress-League coalition, the two major communities would eye each other watchfully, lest either take advantage of the other to prejudice the eventual settlement, while the smaller minorities would live in an atmosphere of suspicion, anxiety and maneuver.

Geographically, even if British India held together, a divided and therefore weakened India would face the enemy; for a declaration of independence would give British India neither legal authority nor physical power in the Indian States, which would certainly not join an independent British India, run by a combine of political parties under this Congress Party's leadership, unless they were compelled under duress to do so. Nor would these be the only sources of political weakness. The public services would be filled with restlessness and uncertainty, pending new guarantees of their position. Especially would this be true of the British officers in the India Coast Service, the police and other services, who certainly cannot be replaced during the war, and whose whole future would be in jeopardy.

To complete the picture of injury to India's power to resist

and repel the enemy, the members of the new independent national government would be for the most part totally inexperienced, not only in the conduct of war, but indeed of the conduct of government at any time. One-fifth only of the Congress Working Committee have ever held responsible ministerial office, and they only for a short time in provincial governments; nor is the high command of the other political parties much more experienced.

Already, even by assuming that the July resolution is not to be taken at its face value, we have been obliged to modify in one respect after another the rationalized substitute proposal, in order to turn it into a plan, which could begin to compete with British policy as a practical contribution to the war effort of the United Nations. Briefly, the Congress Party's proposal passes the preliminary muster only if it is modified in two vital respects. First, there must be no prejudice to the permanent future constitution, to the detriment of minorities, nor any challenge to their present determination not to be ruled over by the majority community. Secondly, allowance must be made for the retention of a unified command for Indian and British forces in India or on her periphery, and for the continued higher conduct of the war by the War Cabinet.

These were in fact the two main considerations which limited the degree of immediate formal self-government which could have been negotiated under the Cripps plan, if it had ever come to the point of applying this clause relating to the continued arrangement.

The wheel has turned full circle. First the Congress Party's proposal was shorn of its mere nonsense or its deliberate invitation to the dacoit and the invader; thus rationalized, it had to be further progressively adjusted to make it practicable and enable it to pass a qualifying test of effectiveness in helping to win the war. At the end, its honest and practicable remnant has been found to differ little, if at all, from British policy, which the Congress Party's attitude of negation has never allowed to be put to the test of practical experience and organic growth. That policy may be summarized as the greatest possible measure of *de facto* self-government for India, within the framework of the existing constitution, pending the building of a

new constitutional structure by Indians themselves, as soon as victory is won.

The two great limiting factors, which affect alike any plan for immediate formal self-government, whether coming from India or from Britain, if it is not to expose India to internal disorder and external conquest, are, in brief, the war and the lack of communal agreement. These limitations are not founded upon British imperialist needs but upon Indian needs and the needs of the United Nations. There is no reason to belabor them, for they are recognized by every patriotic and realistic India; but the precise way in which they affect the constitutional problem of immediate self-government is not always understood.

The defence of India in this context is not to be thought of in a static and local sense. India is an integral part of a world-wide system of offensive and defensive operations, of supply, transport and all that goes to make a total war effort. This system requires the most intimate cooperation among its different elements; nor can its control be bisected, though it can be shared. Hence it is that in two of the most vital ganglia of such cooperation—the War Cabinet and the Pacific War Council in London—India is represented by her own spokesmen, as an equal among the United Nations.

For reasons which reach far back into history, the bilateral connection between Britain and India for the conduct of the war is peculiarly intimate. Among those reasons are the presence in India of a great British Army; its unity of command, including supply and training, with the Indian Army; the large numbers of British officers in the latter, in spite of accelerated Indianization; the presence in it of thousands of Gurkhas, subjects of Nepal, whose relations for this purpose are with the British Crown rather than the government of India; the attachment to it of forces of the Indian States; and many others.

It was in recognition of these reasons that the Congress Party leaders, in a saner mood from which they have now dangerously lapsed, declared:

We had no desire to upset in the middle of the war the present military organization or arrangements. We accepted also that the higher strategy of the war should be controlled by the War Cabinet in London.
—*Letter from Maulana Azad to Sir Stafford Cripps, April 10, 1942.*

Yet the admitted need for a unified command of British and Indian forces operating in or from India, and for ultimate control of those forces by the War Cabinet as part of the higher strategy of the war, does not mean in the least that the connection is entirely one-sided, or that this great field of responsibility is taken out of the hands of the government of India. Such a segregation of military defence from the rest of government would be totally impracticable. On the contrary, though the ultimate responsibility is with the British government, *the primary responsibility for the defence of India in all its aspects is with the government of India.* That includes the whole duties of the Commander-in-Chief, who is directly answerable to the government of India, not to the War Cabinet.

If, then, the government of India is at one with the British government in pursuing relentlessly and with its whole will the complete overthrow of our enemies, and if as a rule it is prepared to defer to a trusted Commander-in-Chief in his own sphere, the ultimate British responsibility need have no tangible effect in qualifying the *de facto* autonomy of the government of India.

It is the same with the second acknowledged check upon formal, immediate and total self-government—the lack of agreement among the communities upon the permanent bases of the constitution. So long as minority communities repudiate the authority of the majority to control a responsible central Ministry, so long will a cabinet form of government be impossible at the Indian Center. For the essence of cabinet government on the British model, both historically and in current practice, is responsibility to the legislature. If this is impossible, the Governor-General in Council—which for most purposes *is* the government of British India—cannot set up as an independent oligarchy, finally controlled by its own majority. Until a new constitutional system can be framed, the ultimate responsibility must remain where it is at present—to the British Crown and Parliament.

Parliament, however, has made plain its anxiety that India shall have the maximum possible measure of *de facto* autonomy in her own affairs; and it will always exercise its responsibilities

in this sense. Therefore, so long as the government of India avoids injury to the rights of minorities, or prejudice to the future constitution, including the place of the states, the ultimate responsibility of Parliament need not be felt as a tangible qualification of *de facto* self-government.

The problem of the states is itself a limiting factor upon the immediate, formal self-government of *India as a whole*. For there is at present no government of all-India to which independent power could be granted or transferred. Authority over all-India, in so far as external affairs and defence are concerned, is united only in the British power, and in the person of the Viceroy so long as he is both Governor-General for British India and Crown Representative for the states. To transfer independent power to a British Indian cabinet or caucus would be automatically to divide India and to half-paralyze her war effort, which now pays little heed to state borders. The total neglect of this problem in the Congress Working Committee's resolution is one of its more blatant weaknesses.

To say, however, that the government of British India cannot have independent power over the Indian States is not to mitigate the *de facto* autonomy that it can possess, not only in the affairs of British India, but also in sharing and indeed leading the conduct of the war effort of all-India, and of other matters of common concern to India's constituent elements. In this it can actually be more powerful under the existing constitution than under a disjointed independence.

In brief, a government of patriotic Indian leaders, resolute to fight the war, and determined to subordinate all sectional interests to that end, can in practice exercise such a full measure of autonomy as to deserve in every sense the name national government. For such a government, the over-riding powers of Secretary of State and Governor-General, which express in legal form the ultimate responsibility of Parliament and the conduct of higher strategy by the War Cabinet, need appear as reserve powers only, which may never have to be used at all.

The chance of exercising that practical self-government is open to patriotic Indian leaders who are resolute to fight the war, and determined to subordinate all sectional interests to that

end. Such are the eleven Indian members of the Governor-General's present Executive Council. If the opportunity which they have seized for the people of India were taken by the leaders of the largest parties, putting the country's need and the country's danger first, and agreeing among themselves to co-operate, then India's advance to complete self-government in practice would undoubtedly go farther and faster than has been possible hitherto.

Such is the chance which the Congress Party's leaders, by their policy of negation and intransigence, have thrown away, in favor of an invitation to anarchy. Judged beside their own proposals, by the test not of barren sentiment but of effectiveness in winning the war, it need fear nothing at the hands of Indian and world opinion.

The eyes of the world are on India. The world knows that India's right to self-government, and to frame her own national constitution, is not at issue; that the British government has promised these things, and with them the right of her leaders to take their full part immediately in the government of their country and the Councils of the United Nations. India's choice is not between two rival views of her long-term future, but between two rival programs for the period of the war or until she can frame her own new constitutional structure. Her choice is between phantasy and realism, between a tearing down of orderly government and a building up of self-government, between emotional defeatism and robust common sense, between the open invitation to anarchy and the enemy, which the Congress Working Committee's resolution presents, and a united effort of leaders and people to play their part in the overthrow of Fascist tyranny and aggression.

AN INDIAN LOOKS AT THE INDIAN POLITICAL SITUATION⁵

It is sometimes suggested that there is a general impression among people in this country that the present Members of

⁵ From speech by Sir Firoz Khan Noon, Defense Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, Government of India, at Aligarh University, India, August 24, 1942.

the Executive Council are mere puppets in the hands of the Viceroy who issues them orders every day as he issues orders to his valet and every Executive Councillor has to obey those orders, in other words, that the whole administrative machinery is run by the Viceroy, and we have no voice in it.

Let me tell you straightaway that there is not one of us who would be willing to serve in these circumstances.

I have been in office since October the 3rd, 1941, and I can say this without fear of contradiction that on not a single occasion has the Viceroy ever overruled me or rejected my advice.

I was a Minister for nine and a half years in the Punjab government and the Governor there accepted my advice as he was bound to do under the Constitution and the same has been my experience with this Viceroy during the short term that I have been in office. He has acted exactly as a constitutional monarch would in the case of a Minister, and may I say that whenever I have had any talks with my colleagues on the subject, the experience of every one of us is exactly the same.

I hope that I am not divulging any official secrets when I say that on many an occasion there have come up questions before the Executive Council which some of us considered as being of a controversial nature. Not in a single case has the Viceroy ever vetoed the decision of the majority in favor of the minority and may I also say, in all fairness to our British colleagues on the Council, that in this experience of mine, every case that has come before the Executive Council has been examined by them objectively and decided fairly.

I wonder how many people in India realize that under Schedule 9 of the present Government of India Act of 1935, Section 41 of the old Act of 1919 continues to be in force under which the decision of the majority of Members is binding on the Governor-General, and I quote from that section:

If any difference of opinion arises on any question brought before a meeting of the Governor-General's Executive Council, the Governor-General in Council shall be bound by the opinion and decision of the majority of those present, and, if they are equally divided, the Governor-General or other person presiding shall have a second or casting vote.

There is a proviso to this clause allowing the Governor-General to overrule his Executive Council if the safety, tranquillity or interest of British India are affected and he does not agree with the majority, but in every such case any two members of the dissentient majority may demand that their dissent be reported to the Secretary of State, but no such case has ever arisen and it remains a safeguard on paper and nothing in this section empowers the Governor-General to do anything which he could not lawfully have done with the concurrence of his Council.

The British Cabinet in London are not protected by any written guarantee. There a practice has grown of letting the majority vote prevail in spite of the fact that the King has the right of veto. Here in India, too, a practice has grown (and under statutory provision) that the majority vote shall prevail. What use were the paper guarantees to Moslems in Congress provinces? The real thing is to have the power exercised through Indians who form a majority in a Cabinet which we have at the moment.

The vast majority of cases are decided by Members of the Executive Council without even the knowledge of the Viceroy. It is only in important cases that he hears of the decision of the Member in charge and only in cases where two Departments differ or when the case is a difficult one or of wide importance that it goes before the Executive Council presided over by the Viceroy. Eleven Members out of sixteen (including the Viceroy) are Indians and you can realize how much administration is now entirely in Indian hands. The eleventh Indian Member has gone to England to represent India on the War Cabinet. The Viceroy only holds the foreign portfolio and some special responsibilities under the Government of India Act, 1935.

At the time when Sir Stafford Cripps came out to India there were seven Indian Members in the Executive Council out of thirteen, including the Viceroy. We all decided to give the peace *pourparlers* the fullest chance of success and every one of us, including our British colleagues, expressed his willingness to make room for men who were representatives of our major political parties.

We kept entirely aloof from those negotiations, because our interference might have been misunderstood. Not one executive Councillor has the least desire to perpetuate himself in his office and our hearts pulsate as earnestly for the independence of our country as any, without exception.

The claim that the Congress Party alone contains all the patriotic Indians, we shall never concede.

Every Indian colleague of mine loves his country and his freedom as much as any but unlike some we do not believe in violence for the acceptance of our civil rights nor do we feel that compromise is unnecessary.

The Congress Party broke down the negotiations and among other reasons it was said that the Congress Party leaders wanted an assurance from His Majesty's government that if they were to take office, their decisions in the Executive Council would be accepted like the decisions of a responsible ministry and it is said that this is one of the reasons on which the negotiations broke down. They wanted to remove the power of veto vested in the Crown and the Viceroy. . . .

The Congress Party leaders were being offered the government of India and on some hypothetical question of difference of opinion in the future which might never have arisen, they threw away the opportunity to serve their country.

The power of veto is essential in all countries. It exists in England today. The popularly elected leaders of the public are after all human beings and they may do something which they might themselves afterwards regret, and unless there were a power of veto in somebody, incalculable harm could be done to the interests of the country. The rigidity of the U. S. A. Constitution will furnish many examples of this.

But apart from this written Constitution which gives the majority of the Executive Council such a strong position, most modern Cabinets like our own are not guided by rigid statutory laws. A constitutional practice grows up everywhere. Here, too, the practice has grown that the Viceroy acts nominally as Prime Minister and is guided by the vote of the majority of his colleagues.

In view of the existence of this practice, I feel that if any party wish any written assurances before they take office regarding the binding character of their decisions, that is carrying suspicion to unreasonable limits.

The thing always to do is to take office and then if you do not find things as you want them to be, threaten to go out, in which case, you would be in a much stronger position.

The Congress Party having refused to take office, some suggested that leaders of other political parties, e.g., the Moslem League, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikhs and the Depressed Classes should be called upon to take office, but even this on fuller examination was found to be unworkable particularly when we consider that such a scheme would not have had the support of the majority—the Congress Party.

It has been suggested that now that the Congress Party has agreed to allow the Moslem League to take office, why don't the British government accept that proposition?

Well, Mr. Jinnah has answered that in the papers in a full statement. The Congress's offer is: "Hand over government to Jinnah and let him win over the cooperation of other Indian political parties, including the Congress."

Supposing the Germans and the Poles were under a Russian government and supposing the Germans said to the Russians, "Hand over the government to the Poles and clear out of this country." No government in these circumstances could carry on without the support of the majority of elected members of the Legislature.

It is not the ministers on the government benches that matter but the persons who vote down the budget. The Poles being a minority in the country could either carry on as mere puppets in the hands of the majority or be pushed out of office at the sweet will of the majority.

Let us suppose for a moment that the government of India were handed over [to] the Moslem League today.

Could the Moslem League accept office and responsibility for the running of this government unless Mr. Jinnah were given a majority of seats on the Executive Council, i.e., at least 8 out of 15?

If he were given this majority would that appease the Congress Party and would the Congress leaders come out of jail and cooperate?

The Congress Party will go on shifting ground, objecting and non-cooperating until the government is eventually handed over to their party. The object of the Congress Party leaders is not that the government should pass into Indian hands, for it is practically in Indian hands already, but their aim is that by hook or by crook, the government should pass into their hands and this without their troubling to come to an understanding with the Moslem minority.

Let us for a moment consider what objections there can be to the Congress Party being allowed to take over this government on their own terms.

First of all, the Moslems of India will object and if the Congress Party succeeded in coercing His Majesty's government through the lawlessness to which they have resorted, that would be an excellent example for the Moslems and other minorities to follow. And if this country is to move from one lawlessness and civil commotion into another, what is to happen to the law-abiding citizens, to the economic life of this country?

If the political aims in this country are to be achieved by everybody by force, then can't we expect that the Moslem will fight and he will fight hard and he will use force greater than any force that the Congress workers are today using in India?

On the other hand, if the Pakistan scheme comes in against the wishes of the minorities in the Punjab, there again the minorities will be able to follow the good example of the National Congress and bring about disorder and chaos.

In my humble opinion, the solution of India's political ills does not lie in the philosophy of force (which the Congress Party in spite of Mahatma Gandhi's years of preaching of non-violence have at last started to use) but in the spirit of give and take and compromise.

Let us for a moment examine this philosophy of force to which the Congress Party have at last turned.

It will be agreed on all hands that there are only two ways—and there is not a third—of making India free, (1) by force and (2) by compromise.

The Congress Party seem to have tried the peaceful way for years under duress from Mr. Gandhi. The Working Committee members have always believed in force and we can only draw the conclusion that either the Mahatma has at last given way or else the Working Committee have decided to defy him. But they all seem to stand together remarkably well in the so-called Civil Disobedience launched by the All-India Congress Committee. When the Congress leaders said shortly before their arrest that this time it will be their last war, and that it will be different from their previous action, and that all will be over within a week, they knew what plans they had made but the non-Congress public who were accustomed to this non-violent creed could not fathom the secret. But now the thing is plain to everyone. The followers of the Congress Party had worked out plans carefully since everywhere the Congress Party's followers have done exactly the same thing.

They have attacked railways and other communications, burnt railway stations and post offices, destroyed post boxes and municipal buildings and lamps. They have murdered government servants. They poured oil over two policemen and set fire to them in Wardha district, within a few miles of Mr. Gandhi's ashram.

No government can allow this incendiarism and killing of human beings, and if the forces of law and order come into clash with rioters, the loss of mob life, if any, is entirely on the heads of those who let loose this demon of civil war.

The whole policy is senseless. How does it hurt England if Indian property is burnt and Indian lives are lost? It is the Indian taxpayer or citizen who paid for the construction of the property which is now destroyed by the Congress Party followers.

If the mills are closed the economic loss falls on us.

When the detailed history of this wanton destruction is written, all Congress Party men will have to hang their heads in shame. They should have realized that force of this description cannot win India her freedom.

The Congress Party have definitely shown to the minorities what their fate will be when the forces for the maintenance of internal peace pass into their hands.

Some are now beginning to wonder whether this creed of non-violence was only a profession for the period during which the Congress leaders felt that mob violence had no chance of success. Resort to violence now in accordance with a set plan which had the approval of all Congress leaders leaves no doubt that the non-violence creed has definitely been discarded.

One might easily say to Congressmen:

Have you for a moment stopped to ask yourselves if by the methods you are using now, by rioting and hooliganism, you will achieve your purpose?

Do you really believe that by attacking and molesting innocent people, by looting their property, by the destruction of public commodities and by the burning of buildings you can justify your claims to home rule?

I am certain that this is not the way. We want freedom, but with honor and in peace.

No party that has for its following an irresponsible mob can ask for any sympathy or respect. By these base and wicked actions, the Congress followers have put India in the wrong, and given the world a chance to frown at you, to dislike you and to despise you.

The law-abiding people of India are watching with apprehension your supporters here and in England appealing to His Majesty's government to make peace with your party while your hands are still warm and bloody with murder and arson written on your faces. I hope the appeasers in England have learnt their lesson, and that they will not repeat in India what they perpetrated in Europe by paying deference to might as against right.

You must realize that winning this war, this life and death struggle, must be our first aim. I know a little of what may happen to us if the Axis wins. Fascism is not just a form of government but a mode of living. Don't believe that you, laborers, villagers, soldiers and ordinary people, will remain unaffected. Nothing is sacred to our enemies.

No matter who constitutes the government of India, its primary duty is to keep internal peace and continue the war effort uninterrupted. . . .

An American journalist lunched with me the other day and we talked of Indian politics and the possible solution of our problems, and at the end, he remarked that ever since he had been here, he had found that in our discussions we went round and round and never came to any definite results. Naturally, a man, in whose country all sorts of races and peoples are living peacefully together, is astounded at the things that he sees in this country, and it is here that every Indian has to hang his head in shame that we as practical men cannot sit round a table and settle our differences.

The whole essence of political progress is compromise.

Where there is amongst men no desire to compromise, there will never be any solution of the Indian problem.

Up to now, I have never uttered a word on the subject in public, because I know that when feelings run high, it is useless to make any suggestion particularly when there is no possibility of finding a receptive ear. However, I wish to put one before you today. I feel that the political unity of India is a great aim which every Indian should have in view. If India can be kept as one political entity, we can be the most powerful country in the world, whether looked at from the point of view of economic resources, financial strength or defensive power. Having that point before us, we have then to find a solution which makes the Moslem minority feel that the new scheme of things is not going to place them forever under a Hindu raj from which there can be no deliverance in the future at all unless there is a civil war or a friendly invasion from abroad.

ANOTHER VIEW OF THE CRIPPS MISSION ⁶

I have long been strongly critical of British policy in India. I realize that Britain's evasion and delay is the primary cause

⁶ By Benjamin H. Kizer, Member of *Amerasia's* Editorial Board. Article in reply to the All-India issue of *Amerasia* for May, 1942. *Amerasia*. 6:233-5. July, 1942.

of the failure of the Cripps proposals. But since the commentary so largely endorses the utterances and policies of the Congress Party in a deep bitterness that makes their decisions seem far less wise than the occasion calls for, I am disposed to urge that the comment of the Western world will gain in value as it approaches impartiality. If we merely underwrite the surcharged feelings of the more embittered side, we add nothing to the settlement of the controversy. What India needs is to advance toward final settlement. Her mere rejection of advances, leaving the situation in deadlock, assuredly does not speed the Indian cause.

This letter seeks to look at the problem solely from the standpoint of the best interests of Indian freedom. Leaving to one side the vexed problem of the right to secession, it has seemed to everyone with whom I have spoken that Cripps' proposals offered to the Congress Party nearly all that they asked. It fell short mainly in its timing. The distinctions between full dominion status (with the explicit right to withdraw even from that into absolute independence), and absolute separation of India from Britain seem shadowy. But if I am mistaken in this, at least dominion status as thus defined is a great advance over the present subjection of India to British rule. Nothing could be lost to India by its acceptance, and much would presently be gained.

As to the timing, it is difficult to answer the British position that in wartime it is impossible to work out such a complex and difficult problem, and that delay until after the war is compelled by the exigencies of the situation rather than by British choice. Be that as it may, the Indians have been in subjection for many hundreds of years. What, then, is the burden of waiting for the two or three years until the war is over for the final achievement of all for which they have so long aspired, when their refusal means that they must wait anyway?

I realize that the Congress Party's refusal can be explained by saying that the Indian leaders are too much embittered by their wrongs to practice the democratic arts of adjustment and compromise, as the Western world is obliged to practice them. That does indeed account for the bitterness, but it does not

make it wise. And, until Indian leaders can rise to *wise* decisions, they cannot solve so difficult a problem as the freedom and independence of all India.

I think it must be conceded that Jinnah and the Moslem League have played their hands much more astutely than the Congress Party. They are in the position of cooperating with the United Nations both in defense and in attack, while the Congress Party withdraws into tragic isolation and non-violent non-cooperation. Thus the Congress Party is at a disadvantage no matter who wins. If Japan wins, the status of the whole Indian people will manifestly be more unhappy than it now is. If, as seems much more likely, the United Nations win with Moslem help and with little or none from the Hindus of the Congress Party, can there be any doubt that both the liberals of Britain and of the other United Nations will find it hard to prevent the United Nations from being more considerate of Moslems who helped than of Hindus who didn't?

The Moslem League may not as yet represent a majority of the Moslems of India, but by its program of active cooperation with the United Nations, its prestige among all the Moslems of India is certain to be greatly increased, alike by victory of the United Nations and by the refusal of the Congress Party to allow the Moslems to decide whether they want to be a minority in a united India or to seek their own will outside the jurisdiction of the Congress Party. It is hard to avoid the logic of Cripps' statement that "if you want to persuade a number of people who are inclined to be antagonistic to enter the same room, it's unwise to tell them that once they go in there is no way out. They might fear being locked in together."

Had the Congress Party reached an agreement with Cripps, it would have gone far, not only to woo to their side a Moslem majority, but also to discredit the claim of the British conservatives that the Indian problem is insoluble. It would much have strengthened the prestige of Cripps and the liberal friends of India in Britain, and would largely have obliged the British conservatives to remit the problems of India to those British liberals who are most India's friends.

But by standing out so unyieldingly for their full program, with no practicable suggestions to meet the overwhelming immediacies of war, the Congress Party has done much, I submit, to damage the prestige of their loyal friends in Britain, and to leave the whole problem of future negotiations with Indian leaders to those in British politics less willing than Cripps and his associates to deal sympathetically with India. Further, they have increased their tensions with the Moslems and other Indian minorities, and have strengthened the world impression that India is such a tangle of castes, religions and languages that her leaders are unable to work out their political problems among themselves.

What, then, should the Congress Party leaders have done? Something like this, I apprehend. They might have said, in effect:

You have offered us less than we are entitled to have. If we could wholly rely on your promise, inadequate as it is we should nevertheless be inclined to accept it, not because it is enough but only because at a time when civilization's house is burning down, we want to help put out the fire.

A bitter past, however, has taught us skepticism. We prefer to trust the two great leaders of China and the United States. If Chiang Kai-shek and President Roosevelt, in the interests of a united front against aggressors, urge us to accept your terms, and if they promise us to use their good offices to see that your promise is kept, promptly and fully; if, further, you agree that these two men may select jurists to decide between us any points of dispute that may arise, and you agree to abide the result of such decision, we shall accept these terms, primarily that we too may play our part in seeing that this war and the cause of human freedom advanced.

Such an answer would have stirred lovers of freedom everywhere. It would have placed all free men and free nations, particularly China and the United States, under deep obligation to India. It would have given the best assurance possible of a sympathetic settlement of India's claims. And last of all, it would have done more to unite India than anything else. All India would be brethren in the struggle, and the Congress Party's willingness to treat India's minorities with democratic equality would have done much to win at least a large addi-

tional part of the Moslems to loyalty to a united India. For even if one or two of the more recalcitrant provinces had stayed out, their economic disadvantages would probably bring them into a united India in a short time, just as our Vermont was finally brought to assent to our Constitution.

One has only to look at the course of Chiang Kai-shek to see how much wiser he has been than Congress Party leaders. It is widely known, I take it, that the Generalissimo and his wife have been deeply embittered by British arrogance and blindness, by which the Chinese have suffered quite as much in this past ten years as have the Hindus. But the Generalissimo has been wise enough to put his bitterness in his pocket and cooperate with the British even while the British were failing to cooperate with the Chinese. By this course he has won the admiration and loyalty of our people as he never could have done had he sulked in his tent and complained loudly. His country will profit greatly by it when this war is over, all the more so because the fall of Hong Kong and Singapore sounded the death knell of the old type of British imperialism in the Far East. That loss of face, incidentally, is quite as great a guarantee of British performance of her promises to India as any endorsement of the "post-dated check" by China and the United States could be.

A final word. Is it not plain that, in India's own interest, we cannot afford to justify isolationism in India, any more than we could at this time in the United States? Isn't it clear that isolationism of any people, or of any important group threatened by the Axis powers, in this great battle for human freedom, is a tragic mistake for that people or that group?

MOHAMMEDANS IN INDIA ⁷

Scattered amongst 206 million of Hindus of India are approximately 94 million Mohammedans. They have a widely different type of culture introduced and spread into India as a

⁷ By J. Chinna Durai, Indian Lawyer. *Choice Before India*. Jonathan Cape, Ltd. c1941. Chapter 7.

consequence of a series of invasions from the north and west which has taken place within historic times. The grand monuments of Mogul architecture stand today as a perpetual reminder of the vanished glory and domination of their rule. The Mohammedans claim that they are a nation by themselves with little in common with the Hindus, which is true, and it is this claim, by which they have sought for centuries to assert their individuality and independence at every turn and phase of Indian life, religious, intellectual, social, political and economic, that has created the serious "communal problem" in India. This problem not only fosters disunity and strife between the Hindus and Mohammedans, often resulting in serious riots, but has been a standing bar to India's political and constitutional advancement.

Hindu-Muslim antagonism is not analogous to the separation between religious denominations in Europe. Differences of race, a different system of law, a different culture, and the absence of inter-marriage constitute a far more effective barrier.

In British India, the Hindu population amounts to 151,000,000 and the Mohammedans to approximately 82,000,000 (1941 census). In two of the Governors' Provinces, Mohammedans are in a majority; their total in Bengal amounts to 33,000,000 out of the 60,000,000 which that province contains, and in the Punjab Mohammedans number 16,000,000 out of a total of just over 28,000,000. In the other seven provinces they are everywhere in a minority. In Assam they are 33 per cent of the population; in Bombay 20 per cent; in the United Provinces 15 per cent; in Behar and Orissa 10 per cent; and in Madras just over 8 per cent. In the Central Provinces they amount to only 784,000 out of a total population of nearly 16,000,000; and out of Burma's 13,000,000 (of which more than 11,000,000 are Buddhists) they number 500,000. Turning to the Indian States, the total Hindu population is 55,000,000, and the total Mohammedan population 12,500,000. Mohammedans are in a majority in Kashmir, though the ruling house is Hindu. On the other hand, Hyderabad, with a total population of 12,500,000, of which more than 10,500,000 are Hindus, has as its ruler the Nizam, who is a Mohammedan.

The distribution, therefore, of the population as between Hindu and Mohammedans provides one of the most serious problems for Indian statesmanship, especially when this question recurs in different forms and degrees in almost every part of India. The minority community is not concentrated in one part of the area, as Protestants in Ireland are in Ulster. It is mainly represented in the northwestern parts of India, and in eastern Bengal, but its numbers elsewhere are not sufficiently small to be disregarded, and not sufficiently large to claim the mastery of numbers.

On Indian soil the opposition of these two faiths is sharply intensified by religious practices which are only too likely to provoke mutual ill-feeling. . . . The occasions when Hindu-Mohammedan tension is carried to the point of violent outbreak have, unfortunately, not diminished since the Reforms. In the five years 1923 to 1927 approximately 450 lives have been lost and 5,000 persons have been injured in communal riots; these figures include some disturbances in which Sikhs were involved. A statement laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly showed that from September 1927 to June 1928 there had been nineteen serious Hindu-Mohammedan riots, which had affected every province except Madras.

The Report of the Bombay Riots Inquiry Committee published in August last, observes that at least twenty serious communal riots have occurred in various parts of India, the two Bombay riots alone accounting for the deaths of nearly two hundred persons. It is noteworthy that in Bombay, where Hindu-Mohammedan tension does not normally exist to the extent that it does in Calcutta, the origin of the recent riots was not communal, but was to be found in inflammatory speeches made by extremist (Hindu) leaders during a textile strike, followed by an outbreak of wild rumor and isolated murders, after which communal feeling was inevitably aroused.

The Congress will have it that the Hindu-Mohammedan tension is aggravated by the prevailing system of communal representation, under which Muslim voters form a separate electoral roll and choose their own members, while non-Mohammedan electors are grouped in distinct constituencies and elect

their own representatives. But the fact is, this separation actually reduces the chances of conflict, as the rival communities are not fighting against one another for the same seats, but each is concerned solely with selection from inside its own body, and there is no solid ground, therefore, for supposing that if communal representation were abolished communal strife would disappear. The true cause lies deeper and arises from conditions which are far more difficult to change than the mechanics of representation.

So long as authority was firmly established in British hands, and self-government was not thought of, Hindu-Muslim rivalry was confined to a narrower field. This was not merely because the presence of a neutral bureaucracy discouraged strife. A further reason was that there was little for members of the community to fear from the predominance of the other. The comparative absence of communal strife in the Indian States today may be similarly explained. Many who are well acquainted with conditions in British India a generation ago would testify that at that epoch so much good feeling had been engendered between the two sides that communal tension as a threat to civil peace was at a minimum. But the coming of the Reforms and the anticipation of what may follow them have given new point to Hindu-Muslim competition. A great part of the evidence given before the Simon Commission was on communal lines. The true cause, therefore, of the Hindu-Muslim tension is the struggle for political power and for the opportunities which political power confers.

The Congress will, however, have it that it is all due to the British policy of "divide and rule"—but listen to the exhortation of Lord Irwin (now Lord Halifax) when he was the Viceroy calling for Hindu-Muslim unity in a speech that he delivered at the Chelmsford Club, Simla, on July 17th, 1926. He said:

Let the leaders and thoughtful men in each community, the Hindu among the Hindus and Muslim among the Muslims, throw themselves with ardor into a new form of communal work and into a nobler struggle, and fight for toleration. I do not believe that the task is beyond their powers. I cannot conceive that a really sincere and sustained appeal by them to the rank and file of their co-religionists, sus-

tained by active propaganda, of the gospel of peace would pass unheeded. In the name of Indian national life, in the name of religion, I appeal to all in each of the two communities who hold position, who represent them in the press, who direct the education of the young, who possess influence, who command the esteem of their co-religionists, who lead them in politics or are honored by them as divines. Let them begin each in their own community to work untiringly towards this end; boldly to repudiate feelings of hatred and intolerance, actively to condemn and express [sic] acts of violence and aggression, earnestly to exorcise suspicions and misapprehensions and so create a new atmosphere of trust. I appeal in the name of national life because communal tension is eating into it as a canker. It has suspended its activities. It has ranged its competent parts into opposite and hostile camps.

Does this look like "divide and rule" on the part of the British? The Viceroy's earnest appeal to these warring communities is not an isolated utterance. There were other Englishmen before Lord Irwin's viceroyalty who, far from encouraging a split between Hindus and Mohammedans, actually strove hard to patch up their differences. Has not the present Viceroy (Lord Linlithgow) brought the leaders of Hindus and Mohammedans together with a view to their reaching some agreement in respect of their national aspirations? While there are these hard facts staring one in the face, it is useless for the Congress to blame the British as though they are responsible for the communal tension. I am afraid the sin is traceable to the Congress itself and its anxiety to dominate over the Muslims, and as long as the Congress shows an intolerant attitude towards the minorities, India is bound to remain divided. Is the British government also responsible for the split between the orthodox Hindus and the Depressed Classes? This again is clearly due to the intolerant and shameless attitude of the orthodox Hindus, and it makes one laugh when they are brazen enough to ease their conscience by conveniently laying the blame for a divided India on the British.

That the Hindu-Muslim tension is a creation of the Hindus and Mohammedans themselves was acknowledged by Mr. Nehru when he said: "India is supposed to be a religious country above everything else, and Hindu and Muslim and Sikh and others take pride in their faiths and testify to their truth by

breaking heads. . . ." Again, Mr. Gandhi did not think that the Hindu-Muslim tension was a put-up affair by the British, but that it was really emanating from within, and he was frank enough to admit that India would be unfit for *swaraj* as long as disunity existed between them. Here is his statement: "*Swaraj* for India must be an impossible dream, without an indissoluble union between the Hindus and Muslims of India. It must not be a mere truce. It cannot be based upon mutual fear. It must be a partnership between equals, each respecting the religion of the other. . . ." Listen also to Sir Rabindranath Tagore who said: "There is the Hindu-Muslim friction, which it must be the duty of our Swadeshi Samaj to eradicate by equity of treatment and regulation of communal interests—failing this, repeated disruptions will only weaken it more and more. . . ."

Who can deny now that the progress of India is retarded owing to disunity between the Muslims and Hindus? The only people who can remove the friction are the Hindus constituting as they do the major community, but unfortunately the Congress which professes to be their spokesman is so eaten up with its own selfish interests that it will not yield even an inch to the Muslims in the deliberations calculated to arrive at a constitutional settlement for the future of India, for fear that it might be dominated by the Muslims in combination with the other minorities, which might jeopardize its own political standing in India. The dominating tendency of the major community and its intolerant spirit must have been in Mr. Gandhi's mind when he said: "As a Satyagrahi I believe in the absolute efficacy of full surrender. Numerically the Hindus happen to be the major community. But even if the Hindus were in a minority, as a Satyagrahi and Hindu, I should say that the Hindus would lose nothing in the long run by full surrender. . . ." Again, Mr. Gandhi asks: "What does unity consist in and how can it be best promoted? The answer is simple. . . . It is best promoted by cooperating to reach the common goal, by sharing one another's sorrows, and by mutual toleration." It will be interesting to know, while the Congress has been dictating to the British and the Muslims as to the policy to be

pursued in India, to what extent it has shown the spirit of "surrender" and "toleration" so earnestly advocated by Mr. Gandhi so as to inspire confidence in the hearts of the minorities. The Congress cannot hope to achieve unity in India by mere arguments, or by wrangling with the British. It must be prepared to make sacrifices, and must come down from the pedestal of a dictator to that of a servant, and show enough sincerity and humility in its dealings with the citizens of India so as to enable the Muslims and other minorities to see it in a favorable light.

The Congress indulges in wishful thinking when it supposes the communal problem is purely an internal and domestic problem, and need not be a bar to the achievement of Indian independence. The Congress seems also to think that once India is independent, the government of the day, presumably drawn from the Congress ranks, can be depended upon to tackle communal questions successfully. This only shows a lack of appreciation on the part of the Congress of the mighty task that lies ahead of it. The Hindus, for over 3,000 years, have not succeeded in bridging some disgraceful differences between their own multifarious Hindu communities, and have been, besides, at loggerheads with the Muslims for nearly a thousand years. Who is the man among the Hindus that has the magic wand that will create unity in India in a flash, and make the Mohammedans submit to the will of the Congress? When for instance a man like Mr. Gandhi says the quarrel between the Hindu and Mohammedan is "coeval with the British advent" while as a matter of fact it is not so, and he himself has admitted it more than once previously, sensible Indians are apt to lose faith in the Congress leaders, and the party that they represent and cannot help looking on with suspicion at every move they make. That the Congress as a body is extremely idealistic, and ridiculously theoretical in its conception of Indian constitutional development, every Indian knows. That the leaders of the Congress are to a great extent irresponsible, and entirely lacking in political and executive experience, is also within the knowledge of Indians who have studied them at close quarters. One would at least like to credit them with a

certain amount of honesty and consistency in matters that vitally concern the public interests of India, and if these are lacking, the case for the Congress cannot but be lost, and it would be difficult for it to face the people of India and say to them: "We are your deliverers."

Is the quarrel between Hindu and Mohammedan coeval with the British advent? Listen to the Maharajadhiraj Bahadur of Burdwan (Hindu Prince). He said:

The fact is that the religious and cultural feuds between Hindus and Mohammedans go as far back as A.D. 1017 or 1018, when Mahmud of Ghazni conquered the then Hindu center of India, known as Kanauij, desecrated the Holy City of Muttra, and destroyed and pillaged many Hindu temples. Mahmud thus sowed the seeds of hatred and religious animosity which have survived through the ages, bringing a bitterness between the Hindus and Mohammedans which breaks out at any moment. . . .

The Muslims regard the Hindu-Muslim problem, not as a domestic problem, but as an international one, as they claim to be a nation and not a mere offshoot of the Hindus, and as such, they assert that the Congress, which is mostly of Hindu composition, cannot be expected to be impartial enough to administer Muslims competently or with justice. The British, of course, are in a dilemma, but knowing as they do the military strength of the Mohammedans and the havoc they are capable of doing to the Hindus when estranged, they have wisely resorted to the policy of "wait and see," in the hope that if the problem is as trivial as the Congress makes out, there is every prospect of an early settlement between themselves, in which case the desire of the Congress for the self-determination of India would become easy of attainment, as the British government has made it quite clear that the moment the Hindus and Muslims reach some measure of agreement between themselves, schemes for the grant of dominion status to India would be put in operation. Hindu-Muslim relations are the crux of the Indian political problem today. On the satisfactory solution of their differences lies the key to the future constitutional advance of India. If the Hindus and Muslims become

united, there is no question that home rule for India would be an accomplished fact.

This apparently serious problem, viewed in the light of the fact that the Hindus and Muslims did unite once, as evidenced by the League-Congress pact from the years 1916-23, seems to suggest that they are capable of combining again, but in that very union unfortunately were sown seeds of dissension which have widened the breach between them a hundredfold. That short-lived union dispelled whatever hopes had previously existed in the minds of the Indians that the Hindus and Muslims might be able to unite permanently for the common good of India. Never before have the Mohammedans been so insistent or particular about their separate representation. Never before have they advanced the theory of their entire separation from the rest of India with such force and vehemence. Never before have they so openly gloated over the resignations of the Congress ministers, or rejoiced over their subsequent absence from responsible positions in India. Never have they criticized the conduct of Congress so furiously and so bitterly. In a word, the Congress and the Muslims are now, after their short-lived union of seven years, as wide apart as the poles are asunder, and it seems as though nothing short of a miracle can bring them together again. . . .

It is now clear, if it was not clear before, that the obstacles to the attainment of home rule for India emanate from within India, as the political policies pursued by the Hindus and Muslims are diametrically opposed to each other, admitting of not even the slightest compromise. It therefore seems absurd on the part of the Congress to throw the blame on the British, venting its spleen against them by withdrawing its ministers from the various provinces. In the frame of mind the Mohammedans are at the moment, the creation of a Constituent Assembly as demanded by the Congress for formulating a scheme for the government of India is an utter impossibility, and unless the Congress "surrenders" its rights (as earnestly advocated by Mr. Gandhi) and readjusts its policy so as to ensure an all-around acceptance of it by all interested elements in India, there is no way of getting India out of the present political deadlock.

The Mohammedans have expressed themselves in unequivocal terms that they are prepared to fight if the Hindus cannot see eye to eye with them, and is the Congress prepared to take up the challenge? Such a clash has not—thank God—taken place so far, but there seems to be no alternative if the Congress insists on having its own way. For the Congress to fight with the British is one thing, for the worst that might happen to the Congressite in such circumstances is to be made a political detenu, when he automatically becomes a national hero and when he is ultimately released can live on the public for the rest of his days in honor and glory! But for the Congress to fight with the Muslims is a different matter. As Mr. Nehru said, there will be "breaking of heads" leading to a revolution, and when these two are fighting, a third power might walk in and hold them both in subjection for another thousand years. The position is a delicate one, bristling with all sorts of difficulties which has got to be most tactfully handled, and the Congress is most unwise in forcing the hands of the British at this juncture which might lead to disastrous results.

SITUATION IN INDIA ANALOGOUS TO THAT IN EIRE⁸

Just now differences of view among the United Nations are being revealed. Severe criticism of Great Britain, particularly of what is described as British colonialism and imperialism, has appeared in some sections of the American press and Congress. It is, in part, an echo of criticism which Englishmen themselves have made, and which other Englishmen have listened to, with more effect upon policy than is perhaps realized in the United States.

But if some of the counsel now being proffered were followed, it would not make either for Allied unity, or the freedom of India and other Asiatic peoples, or for ultimate peace between Asia and the Western world; and might easily ham-

⁸ Letter by Norman Angell, Author and Lecturer, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1933. *New York Times*. p. 6E. March 1, 1942.

string Allied strategy, perpetuating the very conditions of division and rivalry which explain the Axis victories.

May I, as a completely unofficial Englishman, who has lived much in America, who happens to have been during thirty years a frequent and severe critic of many aspects of British policy throughout the world, and who has tried to do his bit in the debunking of economic imperialism, make an appeal—in the interest of unity and cooperation and sane political strategy—for the facing of the real difficulty in this matter of colonial and imperial policy. For, after all, we do not solve difficult problems by pretending the difficulties do not exist.

I am certain that the immense majority of the British people, including the majority of the "ruling classes" (in using that term it is as well to remember that twice within a generation the government of Britain has been handed over to organized labor, in effect the trades unions) are now in favor of putting an end to imperialism in the sense of the rule of one people by another.

But if ever we are to rid the world of the evils of such imperialism—British, Dutch, Hitlerite, or other—the alternatives we propose must not be obviously unworkable, impracticable or morally unsound. They must not, for instance, involve a worsening of the kind of anarchy and Balkanization which has already put the democracies of Continental Europe at Hitler's mercy. Yet the alternatives implied in some of the criticisms to which I have referred would in fact expose us all—Asiatic and European alike—to just that risk.

It seems to be almost universally assumed that the whole problem could be solved if only Britain and Holland (the Foreign Minister of the latter country has just announced that foreign and military affairs will be "reserved" in the future autonomy of the Dutch Indies) would proclaim the independence of their imperial territories; Britain that of India, or Burma, or Ireland, or Palestine as the case may be. The issue is taken to be almost purely a moral one in which on the one side we have imperial power clinging to ancient privilege and on the other "peoples rightly struggling to be free."

Thus, in a recent discussion of the Irish bases question a New York weekly publication in its issue of Feb. 7 has this editorial comment:

The Irish are painfully aware that England has denied them justice and they are convinced that their age-old enemy has not changed. When England makes restitution for her many conquests, gives back Gibraltar to Spain, Ireland to the Irish, India to the Indians, loosens her grip on Egypt and other territories, it will be time enough to believe that she has turned over a new leaf. Until that time comes it is futile to talk of trusting a centuries-old aggressor.

That comment is more blunt than most, but it expresses in simple form the assumption which runs through so much comment—that the essence of the Indian, the Irish and similar imperial problems is a struggle between sheer power and moral right.

The real difficulty, of course, in the Indian problem is that the form of freedom or self-government acceptable to one section in India might be regarded as a gross betrayal of their rights and interests by other sections; and that to proclaim independence in merely general terms before some agreement on internal differences had been arrived at would be to run the risk of repeating in the case of India the present Irish difficulty in a far more serious form. "There are about fifteen Irelands in the Indian problem," someone remarked the other day.

Separation of Eire from Britain, before resolving the Ulster-Catholic-Protestant problem—an internal conflict within Ireland—has deprived America and the other United Nations of naval bases which were available to America previous to Eire's secession—a loss of power to us and an addition to the enemy's power, which may have most vital importance with the renewal of the Battle of the Atlantic.

If now Britain agrees to a Hindu-made constitution for India which appears to let down the hundred million Moham-medans of that country, the United Nations will be faced not merely with deep divisions within India itself, weakening the defensive power of that country, with, that is, the Irish and Palestinian situations on a vast scale, but, even more seriously, with repercussions throughout the whole of the Mohammedan

world, particularly in the vitally strategic areas of Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Iran.

For the countries of these largely Moslem areas to be led by bitter religious resentment, to take the line that Eire has taken—the line, that is, of ironclad neutrality in the present struggle, or, worse still of enmity to the Christian world—would be to aid the Fascist technique of divide and rule to such an extent as to render the victory of the United Nations all but impossible.

Assume for a moment that Britain had accepted the advice proffered by the anti-imperialist heretofore quoted, and had "turned over a new leaf," not merely to the extent of turning over naval bases to an independent Ireland, but had, as suggested, done an analogous thing in the case of Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Palestine, the Suez Canal region, Aden, the Sudan, Iraq, Iran, the colonies of the East and West African coast (the latter with their harbors so very close to the South American bulge), Malaya, Burma, India, the Pacific Islands on the approach to Australia. Suppose all those places had been granted "complete independence" in the Irish sense, an independence, that is, which is regarded as quite incompatible with any obligation to cooperate with others for mutual defense, each insisting, like Eire, upon the right to be neutral in "Britain's wars" even though Britain be but one among a score, and however defensive the war might be; the right to give hospitality to the agents and diplomats of the enemies of those twenty; as does Eire.

What would have happened to the "liberated" Gibaltars, Egypts, Malts, Palestines, African and Pacific territories, cut off from all connection with Britain this last twenty years? The reply to that question is to be found in the position of the independent states of the European Continent today: they would all be in Axis hands.

The Battle of the Atlantic would have been over long since. For Britain would have been overwhelmed. Her bases, harbors, shipbuilding and factory resources would, like those of France, be in German hands. As Britain is far less self-sufficient than France in the matter of foods, German pressure upon the former for "collaboration" could be that much greater.

A helpless government in Britain might be desperately trying to buy better conditions for the British people by concessions to the conqueror in the matter of warships and naval facilities. With the resources of the European Continent and of the British Empire in Europe and Africa in German hands, and the Battle of the Atlantic having gone in Germany's favor, with the Middle East and India and the command of the Indian Ocean in Axis hands, the Battle of the Pacific would have gone in Japan's favor.

What would have been the outlook for the United States? For the preservation of a free and democratic world? Does anyone, can anyone, deny that at the very least there would have been very great likelihood of the result as indicated if Britain had proceeded on the principle that it is politically immoral to occupy any but her own territory, and that respect for freedom demands that a world-wide system of association be torn to shreds?

It is true that those who demand complete severance of the ties between Britain and such territories as Egypt, or Iraq, or Burma or India, argue that if only complete independence of these units be granted and the existing organization be torn completely to pieces, the pieces will by some magic all come together again and work harmoniously for their common defense.

This was the argument used with great eloquence by the supporters of Mr. Chamberlain when in 1938 the naval bases of Southern Ireland (reserved for Britain in the original Anglo-Irish treaty) were turned over to Mr. de Valera's government. The gesture would, we are told, so conciliate the Irish that they would never dream of denying Britain the bases if ever she were in peril.

Mr. de Valera's very Irish argument was, as Mr. Churchill put it at the time, that the only way to unite the two islands was to dissolve every possible connection between them. In the last war, when Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, the American fleet had full use of the bases. Independence deprives America of that use.

But Eire merely illustrates a common experience. When the units of the Austrian Empire, instead of replacing the empire with a workable federalism, simply tore it apart and Balkan-

ized it, the resulting "independent" sections did not agree one with the other. They engaged in bitter feuds over a variety of partitions and each within itself had minorities ready to claim independence from the newly created government.

The fallacy of the idea that complete independence is the proper alternative to imperialism and will of itself solve the most urgent and agonizing problem that now confronts civilized man—effective protection against the evil violence of an organized criminal minority—is revealed, of course, most strikingly by the plight of the states of Continental Europe now conquered by Hitler. France, the Low Countries, the Scandinavian States and the other older nations had all been "liberated" from any imperial domination ages since. They were all free peoples, but their freedom could not be defended, however well they fought, because they all refused to create any real union for mutual defense. And that is just why Hitler was so easily able to pick them off one at a time. Because they refused to hang together it was so easy for him to hang them separately.

The other day the *Nation*, which has so often befriended Irish causes, remarked that "the fact that Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom is very probably responsible for Britain's continued existence, for had all Ireland remained neutral, the German blockade might well have succeeded."

The point about that observation is that if, as the result of Irish neutrality, the blockade had succeeded, it is not merely Britain that would have gone under, Ireland would have done so too. The proposition that a powerful nation should commit suicide on behalf of an unfriendly small and weak one may have a sort of lunatic-nationalist logic in it. But if the suicide will mean the end of the smaller nation as well, the whole idea parts company with the world of political reality or explainability.

Yet it is exactly the Eire example which is held up by so many anti-imperialists as the true alternative to imperialism! The whole subject will remain bedeviled by confusion and a fruitful source of disunity among the Twenty-six Nations, until it ceases to be dominated by two or three absurd fundamental assumptions.

One is that the retention of any ties between Britain and overseas territories is just a manifestation of oppressive imperialism on Britain's part.

Another fallacious assumption is that it is right and moral in a world where integration is so extremely difficult and disintegration so extremely easy, for any member of an old political society to insist not merely that it should get a square deal in the community of States—which it is entitled to do—but that its proper status should be one of "complete freedom"—freedom from all obligations whatsoever to other members of the society, although the world now knows that the price that must be paid for the preservation of freedom is the acceptance of those obligations—sometimes onerous—by which alone it can be defended.

If the story of human association tells us anything, it is that where all demand complete freedom, none has any.

It is a strange fact that so often the progressive who insists we must create a new order which shall be worth the sacrifices of free peoples wants the retention in international politics of conceptions which are very much indeed of the old order and which lie at the root of our present miseries.

The rightness of "absolute" independence and neutrality is one such conception. It involves repudiation of the moral obligation by which alone humane society can be maintained: the obligation of each to do his part in the defense of the victim of lawless violence.

To repudiate that obligation, so that each has to defend himself as best he may, necessarily exposes the great mass of men to domination by a ruthless and violent minority, since the minority can apply to the unorganized mass "the simple and deadly plan of one by one."

In the period of political evolution which confronts us let us talk less of independence, which none can have in any civilized society, and more of equality of right, which all can have; less of neutrality, which would inevitably deliver the majority over to organized violence, and more of partnership in the defense of law, by which alone that Right to Life for which we now fight can be made secure.

EXCERPTS

What the Prime Minister [Churchill] should frankly recognize is that he has a bad record in regard to India. He has to get back to the generous enthusiasm with which he supported the Montagu Reforms and to clear away the memories of his prolonged opposition to the 1935 charges. To myself, what he had to say recently about the future of India, as envisaged by the government, went far beyond the vague promises of the Atlantic Charter, for in supporting and repeating the pledges of the Viceroy and Mr. Amery he put his personal guarantee behind a plan that assures India the fullest freedom within the empire—a freedom as wide and untrammelled as that enjoyed by Canada or Australia. Unfortunately that is not the interpretation put upon his words by Indian publicists, or by some commentators in this country, one of whom asks, “does the Premier think Indians are children and he is their governess?”—*Sir Alfred Watson, Writer on Indian Affairs. Great Britain and the East. O. 23, '41. p. 262.*

When Mr. Gandhi initiated his first “non-violent” campaign in 1919 Mrs. Besant was a great figure in the life of India. Two years earlier she had been the President of the Congress Party, and had been interned by the government because of the extremism with which she urged her views. Martial law had to be imposed to deal with the consequences of the Gandhi agitation. When it had been suppressed Mrs. Besant wrote:

None, I presume, will contend that the government should look on while mobs murdered, wrecked banks, fired railway stations. Do they then think that it is more merciful to give a mob its head than to stop it at the very outset of violence at a cost of a score of lives, or will my critics say at what stage the government should intervene? Let us, for this time of danger, drop all criticism of government action and stand firmly against revolution, which means bloodshed at home and invasion from abroad.

Every word of that might be repeated today with emphasis.—*Sir Alfred Watson. Great Britain and the East. S. 19, '42. p. 13-14.*

One thing is certain: the various elements in India will eventually find their level by their own weight. If it does not correspond with this, any constitution which may be drawn up on paper before the British withdraw will have a brief existence. Take the idea of Pakistan; its realization does not depend on whether the British look favorably upon it or not. It depends solely on what military power the Moslems really possess. If they have enough to hold Pakistan against Hindu opposition, then, even should the British prevent its appearing in the paper constitution, it will be established by the Moslems as soon as the British are gone. On the other hand, if they have not enough military power to hold Pakistan against Hindu opposition, then, even should the British get it put into the constitution, it would be swept out of existence by the Hindus when the British are gone. The same consideration applies to the princes and to the Sikhs, who are now accusing the British of "betraying" them because the British have expressed the view that the Punjab should be allowed to separate from the rest of India, if the (Moslem) majority of the population so desires. The fate of the Sikhs, when the British have departed, will not depend on anything the British may have said or done.—*Edwyn Bevan. Spectator (London). Ag. 21, '42. p. 167-8.*

Critics of British policy in India are fond of saying that Mr. Churchill declared that the Atlantic Charter does not apply to India. This is such a prejudiced distortion, repeated so frequently with stubborn disregard of what he actually said, that we quote here the words Mr. Churchill addressed to the House of Commons on the subject on September 9, 1941:

The joint declaration does not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India, Burma, or other parts of the British Empire. We are pledged by the declaration of August 1940, to help India to obtain *free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth with ourselves*, subject, of course, to the fulfilment of obligations arising from our long connection with India and our responsibilities to its many free races and interests. . . .

At the Atlantic meeting we had in mind primarily restoration of the sovereignty, self-government, and national life of States and nations

of Europe now under the Nazi yoke and the principles which would govern any alterations in the territorial boundaries of the countries which might have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem from *the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and Peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown*. We have made declarations on these matters which are complete in themselves, free from ambiguity, and related to the conditions and circumstances of the territories and peoples affected. *They will be found to be entirely in harmony with the high conception of freedom and justice which inspired the joint declaration.*

—*Bulletins From Britain*. S. 1, '42. p. 14.

There is no Englishman today who would deny that in the past we have made mistakes in India.

We should admit these mistakes in all candor and regret them. It is fair to remember that the standards of administration of the eighteenth century were not those of the nineteenth, nor were these in their turn the standards of the twentieth—neither in India nor, for that matter, anywhere else. But, in a democracy, the final test of any country's conduct lies with the public conscience of its citizens as a whole.

We can truly say—as you can of your people—that the tests applied by our public conscience have steadily been rising. And by the light of the standards of today we see plainly that, in the past, things have been done in the name of England which have brought that name no honor.

But freedom for all beneath the British flag has been and will remain the aim of our endeavor. Yesterday, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland; tomorrow, I most earnestly pray, India may join their ranks. Over two thousand years ago the great King Asoka set up columns in different parts of India, on which he carved these words: "For what do I toil? For no other end than this, that I may discharge my debt to living beings." We, too, have toiled in India, for past and future generations. The issue of our toil lies in other than human hands. But if, when the time comes that we can lay upon India's shoulders the full burden of responsibility that has rested upon us—if then a like verdict might be recorded, I do not think that the British race could desire any

higher commendation.—Lord Halifax, *British Ambassador to the United States. Address at Town Hall, Ap. 7, '42.*

On what footing are we to remain members of the Commonwealth? Let Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru speak. "I suggest," he writes, "that our aim and objective should be that India be placed after the war on the same footing, and possess the same powers, as other independent self-governing units of the British Commonwealth." And he pertinently adds: "Let us, therefore, not dissipate our energies in the fight about the words 'dominion status' and 'independence.'" Our immediate task, he rightly suggests, is to fight and overthrow a common brutal foe. Here is the language of wisdom. It makes explicit what is implicit in the Indian consciousness. If Britain is defeated in this war, then the talk of Indian independence is an impertinent irrelevancy. The task, then, is to overcome the forces of evil which threaten to engulf the world. India must help Britain in a vital and total manner. No solution without that. The future of India, as also of the whole British Commonwealth, depends on the outcome of this war.

Such seems to be the underlying meaning of the White Paper issued last week. It may appear timid and insufficient to some, but, on the whole, it is fundamentally sound. It takes into full account the internal conditions of India and the chaotic state of the outside world. There is not the least doubt that it marks a turning-point in the destinies of India.

His Majesty's government admit, *sans phrase*, India's right to self-determination. After the war, subject to agreement among themselves, and subject to some safeguards, Indians are free to frame their own constitution. Here an all-important Congress demand is satisfied. More: we are told that "free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth remains the proclaimed and accepted goal of the Imperial Crown and of the British Parliament." This gives to Indians what they have always clamored for, "equality of status." In addition to this the government give a solemn undertaking that "they will welcome and promote in any way possible every sincere and practical

step that may be taken by representative Indians themselves to reach a basis of friendly agreement.

The road to home rule, therefore, is to all appearances left wide open by Britain. Who blocks it? Paradoxical as it may seem, it is precisely those who claim to be the greater patriots. Instead of studying the Viceroy's proposals and understanding all their implications, they have condemned them querulously. Which shows neither sense nor sensibility.—*Ranjee G. Shabani, Author of "Indian Pilgrimage." Spectator (London). Ag. 16, '40. p 163-4.*

Looking back at this historical incident, an important incident in the history of both our countries, I feel no regret at the decisions taken by His Majesty's government. I am convinced that they were just and that we have done all that we could in an admittedly difficult situation to bring about an agreement and a better understanding between the peoples of the two countries. It is, in fact, the past exercising its influence upon all parties that has proved too strong for us, and we must now leave the leaven of better understanding to work quietly towards an ultimate and satisfactory solution of the political problem. If we are to do this, let us at all costs forego the transient satisfaction of blaming others and of encouraging those very antagonisms which have been a major part of our difficulty.

I stated when I left India that, in default of acceptance, the draft Declaration must be considered as being withdrawn. But this does not and cannot close the door to that closer co-operation which we desire to see in the defence of India or to the solution of the problem of self-government after the war. It means that His Majesty's government have done their best to make their contribution to the solution of the problem both in the substance of the draft Declaration and in the method of its presentation to the Indian people. For the time being there is nothing further we can do. We must be patient and open-minded, willing to consider any proposals upon which the Indian leaders can agree. But we must concentrate upon our duty to do our utmost for the defence of India, a task in which our great American allies have generously come forward to offer

their help, a help which we and the Indians alike welcome and appreciate. Many of the Indian leaders, too, will do their best to arouse the Indian peoples in their own defence, and I hope that by cooperation in defence we may move a step nearer to the solution of our problem.

Of this I am certain, that the Members of this House, the British people, and all well-wishers of democracy the world over will continue in the hope that through a successful resistance to the brutal aggression of Japan the Indian peoples will reach their goal of self-government and self-determination without internal strife and bitterness, and that thus India will emerge as a great equal of the free nations of the world able to make her full contribution to the future of a new civilization after the victory of the Allied cause.—*Sir Stafford Cripps. Report to the House of Commons, April 28, 1942, on his mission to India. British Information Services. N.Y. '42.*

Perhaps the most strange outcome of the present alarm in India—for alarm there is—can be seen in the reproaches to the Home Government for failure to hold Singapore. It is conveniently forgotten that when, before the war, the Singapore garrison was strengthened by the sending of a small body of Indian troops the whole Congress Party walked out of the Central Legislature. Singapore was not regarded by its members then as what they now recognize it to be, the outer bastion of India's defence. Singapore was intended to be and should in fact have been a security against the penetration of any large naval force into the Indian Ocean.

With the fall of Singapore the nationalist press takes a new line. Now the government of India is reproached because in the years of peace India was not provided with military and naval forces adequate to make its defence secure. This is an amazing *volte face*. There never has been a year since Congress came into any sort of power when it has not attacked military expenditure in India as too large and beyond the capacity of the country to bear. The military budget has had to be certified again and again because the Legislature refused to pass it, although in actual fact India was spending a smaller sum per

head of the population on defence measures than any other country in the world, and but for the protection that the British fleet could afford her coast line was practically undefended.

There is no end to the inconsistencies of the Indian politician. Any stick is good enough with which to beat what is still called an alien government, although in fact nine-tenths of the things that matter in government had been transferred to Indian hands. At the back of all this criticism, much of it merely foolish and much peevish, there is the comforting knowledge that in present circumstances India will not be allowed to shift for itself. Every aid that can be given in its defence will be furnished. For Great Britain, as for India itself, the protection of India against aggression is of the first consequence in the war.

Yet up to the present there is no sign of the political parties getting together to ensure that the whole of the mighty resources of the country shall be utilized. In war the political leaders continue the game of cross purposes that they have pursued in peace. Mr. Gandhi, Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah may have had conversations with General Chiang Kai-shek, but Muslim leaders and Congress chiefs have had no conference between themselves. . . .

Little that is practical can be done until the Hindu and Muslim leaders get together in the same room and work out a plan on which they can unite to go ahead. Better would it be if they would agree to sink their differences for the term of the war and rally their people for full defence. Then India might begin in real earnest to make up the deficiencies in preparation that have marked the last two years.—*Sir Alfred Watson, English Journalist, formerly of Calcutta. Great Britain and the East. F. 28, '42. p. 5.*

I am frequently asked what the British government has done for India and why it does not do more. I hold no brief for the government and I can point out serious mistakes it has made. But others have written powerfully of these mistakes, while few have spoken of the positive, constructive side of British administration in India, so I shall confine myself chiefly to the credit side of the account. Among the things that the British have

given to India is the system of law courts which recognizes all men as equals before the law. This, in a country of many religions and many languages, and above all of caste, is a very important thing. . . .

The British have been accused of taxing India so heavily as to be the cause of India's poverty. Investigation shows that India is one of the least taxed countries on earth whether measured on percentages or by actual figures. The statement was recently made in the United States that the British took one-half of the produce of the soil in taxation. This is not the case. Such a statement arises out of a misunderstanding, a confusion between land revenue and produce of the soil. The different provinces of India have different systems of land tenure. A good many of these systems, like Topsy, have just grown. Bengal for instance has what is known as the "Permanent Settlement" where the landlords of Bengal and the government came to an agreement by which the amount of land revenue to be paid by the land-owner to the government was fixed for all time. The great omission in this agreement was that the amount of rent to be paid by the tenant to the land-owner was not fixed for all time. Whatever else the British have done or have not done for India, they certainly have brought peace. They have prevented the inter-tribal, internecine warfare. They have guaranteed to every man safety and protection. With the incoming of roads, railroads, water transportation, irrigation facilities, with the opening of Calcutta, so that today it is the largest port in Asia, great demand for the products of Bengal, its jute, rice, tea, indigo and pulses, have caused the population to increase rapidly. The result is an increased competition to secure land. . . . It is not by constantly remembering the mistakes of the past of either side and brooding over them in a spirit of vengeance, but it is in looking to the future with a mutual trust and goodwill that promises the speediest fulfillment of India's desire for the fullest realization of her own genius in complete responsible government. Each has much to learn from the other, each has much to give to the other.—*Sam Higginbottom, President of the Allahabad Christian College, American Presbyterian Mission, Allahabad, India. The*

Gospel and the Plow, Chap. 7. Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. '38.

It is essential, if any fair judgment of British policy at this juncture is to be formed, that the real nature of this Congress Party demand be understood. Congress demanded a Cabinet, not of elected members of a legislature, but of members of party organizations, a Cabinet composed of party members responsible neither to a legislature, and through a legislature to an electorate, nor to the Viceroy. In fact, it proposed a self-perpetuating autocracy which could be voted out of office by no legislature, dismissed from office by no overriding powers of the Viceroy. No other political or communal group in India would tolerate such a government for an instant; it would have subjected those other groups to a Congress or Hindu majority in that dictatorship.

That is what Sir Stafford's letter, in diplomatic terms, replied to Azad. But there was an even more crucial aspect which Sir Stafford, for sound reasons, avoided stating. It was this: the decisive influence upon the Congress Party is Gandhi; Gandhi is a sincere proponent of the philosophy of non-violence, or pacifism.

The Congress Party demanded an autocratic Cabinet with full powers. On any proportionate basis of representation the Congress Party, or that party plus Hindus from other parties, would form the majority in the Cabinet. Could Sir Stafford, could any government—British, American, Russian, Chinese—agree to set up an irremovable Cabinet responsible to and dismissable by no higher authority or no legislature, and in time of war face the risk that the defense of India would become subject to a philosophy of pacifism? Nehru, Azad, and many other important leaders of the Congress Party believe in active resistance, are vigorous anti-Fascists. The greater part of the rest of the Congress Party supports resistance to the Japanese. But resistance by what means? They have usually defined resistance as non-violent resistance. On May 2 the All-India Congress Committee voted 176 to 4 in favor of non-violence (it rejected at the same time Rajagopalachari's proposal for

cooperation with the Moslems). Let me be perfectly blunt—the risk of interference in the defense of India by believers in non-violence could not be taken with Japanese troops on the borders of India and the Japanese Navy in the Bay of Bengal. . . . The success of the mission was possible; if the Congress Party had stood by its own acceptance of the final form of the proposals, the other parties in India would have readily accepted them. There would have come into being a government of the principal Indian political leaders controlling through the Executive Council the great departments of state. This Executive Council would have ruled India by its own majority decisions, for that is the law of the existing constitution. It would have been subject to no use or exercise of the Viceroy's overriding powers so long as the Hindu majority did not impose its views on Moslem or other minorities and so long as the organization of the defense of India was not impeded. It would have represented the power and will of the great political parties of all India. In practice that Executive Council would have been the supreme government of India; so long as it resisted the pacifist wing of the Congress Party and cooperated fully in waging war in every sphere of its activities, there would not have been interference. The tragic disorders that inevitably followed when Gandhi and Congress attempted last August to stimulate a campaign of mass civil disobedience would not have occurred.

As M. N. Roy, former leader of the Congress Party and former member of the Third International, wrote in the *Statesman* of Delhi, April 12, "Britain's offer visualized the real transfer of the power to wage war for the defense of the country. Only the power to make peace with the invader, instead of resisting him, was withheld."—*Graham Spry, Canadian Member of the Cripps Mission to India. Nation. N. 14, '42. p. 504.*

The present crisis in India has for some time been poisoning American opinion against the British. The common belief is that there is a nation of people called the Indians who are clamoring for their independence but who are forcibly kept in bondage by the British. And in the popular imagination Mr. Gandhi is a saint, a hero, and a martyr, manfully struggling

against the British "oppressors." This belief is almost entirely false and absurd, and it is a falsehood which tends to have disastrous effects upon Anglo-American relations. . . .

I worked for twenty years as a British civil servant in Ceylon before I became a professor in America. Let me state a few facts. There is no such thing as the "Indian nation." There are an immense number of races in India and over 200 different languages. A Tamil from South India has less in common with a Punjabi than an Englishman has with a Hungarian. Next, there has never been in all history a united, self-governing, free India. Unification has come only once or twice and only by force of conquest—the British unification and the unification under such Moslem conquerors as the Emperor Akbar. It follows that to create now a free, independent, united India—which is Mr. Gandhi's demand—is a problem of the same order as that of creating a United States of Europe under one free government.

A common delusion in this country is to suppose that Mr. Gandhi's demands are the "demands of India." Mr. Gandhi no more represents the views of the whole Indian continent than some powerful party leader in the United States represents the views of the whole Western Hemisphere. Mr. Gandhi's party represents only the Hindus of British India.

In the light of these facts, what do the Congress Party's demands actually mean? The British are to go. Very well. But they cannot leave the country without any government at all. They must hand over power to some one. To whom? There is no government organization in existence to hand over to. The problem of India is the problem of creating one. And the Congress demands that it be a single government of a united India. . . .

There is nothing that the British government can do except preserve order and wait for a more propitious time. It has been suggested that America, or President Roosevelt, should "mediate." I see no objection, though I should have little hope of anything coming of it. But if such mediation is tried, let one thing be clear. It is not mediation between the British and the Indians which is wanted—for the British have already agreed

to grant any form of independence the Indians ask for, provided they agree among themselves. The mediation should be between the Congress on the one hand and the Moslems and other minorities on the other.

In all this, it is true, I have ignored the issue whether independence should come now or after the war. This is played up by the newspapers and by the Congress leaders themselves, but it is, in my view, a minor question. The real difficulty is to get an agreement among the Indian parties about the form of government. If this were solved, the question of the date would fade into insignificance, and would probably resolve itself.—*Walter T. Stace, Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University. Nation. S. 26, '42. p. 280.*

India is now an essential and vital part of the world front against the Axis powers. There are British, American and Chinese forces, as well as the Indians fighting side by side, to defend India against Japan. If the obligations of the British government to their American and Chinese allies are observed, we must ensure that India remains a safe base in and from which to operate against the Japanese enemy. We cannot allow conditions to be created by any political party leader in India which will jeopardize the safety of the United Nations' armies or air forces or throw the door open for the advance of our enemies into this new and dangerous theater of war.

That is an obligation not only to the British and American forces in India—it is an obligation to the Indian people themselves. That is why your country and mine find themselves both intimately concerned with the condition of India at this moment. Your sons as well as ours are helping to defend India and to wage war against the Japanese. Your policy as well as ours is to defend India. But Gandhi and the Congress Party have other views. Mr. Gandhi I have always regarded with respect as a great nationalist and religious leader. But I am bound to say that in the present circumstances he is not showing himself to be practical or realistic. Certainly the action he is now threatening—mass civil disobedience by his followers—is calculated to endanger both your war effort and our own and to

bring the greatest aid and comfort to our common enemies. Gandhi's views are not always easy to follow or consistent, but let me read two of his recent statements.

"We do not want these Allied troops for our defense or protection. If luck favors us, the Japanese may see no reason to hold the country after the Allies have withdrawn." China will hardly appreciate this.

Again Gandhi has said: "American aid amounts in the end to American influence, if not to American rule, added to the British. If the British left India to her fate . . . probably the Japanese would leave India alone." These are solemn words, and what do all of them amount to? Mr. Gandhi is not prepared to wait. He would rather jeopardize the freedom and the whole cause of the United Nations. He threatens extremes of pressure in this most difficult hour to win political power for his own party. There is not the slightest doubt that other large and powerful political parties in India are opposed to Mr. Gandhi's demands.

I regret profoundly that he has taken this attitude, and I know that the Indian people as a whole do not support him. He may gain a measure of support for his mass disobedience, but, for the sake of India as well as for the cause of the United Nations, it will be our duty to insist on keeping India as a safe and orderly base for our joint operations against the Japanese. Whatever steps are necessary to that end, we must take fearlessly. Once victory is gained, India has been offered complete freedom to provide in whatever way she chooses for her own self-government. But that victory must first be gained. We cannot allow the actions of a visionary, however distinguished in the fight for freedom in the past, to thwart the United Nations drive for victory in the East. The issue is too grave and too great for the whole world.—*Sir Stafford Cripps. Broadcast, July 26, 1942. Bulletins From Britain. No. 101:11-12. Ag. 5, '42.*

Now that the [Cripps] offer has been made and rejected, the American people, and even the peoples of India themselves, have a sharper knowledge of the inherent difficulties

and complexities of the problem. It is not simply a question, as many Americans supposed and as some Indian leaders still pretend, of whether "the people of India" should be given their "freedom." India is a maze of vertical and horizontal divisions. How can one find a solution that will satisfy at once the provinces under representative rule and the states under local princes; the upper castes and the Untouchables; the Hindus and the Moslems? Whatever questions may be raised regarding their details, no one can question the sincerity of the proposals brought by Sir Stafford Cripps. The fact that the All-India Congress Party rejected the proposals chiefly because they seemed to make non-accession for a province too easy, while the Moslem League rejected them because they seemed to make non-accession too difficult, is itself an indication of the effort of the British to adopt the fairest compromise.

Though the British proposals are doubtless subject to later discussion, criticism and adjustment, common sense would dictate their acceptance on at least a provisional basis. There is a disheartening unreality in the response of some of the Indian leaders. The reply of the All-India Congress Party, for example, is an insistence on points that have now become academic. It consists of the repetition of slogans that have suddenly lost their meaning. Indian leaders who have had no experience or training whatever in the matter insist that they be placed in immediate charge of defense. They talk of the "freedom of India," when, unless they cooperate fully with England and the United Nations, this may mean today nothing more than the freedom to be conquered. They choose a time when all of India may be reduced to slavery by Japan and Germany to insist on the immediate democratization of the states under the Indian princes. They have been trained in the habits of protest, and seem unable to change quickly enough to the habits of responsibility.

Strange as the notion may seem to them, many of the Indian leaders, together with their practices and philosophies, are the products of English liberty. The very principles to which they are now appealing were developed by the great English liberals. Appeals to such principles move only a people who themselves

profess them. It is true that the English have at times put leaders like Gandhi and Nehru in jail, but under the all-embracing despotism of Hitler or the Japanese, the Gandhis and Nehrus would never be heard of. The philosophy of non-resistance works only against a ruler with a conscience. Under the Nazis or the Japanese, such a philosophy could not get itself preached. We may be sure that German and Japanese publishers would not be printing any Indian works of protest.

Contrast the situation in India with that in the Balkan States. The British government is pleading with the people of India to defend themselves in their own interest. In the Balkans Hitler is now engaged in forcing the Bulgarians, as he has forced other Balkan peoples, to fight on his side in a war in which they have nothing to gain and everything to lose. He can do this because he has gained life and death power over the Bulgarian leaders, and they know he will not hesitate to use it. Neither Hitler nor the Japanese would ever make India anything approaching so reasonable a set of proposals as Sir Stafford Cripps has just made; but in behalf of whatever proposal they did make, they would not hesitate to murder thousands of hostages to make sure that it was carried out.

Only by now surmounting their habit of past distrust of the British can the Indian leaders face squarely the present reality of the threat of invasion and conquest by Japan.—*Editorial. New York Times. Ap. 13, '42. p. 14.*

India knows that there is not the slightest chance of an agreed provisional government coming into being on the disappearance of British rule. If they believed this, surely their obvious course would be to bring the members of such a government together now and let India know in advance to whom her fortunes are to be entrusted.

They know that for all their professions of zeal for the Allied cause they could not add a rifle or a recruit to the forces which India is putting in the field, but could only disorganize the whole of that splendid army of which India is so justly proud.

What we are really concerned with is not a demand which no one can take seriously, but the action which Congress had

from the outset resolved upon. For that action, acts of preparation had for some time been in progress. It includes the fomenting of strikes, not only in industry and commerce, but in the administration and in law courts, schools and colleges; the interruption of traffic and public utility services, the cutting of the telegraph and telephone lines, the picketing of troops and recruiting stations.

All this is to be done, so we are told, non-violently. But bitter experience has shown how easily the non-violent activity of excited crowds can lead to terrorism, riot and bloodshed.

The success of the proposed campaign would paralyze not only the ordinary civil administration of India, but her whole war effort. It would stop the output of munitions, the construction of airdromes and even of shelters against air attack. It would put an end to recruiting; it would immobilize the forces.

No worse stab in the back could be devised to all the gallant men, Indian or British, American or Chinese, now engaged on Indian soil in the task of defending India herself and of preparing, from India as their base, to strike at the enemy.

It would mean the betrayal of China and of Russia. It would mean the enslavement of India herself to the Japanese. That is what, in their recklessness and irresponsible desire for party dominance, the Congress leaders are prepared to bring about.

In the face of such a challenge and of such a menace, there could be only one answer. That was for the government of India to take firm, and above all swift, action to deal with its authors before their preparations were further advanced, or before the campaign could gain momentum. This it has done.

The leaders, including Mr. Gandhi, have been detained and cut off from all communication with those who were to have been the instruments of their wicked folly. The press has been forbidden to do anything that would give publicity to them or to those who may attempt to carry on the movement without them.

There is abundant ground for punitive action. But the government of India has confined itself to action which is essentially preventive. What they have in fact done is to disconnect Mr. Gandhi and his confederates, to cut out the fuse leading from

the arch-saboteurs to all the inflammable and explosive material which they had hoped to set alight all over India. . . .

The forces of stability and constructive patriotism will prevail in India, as in the world, over reckless, totalitarian methods and ambitions. When the hour of victory comes, as assuredly it will, then it will be for Indian statesmanship to make the fullest use of the opportunity to which we have pledged ourselves and to which we remain pledged to devise for India a constitutional framework within which she can live at peace and in unity of spirit within her own borders, and take her rightful place among the free nations of the British Commonwealth and of the world.—*L. S. Amery, British Secretary of State for India. Bulletins From Britain. Ag. 19, '42. p. 4-6.*

However the situation may develop in the immediate future, it is hard to believe that the story told in these pages is doomed to a tragic ending, provided that it lies with Britain and India and not with Germany to end it. There are solid grounds for a reasonable optimism.

First, the story, all in all, has been a good story. With all their failings and mistakes the British people since Burke's day have genuinely tried to fulfil their trust for the welfare of the Indian people and, during the last twenty years, to bring it to a smooth and safe conclusion; and "plain good intention," as Burke said, "is of no mean force in the government of mankind." It is all too easy in the short run to kindle the fires of national jealousy and hate, and easier still when race-feeling fans the flame. But a really bitter and lasting quarrel must be fed with facts. And in the long run, the individual Indian, re-reading the record of the past in the light of his own experience of the present, will know that the charge that the people of Britain have enslaved and exploited the people of India is untrue. *Magna est veritas et praevalabit.*

Secondly, while there are many good reasons why the old association of Britain and India should endure, transformed into "a free and equal partnership"—the common cause of peace and liberty, the common hope of linking Europe and Asia in one world society—there is no good reason for their separation, still

less for their estrangement. India, on her side, wants freedom, but, as the fate of other nations shows, the forms of freedom are illusory without security; and in what other partnership can India find as much security without abandoning one jot of freedom as in the British Commonwealth? Surely, then, she will choose to accept that partnership once she is convinced that the old embittering facts of conquest and subordination have faded into the past and that within measurable time she will be equipped, as Munro long ago foretold, "to govern and protect" herself, as much the mistress of her destiny as any nation in the world. . . .

On the moral side there are those immediate obligations to which the announcement of August 8 alluded. In the course of India's attaining her full nationhood, Britain must continue to give such help as India needs for her protection on the North-west Frontier and at sea and to do her part in upholding law and order within the country. She must honor her old-standing treaties with the princes. She must not assent to, still less assist in, the coercion of minorities. Those are, so to speak, the trustee's deathbed duties, the moral prerequisites of abdication. And no wise Indian can wish that they should not be fulfilled.

But there is more than that in Britain's moral interest in India. It is not merely negative. It is not only a question of maintaining peace, of keeping faith, of refusing to do injustice, while India is achieving freedom. That achievement itself is Britain's greatest moral interest. She is proud of the work she has already done in India. There are one or two black pages in the record, but, taken as a whole, she regards it as one of the finest chapters in the story of her island race. But the work is not yet quite finished. . . . All that Britain can do is to seek by all possible means to promote agreement among Indians as to the form of government under which they will take their place in the fellowship of free nations. The rest must be India's doing. —R. Coupland, *Fellow of All Souls College and of Nuffield College, Beit Professor of Colonial History, University of Oxford*. "Britain and India." Longmans, Green and Co. Lond. '41. p. 92-4.

Now that we are at war with the aggressors, these leaders and their followers are doing everything in their power to frustrate the war effort, not only by taking no part in it, but by clogging the machinery of government through their defiance of the law. In effect, therefore, they are playing the part not of neutrals but of non-violent allies of the aggressors, increasing their chances of victory and so of prolonging the sufferings of the subjugated nations. Hating yet aiding Hitler in the supposed interests of their own country, their position is not unlike that of the Men of Vichy, without Vichy's excuse of several million hostages in Hitler's hands.

The reply may be that this is not the intention: the intention is to resist participation in the war without India's consent. In that case, we are entitled to ask the non-cooperators: If India had been consulted, what would the answer have been, if you could have decided it? If it would have been "Yes," was the absence of formal consultation, even if a bad mistake, so inexcusable under the stress of great emergency that it should condition your whole attitude and turn you from potential allies of ours into actual allies of the aggressors, for that is what in effect you are? If it would have been "No," then, where is the consistency of condemning appeasement yet hindering and not helping war? If you would have replied "Yes, but on the condition of securing India's freedom and independence first," are you not guilty of just the charge you brought against the appeasers of callously sacrificing the interests of every other country to your own? Are you not refusing to forego, for the sake of other peoples, the tactical advantage which you think Britain's emergency gives you and the satisfaction of paying off old scores against her?

I know that the non-cooperators repudiate the motive of vengeance and the desire to exploit England's emergency. But can they really be exonerated from either motive? Why, for example, does the ablest of their younger leaders, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, refer so repeatedly in his latest writings to old and new injuries and affronts as "things we could never forget or ignore"? (Page 399, *Unity of India*, Lindsay Drummond, 1941.) Why, specifically in relation to the question of whether

India should help in the war, does he rake up the old story of the 1919 Amritsar massacre and of martial law in the Punjab as the things that "really followed" India's help in the last Great War? (Page 358.) Amritsar was a horror of which most progressive Englishmen are deeply ashamed, though there were other Englishmen who condoned it. The General who ordered the massacre was rebuked by a Parliamentary Commission and removed from his command. But were these the only things which "really followed"? Do all the steps towards Indian self-government culminating in the Statute of 1935, the promise of dominion status and the latest offer that the framework of India's future constitution should be drawn up by Indians themselves, really count for nothing, however much they may fall short of the full demand? And how else but as an exploitation of England's emergency can we view the revival of civil disobedience—abandoned throughout the years of the appeasement-policy, revived precisely at the time of our greatest peril, after the fall of France had left us to face alone the future of blood, toil, tears and sweat held out to us by Mr. Churchill? . . .

We do not blame Indians for putting India first. But in what sense are they serving her by resisting the war effort? Suppose their resistance were to prove the straw that turned the scale against us and gave victory to Germany, Italy and Japan, for Japan would come in in the East as Italy did in the West in time to share the expected spoils of victory. Would that mean freedom and independence for India? . . .

Those of us who are internationally-minded are, many of us, happier than we have been for years, in spite of the dangers and suffering around us. We hated the policy of appeasement, thinking it—as we think your policy—shortsighted, selfish and ungenerous. We foresaw the abyss into which it was leading us. We fought hard against it as it affected China, Abyssinia, Spain, Czechoslovakia. We were ashamed for our country. Now we are no longer ashamed, but passionately proud. We feel that if there is anything in the doctrine of expiation, Britain has expiated her sin.—*Eleanor Rathbone, Member of Parliament. Spectator (London). Je. 13, '41. p. 627-8.*

Consciously or not many in the United States sum up the quarrel between India and Britain in these terms: India wants freedom, Britain refuses to give it—and, the main reason why Britain says "No," is the vast economic advantage which she derives from her hold on India.

Both the statements are entirely and dangerously wrong. The problem in India today is not whether India is to be free but when and how. And the motive attributed to Britain, the bogey conjured up of the selfish imperialists holding on leech-like to economic advantages, is also totally imaginary.

Now, there can be no denying that Britain, for over two centuries, did derive immense and direct benefits from her hegemony over India. There is as little to be said for the doings of the East India Company and its immediate successors as there is to be said for George III, but let us examine the position as it is. What does Britain get out of India today?—

Profits on British enterprises; interest on loans; and the pay and pensions of British nationals working in the country, those are all the economic benefits Britain gets out of India. India pays no sort of direct or indirect tax, subsidy or tribute to Britain. What do these items add up to?

British enterprises operating in India—factories, mines, public utilities, estates, trading concerns and so on—have today an estimated capital value of a little less than £500,000,000 or, say, \$2,000,000,000. Their profit in recent years has been computed at £16½ millions or, say, 70 million dollars, per annum.

Item number two of British interest in India was the interest on British loans to the country. These were loans borrowed or raised by the government of India in London from the nineteenth century on to the year 1913 when the last India loan was floated on the London market. Several of these were for productive purposes, railways, irrigation schemes and so on, though the others were not so justifiably debited to India.

But together these loans amounted in 1937 to £276 millions yielding to British nationals a guaranteed interest of some £10 millions a year.

But, since the war, India has wiped out this debt almost entirely.

Britain and the Commonwealth have bought so much from India of raw materials and manufactured goods that we were able to build up huge sterling credits. With a part of these India has repaid over 80 per cent of these debts now and in a few months the entire debt will be liquidated. Britain therefore gains little or nothing any more by way of interest.

And, as to British nationals working in India, it may startle some of you to know that of a total of over 500,000 employed by the administration, only 2,500 are British, the rest Indians. In the highest administrative Civil Service there are 613 Indians and 585 British. There are, all told, about 10,000 Britishers in India making more or less comfortable livings.

The present economic stake of Britain in India—the vested interest—boils down therefore to a capital of about \$2 billions yielding about \$70 millions a year and pay and pensions for some 10,000 of her people.

And, as to trade, Indians enjoyed fiscal autonomy since 1921 and levies what duties she likes on British as on other goods. Her trade with Britain today is regulated by a treaty negotiated in 1938 according to which India gives certain preferences to a limited group of British imports in return for like advantages for her goods in the British market. India in normal times is Britain's largest buyer but Britain is also India's largest customer. Today, the balance of trade is overwhelmingly in India's favor.

A capital investment of \$2 billion and a living for 10,000 nationals is therefore the limit of Britain's present benefits from India and the most cold-blooded Marxist cannot surely see in that a sufficient political motive! Britain has about the same order of economic interest in Argentina, Canada and Australia.

Nor is this the whole story. India's defense expenditure has multiplied since the outbreak of the war as her armed forces rose from less than 200,000 men in peacetime to the present figure of over 11½ million. But it is quite impossible for the resources of the government of India to meet all these costs and so in 1940 an agreement was arrived at with Britain by the terms of which India is to pay only for the internal expenses of her defense, the balance being paid by the British government. Two thirds of the defense cost of India was met by Britain last year—about \$600

million. This year, the British share is estimated to amount to 1.2 billions. These two payments alone towards the defense of India, equal the total vested interest Britain has in the country today!

Let us therefore drop this bogey of sinister vested interests hiding somewhere in bomb-racked Lombard Street and Threadneedle Street, and thwarting a fair settlement of the Indian problem. I have no brief for the British and have much criticism to make against their former policies towards my country. But, in fairness to a much-tried people whose sufferings and privations I have shared, I want to bear witness to the genuine goodwill for the cause of India's freedom which exists in Britain today—and which has been growing rapidly in recent years. If, tomorrow, there is an announcement of a settlement of the India problem, then every member of the House of Commons will stand up and cheer and not more than a dozen would bother to ask on what terms the settlement was reached—not many more could understand the terms anyway!—*T. A. Raman, formerly London Editor of the United Press of India. Address, New York. O. 15, '42.*

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